Same sex sexuality and Islam in Singapore by NORHAZLINA BTE MD YUSOP



















NORHAZLINA BTE MD YUSOP 














A THESIS SUBMITTED 
 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
 







My most sincere thanks and heart felt gratitude to: 
 
My two supervisors, Dr Saroja Dorairajoo and Dr Carole Facuher. My deepest 
gratitude goes out to Dr Saroja as she gamely took me on when Dr Carole 
Faucher left for Japan.  Thank you so much for your patience, your insightful 
comments and your encouragement. Your steady, calming hands have staved off 
many a panic attack.  
 
My interim supervisor, Dr Maribeth Erb, who painstakingly took the time to go 
through my thesis and pointed out the parts that needed to be clarified and very 
willingly offered suggestions to better it. This you did with an exacting 
thoroughness despite the very limited time that you had.  
 
A/P Hing Ai Yun who very kindly granted me the extensions when I required it. 
Thank you for putting up with the seemingly endless streams of paperwork that 
have come your way, courtesy of yours truly.  
 
Dr Suriani Suratman who was kind enough to share with me her conference 
paper. I gained much insight from your work. 
   
The Board of Graduate Studies for granting me a research scholarship. 
 
The great staff over at the Department of Sociology, especially Ms K.S Raja who 
had to endure my endless incursions into the office.  
 
My family, especially my mother who had to put up with ever growing and 
increasingly messy mounds of paper as I progressed deeper into my work.  
 
To Hans, Louise and Isaac. Thank you for being such great friends. I love you all 
to bits. 
 
And most notably of course, my respondents. You endured my questionings and 
the long meets and were generous with your time. Your willingness to share a 
slice of your life was a privilege that I was most grateful to have. Thank you very 












Islam is now normatively seen as a religion with an uncompromising and severely 
puritanical outlook in its attitudes towards sex and sexuality. In Singapore, where an 
overwhelming majority of Malays are also Muslims, the role of ethnicity should be duly 
scrutinized as well. In this thesis, I will be examining the normative boundaries of being 
Malay and Muslim in Singapore and the impact that it has on local representations of 
same sex sexuality in Islam. Specifically, I am interested in exploring if homosexuality 
could be repositioned on two fronts: the theological and the political. For the first, I 
would like to explore how the Malay Muslim public and gay Malay Muslims themselves 
understand and confront the issue of homosexuality in Islam. For the latter, I am keen to 
see if the model of faith-centric gay activism that has been taking root overseas would 
appeal to gay Malay Muslims in Singapore. I will attempt to unravel the above through 
in-depth interviews with 14 Singaporean gay Malay Muslims. I believe that the face and 
thrust for legitimacy for homosexuality in Islam would take on a very different slant if it 
is to happen here. This thesis therefore seeks to uncover the points of difference behind 
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        CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. Introduction: 
Intersections of religion and sexuality have been explored often in recent times. We have 
experienced quantum shifts from the severely puritanical pronouncements on 
homosexuality to the liberal dictums which have permeated and influenced much of 
progressive society today. Academic dissertations which seek to explore the morass of 
emotions and politics which surrounds religion and sexuality are certainly not new. 
However, inquiries into the lives of gay Malay Muslims are rare. I qualify at the outset 
that this thesis makes no representations on the lives of gay Indian Muslims. This thesis 
seeks to examine Islam as understood by the majority Muslim public who are largely 
Malay. It also seeks to unravel the model of ethnicity (being Malay), which is an almost 
ironclad consequence of being Muslim in Singapore. The manner in which Islam is 
theologically understood and felt may be very different for Indian Muslims and could be 
mitigated by specifics in their culture which I am ill-equipped to unravel.1This thesis 
seeks to plug many of the holes that exist in this field. It will examine the current 
reproductions of Islam and same-sex sexuality among Singaporean Malay Muslims. 
 
The central theme in this thesis is of boundaries and control. My questions are two-fold. 
They depict the personal and political dynamics when framing identities and sculpting 
sites of existence. First, I am keen to explore the various dimensions of being gay, Malay 
and Muslim. Singapore is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic country, with the Malays 
                                                
1 The Indian-Muslims are often linked to the impurity of Indian-Islam which has been described as 
saint-centred Islam. (Mariam Ali, 1989:114) 
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forming a politically significant minority and religion is a politically sensitive issue for 
the government. In understanding that the state exudes much control over race and 
religious issues, what are the reclamation strategies, if any, of the Singaporean gay Malay 
Muslims?  Is the perceived triplex of disadvantage, being Malay, Muslim and gay 
keenly felt by my respondents? Or is this perceived triplex a moral hyperbole?2 
 
The Malay/Muslim dyad is one which is very much in operation in Singapore, both at the 
personal and collective level. The reason for this being that an overwhelming majority of 
Malays in Singapore are Muslims.3 Unlike the constitutional definition of a Malay in 
Malaysia where according to the Malayan constitution, a Malay is a person professing 
the Muslim religion (Islam), habitually speaks Malay and conforms to Malay custom 
(Gabriel 1996:47), Islam had never been officially defined as a necessary marker to being 
Malay in Singapore. It would undoubtedly remain within the jurisprudence of the Malay 
public. However as early as in the 1980s, there were calls for the incorporation of Islam 
to the definition of Malay4. This drive had become so complete as to lead the then 
Minister in charge of Muslim Affairs, Abdullah Tarmugi to announce: Islam is such an 
intrinsic part of the Malay-Muslim psyche that it is reflected in everything that a Muslim 
does. We take it as a given, we dont have to be explicit or be reminded of it.5 
Therefore, one sees the convergence of ethnicity and religion amongst the Malay 
Muslims in Singapore. The state has exercised considerable will in the moulding of the 
                                                
2 This was the central assertion made by Joseph Toh in his thesis, Muslim by Birth, Malay by Society, Gay 
by Choice (2002) 
3 At the last Census take of 2000, Malays constitute some 14% of the population and 99.6% of Malays are 
Muslims. 0.04% are Christians or profess no religion. Indian-Muslims form approximately 12% of the total 
Muslim population in Singapore. 
4 Refer to Call to Include Islam in the Definition of Malay, Straits Times, 9 July 1987 
5 Refer to Islam will still play a big role in future, Straits Times, 15 November 1999 
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Singaporean Malay, as I will show in Chapter Two. Its confluence with Islam has made 
its parameters of being even more regulated. As homosexuality in Islam is regarded 
with general abhorrence and regarded as a serious instance of moral turpitude, I aim to 
investigate the social spaces that gay Malay Muslims occupy in Singapore. I am also 
interested to find out the pathways of action that gay Malay Muslims undertake when 
amongst their own. Another important aspect that I would like to understand is whether 
gay Malay Muslims in Singapore are keen to adopt the agenda of faith centric gay 
advocacy group such as Al Fatiha. 
 
Al-Fatiha  The Opening  is an IGTLB [intersex, gay, transsexual, lesbian and 
bisexual] Muslim support group based in the United States, which seeks to argue for the 
right of the gay Muslim to exist without prejudice in Islam and Islamic spaces. It has 
established numerous chapters in the United States and it was seeking to hold, according 
to its website, the first ever conference in Indonesia in 2004.6 However, there has been no 
further confirmation of its purported date, time or participants.  Its existence has been 
lauded and vilified by various quarters. Given the popularity and persuasiveness of 
identity-based politics, I was interested to see if a similar model of action and 
organisation could happen in Singapore. Arising from this line of inquiry, I am interested 
in unravelling the focal points, if any [is it religion, ethnicity, a composite of both, or 
neither?], around which the Singaporean gay Malay Muslims organise themselves. It is 
relevant at this juncture, to insert the traditional and time-honoured traditions in 
interpreting and understanding homosexuality in Islam to serve as an anchor through 
which all the above are to be unfurled. 
                                                
6 See, www.al-fatiha.org 
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1.1 Same Sexuality and Islam  The Position of the Quran and the Hadiths. 
The two main sources in the appreciation of sin or praise in Islam come from the Quran 
and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet). The Quran encapsulates all the eternal beliefs 
and projects an unflinchingly true and constant portrayal of what was, shall be and must 
be. Muslims believe in its immutability and doctrinal supremacy and that this supplants 
all the earlier revelations given to Adam, the scrolls of Abraham, the Torah, the Psalms 
and the Gospel (Riddell 2001:61). The Prophets traditions and his sunna (custom) 
supplement the Quran, in cases where the Quran was ambiguous. [The] divinely sourced 
Islamic scripture, in the shape of the Quran and the Hadiths, provided the answers  and 
represented the only legitimate source of law and morals (Riddell 2001:21). This point is 
of great importance as latter day interpretations of sin and morality are often derived from 
these historical traditions and sunnahs.7 I shall begin the section with the scriptural 
provisions on same sex sexuality and then move on to the different (contemporary) 
cultural and political interpretations of the edicts. I shall discuss the general 
pronouncements on same sex sexuality and the (popular) inferences drawn from it. 
 
-The Quran 
There are seven references in the Quran to the story of Lot and the people of Lot, that is 
the Sodomites, 7: 80-84, 11 : 77-83, 21 : 74, 22 : 43. 26: 165-75. 27: 56-59, 29: 27-33 
(Wafer 1997:88). The oft-quoted line from the Story of Lot is How can you lust for 
males, of all creatures in the world, and leave those whom God has created for you as 
                                                
7 See Jim Wafer, Muhammad and Male Homosexuality in Islamic Homosexualities, (eds.) Stephen O 
Murray and Will Roscoe, New York, 1997, pp. 89-90 
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your mates. You are really going beyond all limits (Jamal 2001:165/166). In response to 
this transgression: And we rained down upon them a rain, so behold thou, how was the 
end of the sinners (Jamal 2001: 81/82). 
 
This torrential downpour of wrath was referred to elsewhere in the Quran where God 
concluded; The Mighty Blast overtook them before morning. We turned the cities 
upside down and rained down upon them brimstones hard as baked clay (Duran in 
Swindler 1993:182). The story of Lot in the Quran is a proverbial cautionary tale on the 
calumny that befalls anyone who sins. Lot was sent by God to admonish and rebuke his 
people for their smorgasbord of sins, the premier of which was approaching men instead 
of women, as well as of committing indecency, of being transgressors (Jamal 2001:14). 
 
However, despite the strongly worded statements on same sex sexuality, which stems 
from the story of Lot, there seems to be a conspicuous lack in the statements on the exact 
prescribed form of punitive action to be taken against these transgressors. And as for the 
two of you who are guilty thereof, punish them both. And if they repent and improve, let 
them be. Lo! Allah is Relenting, Merciful (Wafer 1997:88). Thus, if we were to sieve 
through the statements against same sex sexuality, there seems to be a yawning gap in the 
explicit directives on the legal position of Islam towards such same sex transgressions. 
The earlier statement on the clearest yet legal prescription for same sex sexuality, to 
punish them both is mild compared to some of the strongly worded statements towards 
other sins. For example, Sura 24: 2 specifies a penalty of one hundred lashes for zina, 
fornication (Wafer 1997:89). Therefore, in carefully dissecting the statements in their 
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entirety, it may be argued that while same sex acts are sinful, mere penitence to redress 
that transgression is enough.8 This conclusion does seem to be at odds with the certain 
perceptions of same sex sexuality, as a class of sin par excellence.9 
 
If the issue of same sex rights between males is contentious in view of its somewhat 
muted presence in the Quran, leading to a profusion of critiques, the theological position 
on female same sex acts shall be an even greater theological hurdle. Lesbianism is not 
referred to explicitly in the Quran; it does not have its eponymous morality tale. The 
existing corpus of knowledge and attitudes towards same sex acts between women are 
gauged from the Prophets sayings: the Hadith. 
 
-The Hadiths 
Hadiths are the secondary source from which the teachings of Islam are drawn upon. Due 
to the relative infrequency in which same sex acts are mentioned, the Hadiths are a good 
place to find out about contemporary attitudes towards same sex sexuality. Although the 
Quran does not articulate explicitly this condition of transgressing (either to attach a noun 
or a prescribed form of punishment for it), it is clear that by the time we come to later 
religious writings such as the Hadith, we have a specific Arab term, Lutiyah, which 
makes reference to some kind of same sex sexual abomination (Jamal, 2001: 67/68). 
                                                
8Ben Nahum, The Turkish Art of Love, (New York: 1933), 88 quoted in Jim Wafer, Muhammad and Male 
Homosexuality, New York : New York University Press,1997, 89  
9 See Mageswary Ramakrishnan, Homosexuality is a Crime Worse than Murder. TIMEasia.com, 26 
September 2000. The Head of Education and research at Malaysias Islamic Affairs Department, Abdul 
Kadir Che Kob, interviewed by TIMEasia.com characterized homosexuality as a crime worse than murder 
and that homosexuals were shameless people. 
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This redirects our gaze and inquiry into the sayings of the Hadith, where Prophet 
Muhammad was reported to have said: Doomed by God is who does what Lots people 
did [i.e. homosexuality]...and that no man shall look at the private parts of another man 
and no woman should look at the private parts of another woman and no two men shall 
sleep [in bed] under no cover, and no two women sleep under one cover (Duran in 
Swindler 1993:182). Thus, the relative lack of prescriptive material on homosexuality in 
the Quran vis-à-vis the Hadith has led some to argue that much of the moral anathema 
surrounding same sex sexuality was culturally constructed.10 
 
1.2 The Relevance of the Study 
There have been very few studies conducted on Islam and same sex sexuality. Studies 
which had been done run the gamut from a historiography of sorts to personal recounts to 
a semantic analysis of homosexuality in Islam.11 There is a need to add on the existing 
repository of knowledge to facilitate a more sustained and in depth inquiry into the 
subject. It also, more importantly, reflects the complex and variegated nexus of relations; 
religion and sexuality present in a particular context; in this instance, Singapore. On one 
level, it would show up site-specific particularities (Singapore-centred), which may or 
may not have immediate broader relevance or applicability but it does, at its base level, 
contribute to the proliferation of Southeast Asian-centred knowledge of Islam and same 
sex sexuality. As mentioned earlier, I want to learn about the applicability and 
replicability of the religious identity-based movements, which have been taking root 
                                                
10 This shall be elaborated upon when I discuss Amreen Jamal and Faisal Alam, who is the founder of Al-
Fatiha in subsequent pages. 
11 I am referring to Will Roscoe and Stephen O Murrays  Islamic Homosexualities, Badruddin Khans Sex 
Longing & Not Belonging: A Gay Muslim's Quest for Love & Meaning and Amreen Jamals The Story of 
Lot and the Qurans Perception of the Morality of Same Sex Sexuality. 
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overseas, ala Al-Fatiha. Thus, this thesis seeks to offer, in an indirect way, possible 
insights into the structure of same sex representation in Southeast Asian Muslim 
countries. The field of alternative sexualities in Southeast Asia remains largely 
unexploited, save for a few treatises on the sex trade in Thailand, its well-known 
kathoeys. Its brief and largely undignified brush with visibility in a Muslim context 
occurred with the infamous charges of sodomy leveled against the former deputy prime 
minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim.  
 
As patterns of change become globalised and intersect and while I am careful not to over 
overestimate the effects the western world may have on other civilizations, it certainly 
has ushered in a significant change in displacing private notions and public displays of 
sexuality. As noted by Drucker (2000:14), there was no overt recognition or any attempt 
towards open mobilisation or coalescing around same sex identity; the kathoeys may 
have had well-developed communities in Thailand, but they did not make collective 
demands, hold marches  let alone form political movements. The situation has 
changed much however. Those who were initially reluctant or unaware of the broader 
utility of their personal abstractions have now begun to more consciously mine its latent 
potential.12 
 
Abstractions of sexuality, ephemeral notions of difference can now be forcefully 
translated into patterns and pockets of active resistance and/or mobilisation. The attitudes 
                                                
12As Drucker subsequently notes (2000:25), the most important catalyst for action seems to have been the 
AIDS epidemic where activist groups were formed to educate the public on AIDS. Whilst conceding that 
these groups were not strictly speaking gay, [they] were in fact their countries first tolerated, largely 
LGBT public organizations. Closer to home, here in Singapore, a gay activist group, People Like Us, has 
tried to register itself as a society. However, its applications have been turned down twice. 
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of the various states of Southeast Asia vary considerably towards same sex sexuality, be 
it whether the conditions are structural or cultural. But the time is ripe for a fresh 
assessment of this region, long buried under and clouded by alien cultural matrixes, 
which paid little attention the nuances of the diverse physical and social spaces of the 
Asian inhabitants.  
 
The study is also timely given that the recent spate of cataclysmic events which have 
precipitated an almost messianic level of inquiry into all things Islamic. Admittedly, 
much of the scholarly attempts are not for furthering understanding of sexuality in Islam. 
But the byproduct of such exercises does impact quite forcefully, the reordering of 
Islam within many relevant and interested spaces. This has an important bearing in 
Singapore and upon the Malay Muslims here. In his speech at the Council of Foreign 
Relations in the United States in May 2004, former Prime Minister Goh noted that the 
battle against terror is an ideological one and that moderate Muslims must do their part in 
speaking out against such acts of extremism. The shifting in the onus of responsibility, 
either rightly or wrongly would not be for this thesis to analyse. What would be of 
interest and immediate relevance would be the subsequent institutionalisation and 
increasing structuration in the conveyance of the right Islam for Singaporean Muslims.  
 
The state, thus far, has shown a disproportionate interest in the elements that make up the 
Malay Muslim dyad. It had for the most part focused almost exclusively on the ethnic 
integer rather than its religious counterpart. I would argue that it had greater occasion and 
authority to do so, given the pre-eminence of ethnicity as a ruling and governing 
principle. Would the rash of rectification works impact on the subsequent moulding of 
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Islam and affect the availability of space for gay Malay Muslims? It may seem to be a 
tenuous connection to make; to link terrorism-related political machinations to same-sex 
sexuality, but the reality in Singapore is that it could very well be possible. The states 
reach and ability to mould a meta-world view for the Malay Muslim minority is ably 
buttressed by the quasi-official agencies whose reach is no doubt extensive. I will 
elaborate on these agents of possible change in the next chapter. 
 
Another reason for this study is the apparent change in the current of same sex rhetoric 
made by the rank of influential political leaders in Singapore. Former PM Gohs recent 
statement of accepting gays into sensitive positions in the civil service, at face value, 
seemed to signal a growing acceptance of same sex sexuality in the public sphere.13 This 
thesis serves as a lens into the world of the gay Malay Muslims who are no doubt part of 
the broader Singaporean society. In view of the flexible public stand of the state towards 
same sex representation, it would be interesting to see the extent of its influence in the 
subsequent organisation and mobilisation strategies of Singaporean gay Malay Muslims. 
Would state rhetoric override the traditional religious remonstration on homosexuality? 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
 
While there is relative lack of literature about Islam and same sex sexuality, there have 
been some notable entrants.  Will Roscoes and Stephen O Murrays Islamic 
Homosexualities (1997) traverses a wide expanse of physical space and intellectual 
                                                
13 Simon Elegant, The Lion in winter, TIMEasia magazine, June 30 2003. PM Gohs comments on 
accepting (foreign) gay talent was then picked up by the major dailies in Singapore with great alacrity.  In 
About gay tolerance, Straits Times, July 5 2003, the paper carried PM Gohs remarks, In the past, if we 
know youre gay, we would not employ you but we just changed this quietly. We know you are. Well 
employ you  So let it evolve, and in time, the population will understand that some people are born that 
way. We are born this way and they are born that way, but they are like you and me. 
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breadth, comprising literary analysis, historical studies and texts and an assortment of 
anthropological contributions. From the outset, it positions itself squarely and resolutely 
against the grain of Eurocentric assumptions of sexuality which have stood dominant and 
almost unassailable for too long. It also strives to carefully delineate the different forms 
of same sex acts that permeated much of Islamic societies then. This underscores the 
importance of differences brought about by varying structural, socio-political 
understandings and interpretations of Islam. However, the shifting conceptions of 
sexuality, religion and power in contemporary times have been unevenly explored. In 
examining the various permutations of same sex activity in Muslim countries, this work 
has neglected to show how that particular variant of Islam came to be established. A more 
detailed assessment in the coming, adapting and subsequent application if Islam to that 
particular space would have better served and illuminated the meaning of Islamic 
Homosexualities. That is, the process is equally important as the end result itself. 
  
There is also a disproportionate bias in the geographical and social spaces that it features. 
Many of the case studies are rooted in the Arab world and considerably less attention has 
been given to Southeast Asian countries. There is a brief mention of Malaysia, with an 
account of the civil society organisation Pink Triangle. Pink Triangle stands as somewhat 
of an oddity in Malaysia, given its Islamic state tag. 14 It has been a forerunner in AIDS 
activism and an active proponent for the rights of the transsexuals in Malaysia. However, 
the article only superficially deals with the issue of same sex sexuality. A more in-depth 
look at the various polemics posed by religion, politics and sexuality; with the civil 
                                                
14 The ex Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamed announced that Malaysia was already an Islamic state, in 
response to the religious-laced riposte launched by PAS; an Islamic based opposition party. Barisan 
Nasional Endorses UMNOs position, Straits Times, October 6, 2001. 
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society organisation serving only to foreground the debate (and not be the primary 
constituent itself) would have been more satisfying.  
 
Amreen Jamals The Story of Lot and the Qurans Perception of the Morality of Same 
Sex Sexuality (2001) offers an interesting perspective on Islam and same-sex sexuality. 
She re-examines the severity of same sex acts in the Quran by comparing them with 
similar crimes/sins. Semantic analysis forms the cornerstone of her arguments. Through 
the analysis of ethico-religious terms that typify a category of transgressions, she 
attempts to reveal patterns in understanding and conceptualising morality. Her analysis 
had led her to conclude that same-sex acts are no more inherently sinful or inappropriate 
than other moral transgressions. In that sense, same-sex sexual abominations are just 
another form of alienation from God, no different from than anything else. (Jamal 
2001:64)  
 
Amreen Jamals study then alludes to the possibility that the hardening of moral/religious 
positions was then a cumulative, crafted one. She points to the observation that the lack 
of definitive punitive pronouncements in the Quran is at variance with the specific 
prescriptions against same-sex acts as noted in the Hadiths. The hadith literature has 
managed to connect Lot and same-sex sexuality exclusively, thus influencing various 
interpretations of the Quran, perhaps also accounting for the later Islamic attitudes of 
same-sex sexuality (Jamal 2001:68). It thus alerts one to the potency of cultural change 
and interpretations which (may) have contributed to the stratospheric rise of same sex 
acts to the ranks of a class of sin par excellence. It provides a useful counterpoint and 
possible pathway to compromise in helping to reduce the moral histrionics which 
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surround same-sex acts. However, the harbinger of portent sin looms large. Thus, this 
complicates the possible platforms on which this issue can be mounted and presented. 
Should the debate centre on reformation and repentance? If so, what then is the 
possibility of accommodation and tolerance within Islam for categories of people who are 
clearly sinners?  
 
The above are works which analyse the configurations of religion and sexuality in 
contexts far removed from Singapore. Of late, there has been a sustained effort in the 
production of Singapore-specific studies. As the social borders of Singapore become 
more permeable to change with regards to sexuality, works eager to document and 
analyse such social shifts will certainly appear. I focus my attention, firstly, on select 
works which deal with the gay Singaporeans at large, secondly, on expositions which 
showcase religion criss-crossing with sexuality and, lastly, on works which seek to 
document the broad patterning of social relationships in relation to the state, with specific 
attention on civil society and mobilisation strategies in Singapore. 
 
Under the first rubric, I will be looking at a work about gay Singaporeans in general: 
Kartini Abdul Rahmans thesis on Lesbians in Singapore (2001). Her interest lies in 
unraveling the dimensions of community as understood, translated and ratified in the 
largely closed, same-sex spaces of lesbians in Singapore. This she showcases through the 
multi-faceted appropriation and reclamation strategies of the lesbian community in both 
the constructed and real spaces available here. For example, she highlights the 
proliferation and the pull of gay Internet forums and also the mushrooming of family 
friendly bars and clubs. Her work is an intimate and thoughtful exploration into the 
 14 
everyday negotiations of a lesbian within Singapore, while grappling with the nebulous 
notions of identity and community. 
 
However, as her focus is on the lesbian community, her notions of identity and 
community begin and end with the women themselves. Thus, although one gets 
compelling and probing vignettes of the lesbian community in Singapore, it focuses 
largely on individual actions which are independent of larger-level considerations that 
may have had a considerable impact on how identity is understood and constructed. 
Thus, an important issue such as labelling, (butch/femme) is taken as an is, rather 
than a why-so.  
 
Isaac Kangs Singapore Sexual Exiles (2001) and Roger Winders I am Gay: Language 
and Identity in a Marginalized Community in Singapore (1994) explores the responses of 
gay Singaporeans who find themselves at odds with strait laced Singapore. The first work 
delves deep into issues of sexual citizenship and identity transformations of these 
Singaporeans who have chosen to call another place home. Through these vignettes, 
Kang explores the lack of gay rights and the constraints (both official and personal) 
operating on his respondents and documents the migration experiences of these 
individuals. He argues that despite the (blatant) discrimination that exists in these foreign 
sites (usually due to their ethnic minority status), these sojourns abroad have often 
empowered these individuals as they have experienced self realization and gain[ed] 
awareness of the inequalities arising from discrimination (2001:89). He dissects the 
varied influences that sexual, ethnic and national identities of these migrants have had on 
their subsequent intimations of what home is.  His work echoes the key concerns of this 
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thesis as I explore the varied workings that faith, ethnicity and sexuality have had on my 
respondents as they navigate through life as gay Malay Muslim Singaporeans. 
 
Winder looks at how language has been utilized by gay male Singaporeans. Language 
signifies their status as a marginalized minority and yet doubles up as a tool for their 
empowerment. This is as language can be exploited to build a sense of shared identity 
and also be mined to devise linguistic smoke mirrors to prevent detection by the 
potentially hostile heterosexual majority. His work conveys the sense of insecurity that 
pervaded the gay spaces of Singapore and is a useful lens back into time (the early 1990s) 
where gay parlance had not entered mainstream consciousness and where public 
presentation of homosexuality was remote (1994:36). This is in marked contrast to Lim 
Kian Fans observations in his work, Where Love dares (not) speak its name: The Spatial 
Expression of Homosexuality in Singapore (2003). In it, he contends that the 
heteronormative norms of Singapore have pervaded and organized much of its physical 
spaces (2003:29). Lim notes that while there is little by way of an organized 
public/political gay (rights) movement that would challenge the heterosexist leanings of 
the state, there has been a quiet revolution taking place spatially in Singapore. This sets 
the current backdrop for the present discussion on homosexuality in Singapore where 
public representation of homosexuality is strong spatially but almost void politically. This 
will figure very prominently when this thesis discusses the possibility of faith centric gay 
advocacy groups setting up base here in Singapore. 
 
People Like Us: Sexual Minorities in Singapore (Lo & Guoqin 2003) is a compilation of 
various responses to gay-themed issues. It gives a concise thumbnail sketch on gay 
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Singaporeans. Activist opinion pieces co-exist quite peacefully and logically with 
personal ethnographies, forum transcripts and various other articles on same-sex 
sexuality. Admittedly, given its varied breadth, there cannot be any sustained angle of 
deep analysis, but it carries deep symbolic value. It is a communitarian-based effort, 
arising from the wishes of two persons who wanted to document the living 
histories/realities of gay Singaporeans. At the book launch, a modest affair by any literary 
standards, I felt an atmosphere of pride among those who had a part to play in the 
development of the book.  The book readily admitted its shortcomings. It was not able to 
document the process behind the heightened gay presence (spatially), oral histories and 
secure a review of published works on same-sex matters in Singapore. (Lo 2003:3). The 
book, despite its shortcomings, offered a prescient look at the present state of same-sex 
issues here. In one article pondering the way ahead for the gay movement, the author 
highlighted the need for social capital in the gay fraternity and the need for a key 
demonstration of the gay sectors non-threatening potential so as to win over the 
heterosexual majority (Birch in Lo 2003:10). This benefit-driven and utility-based 
strategy of acceptance is reflective of the states attitudes towards homosexuality and it is 
similarly indicative of a more sophisticated and nuanced approach by gay Singaporeans 
in gunning for acceptance within broader society. In the same breath, Birch also 
underscored the importance of recognising difference that exists within the gay ranks of 
Singapore. This reflects a growing awareness of the multi-faceted nature of its existence 
and also a growing confidence.  
 
Under the second rubric, I will highlight Joseph Tohs Muslim by Birth, Malay by society, 
Gay by Choice (2002). This work offers an intimate glimpse into the lives of 11 Malay-
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Muslim gay males who flit between various spheres of existence; as prescribed by their 
ethnic and religious categories. In his study, Toh seeks to unravel the triplex of 
disadvantage which arises over their three spheres of being; ethnicity, religion and 
sexuality. Thus, the primary focus of his study is on adaptive strategies of the gay Malay 
Muslim male as he travels across the many borders of his existence. The gay Malay is 
unfairly disadvantaged against within the prevailing socio-cultural sensibilities of 
Singapore. He is conventionally less economically successful and less physically 
desirable when pegged to certain standards of beauty present in gay Singapore. The gay 
Muslim feels trapped within the conventional dictum in Islam, from which there is no 
reprieve. And the gay anyone is unfairly repressed in Singapore, with its stifling brand of 
moral puritanism. Arising from this line of analysis, the social stereotypes which are 
unfairly clotted with a particular ethnic/religious category are given their due airing.  
 
Toh showcases these disadvantages at work in various social situations, with families and 
friends and with strangers. While his observations are generally true, as borne out by my 
gay male Muslim respondents themselves, as they have been rebuffed in their attempts to 
forge relationships with others due to their phenotypical appearance, such a 
disadvantage is one which is almost exclusively tied to notions of beauty, which are 
contentious and injures almost everyone in any given social situation, gay or otherwise. 
Whilst the gay world may seem to be especially hostile to one of a particular colour or 
creed, there are numerous integers at work in this web of desirability; with ethnicity 
simply being one. To attribute singular dominance to this factor would be a simplistic 
reduction of the disadvantage that gay Malay Muslims face. 
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 The study does not address the larger discourse which pervades the Malay/Muslim life in 
Singapore. It is necessary to separate what are notions of disadvantage as operationalised 
and understood within gay circles here. These are often guided by considerations which 
emanate from far beyond Singapore [no one can say Singapore is a fore-runner in all 
things gay]. Toh fails to investigate the specific outcomes which result from policies or 
rhetoric that the state or state sanctioned agencies have put in place with regards to being 
Malay, Muslim and gay in Singapore.  
 
Under the third rubric, I will focus on works which have analysed the patterning of state-
society relations. This is useful in placing the gay Singaporean vis-à-vis the bureaucracy 
and broader society. As the agitation for formal, public representation becomes more 
pressing in certain quarters of gay circles here, the role of civil society and ideas of public 
versus private space become prime topics for discussion. Laurence Wai-Teng Leongs 
articles, Walking the Tightrope: The Role of Actions for AIDS in the Provision of Social 
Services in Singapore (1995) and The Sociolegal Control of Homosexuality in Singapore 
(1997) provide key observations and insights in the nascent growth of a civil society 
movement and the hurdles that lay in wait. AFA, Action for AIDS, walks a tightrope  
balancing its primary mission of raising public awareness and public education on AIDS 
with its secondary objective of normalising certain sexual activities and behaviours.  
By that I mean it attempts to foster a culture of non-discrimination regarding sexual 
practices, as its overriding aim would be the realisation of safe sex. In line with its 
mission to normalise and de-stigmatise, it is then a natural choice for many socially 
conscious gays to volunteer their time, services and expertise. Leong Wai Teong notes: 
It has initiated and supported artistic, cultural and social events of a gay nature that can 
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barely be legitimate if not framed in the logic of health and Aids education. (Leong, 
1995: 20) As Jamelia, a volunteer for AFA told me:  
Come on, we all know that the transmission of AIDS from women to women is 
extremely low, but with title like, WSM  women who have sex with women  
it is only acceptable if it is medicalised!  
 
In the Sociolegal Control of Homosexuality, Leong artfully presents the socio-legal 
minefield which lies in wait for any act which is deemed prejudicial to public interest, 
like same-sex sexuality. He gives an overview of how homosexuality is muscled out of 
the public sphere and in the same vein, how it invites legal and social recriminations. 
Singapore has inherited the colonial system of punitive governance. Section 377A 
specifically prescribes the penalty for same sex acts, perpetrated by men. While it is 
essentially a piece on penal governance, it does reveal the antiquated attitudes of the state 
with regard to same-sex sexuality.  
 
This would reflect the general reluctance of the state to allow visible and legal 
representation of homosexuality in the public sphere.  As such, the fight for 
representation and legitimacy has taken flight from concrete physical spaces to its virtual 
environs. The first sustained inquiry into the use of the Internet by gay Singaporeans was 
undertaken by Ng Kin Kang and his treatise on the above, The Rainbow Connection: the 
Internet and the Singapore gay community (1999). The Internet as the frontier for 
unrestrained expression has taken root in Singapore. Ng shows the potential of the 
Internet and the clear benefits it has brought to many who were afraid to step out. The 
Internet offers anonymity and allows for the development of relationships, which are 
generally free from pressure and expectations.  
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However, Ng focused almost exclusively on the social potential of the Internet; personal 
empowerment. While it can be argued that a collectivist fight must necessarily start from 
a personal identification to the cause, the book did not document whether the rush to the 
Internet was of any use to the fledgling gay movement in Singapore. Such a manner of 
questioning would certainly open up the field for a more accurate depiction of the 
contribution of the Internet to the local gay movement. In view of the current 
impracticability of setting up a physical presence in Singapore, would a virtual presence 
be enough to ensure its relevance and future existence? By cannily redirecting the gay 
fight to the Internet, the state had provided a semblance of an outlet for free 
expression. But with no physical outlet, it may not be sustained. By glossing over the real 
implications over the limitation of the Internet to purely social networks, the book did not 
fully take in the context of the broader why behind the wide allure of the Internet. It was 
because the right to exist outside it had been constantly denied. And in so doing, would a 
virtual presence be adequate or would it merely be a hollow concession? 
 
Another recent work of considerable influence and import is Dennis Altmans Global Sex 
(2001). Altman carefully considers the impact of globalisation on the fashioning of 
sexual identities. He argues that there is an interconnectedness underpinning the various 
sexual imaginings of diverse communities all over the world. He also discusses the 
manner and modalities in which the body is packaged and commercialised in this new 
global economy. He highlights the ubiquitous and pervasive manner in which the 
personal is regularly beamed via the media to the public, with the advent and popularity 
of confessional TV programmes like The Oprah Winfrey Show. The realm of the private 
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gets aggressively pushed out for mainstream public consumption. The notion of human 
rights, the right to self-expression, personal liberty and autonomy are now phrasal 
mainstays of the 21st century.  Overwhelmingly, globalisation has erased the differences 
which marked personal and sexual identity and have subsumed all under a heaving mass 
of sameness and replicability. However, Altman argues that there is a compelling need to 
examine context and that assumptions about sexuality are far from universal. Thus, we 
must not casually dismiss the very real site-specific particularities which will impinge on 
and affect this deceptively common and unitary model of identity. Thus, although gay 
advocacy groups have increasingly and stridently entered into the mainstream of public 
consciousness, one must consciously evaluate the site from which they operate so as not 
be lulled into this picture of imagined likeness. In this thesis, where I am examining the 
pull and ubiquity of gay advocacy groups amongst gay Malay Muslims, Altmans book 
serves as a useful anchor in helping highlight the importance of local agents (ethnicity, 
faith and state) and of individual agencies in contributing towards variegated ideas of 
self, sexuality and identity.   
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
I am locating this study within Jurgen Habermas examination of the public sphere in his 
book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and his later work, the Theory 
of Communicative Action. Habermas surmised that the public sphere, which represented 
private people coming together as a public to use their reason critically, had been debased 
into a shadow of its former self. The public sphere of the past could act as a critical check 
against the fast expanding domination of the state. However due to structural changes, 
notably the shift to a capitalist economy, the public sphere becomes little more than a 
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vehicle for the operation of the insidious culture industry where political parties and 
other agents of influence (notably the media) have blunted the critical edge of the public 
sphere. The public sphere has since ossified and the public is a mirage where no real 
critical debate takes place. The contention that there is a blurring of boundaries between 
the private and public and the enormous power that the public yields over opinion 
shaping and meaning making is relevant here, especially with regard to ethnicity, religion 
and sexuality in Singapore. I suggest that there is a master narrative in place to being 
Malay and Muslim in Singapore and there is a similar pressure being exerted on sexual 
boundaries as well. I will show how these will impact the (lacklustre) response towards 
same-sex sexuality and Islam in Singapore, by both my respondents and the larger Malay 
Muslim society in Singapore.  
 
However, Habermas in his later work, Theory of Communicative Action points to a more 
hopeful picture in the possible revitalisation of the public sphere. He replaces his earlier 
pessimistic model with one where he remains hopeful that grassroots initiative and 
citizens movements can restore the lustre and idealism of the public sphere. Thus, real 
change could perhaps occur with organic social movements. In this thesis, I have 
contextualised this to be the virtual movements which have argued for a rethink in the 
heteronormative boundaries of society. I am interested in whether my respondents would 
be similarly enthused to visibly project and translate private notions of self and sexuality 
into very public remonstrations of resistance against heteronormativity. Given that I am 
looking at resistance models which largely began as virtual groups (Al-Fatiha), the 
issue of making a private fight public becomes central and very real. Their responses 
would give an insight as to how religion, particularly Islam, and sexuality are imbibed 
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and practised in Singapore and consequently reveal if such a model of resistance, a la Al 
Fatiha would be possible or desirable amongst the gay Malay Muslims in Singapore. 
 
I am also guided by the wave of feminist critique on the public/personal divide. Radical 
feminists of the 60s and 70s decried the implicit masculinist assumptions underpinning 
the ordering of the public and private with the now infamous slogan, The personal is 
political. The construction of false borders which neatly cleave the public from the 
personal thus perpetuates the further subjugation of women. While I am not exploring the 
personal/public divide from a purely feminist view in this thesis, the very strong 
statement that feminists have made with respect to the continued silencing or systematic 
emasculation of the female voice could be expanded to include gay men and women. 
Indeed, the policy and strategy of choice for identity affirming politics has been to argue 
for the political importance of personal matters; hence the contentious issue of the rights 
of gay marriages and the rights for the ordaining of gay priests. Baker (1999) emphasises 
that the end result of this dialogue is concrete social change, which would be manifested 
in the move away from traditional cultural gendering. Therefore, of particular relevance 
for this thesis is this importance of continuous dialogue and active public participation. 
Hence, I am keen to see if there any such active demagogues among gay Malay Muslims 
here who would be capable and willing to take into the public sphere what conventionally 
has been a very private agenda and the resultant face of this emancipatory exercise. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
There were 14 main informants, whose lives and ideas I was most interested in 
portraying. Eight of them are women and six of them men, with ages ranging from 22 to 
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34 years old. While this thesis focused principally on them, I also spoke informally to 
various other people who had opinions to offer on homosexuality in general or those 
which were related to Islam and the Malay Muslim public. Thus, I sought out civil 
society activists (notably Action for AIDS) and also a cub reporter who was part of a 
team which covered the issues of homosexuality amongst Malay Muslims here (this will 
be elaborated upon in subsequent chapters). I was also fortunate enough to have met the 
originator of As-Salam, which is the first virtual newsgroup for gay Muslims in 
Singapore. I have also tried, where possible, to attend various social activities (house 
parties, sessions at the various gay nightspots in town, sporting activities, a book launch) 
in my attempt to better understand the social outlets available to gay Singaporeans. 
Through my conversations and involvement with this diverse group of people and 
activities, I have been able to better understand my respondents euphoric highs and 
tumultuous lows as they navigate their way around personal and public minefields that lie 
in wait for them. 
 
It was an incredible challenge to find anyone who was willing to talk to me. Given that I 
was not plugged into any manner of loose, informal networks of gay Malay Muslims, it 
was extremely difficult to persuade those concerned to come forward. While the circle is 
small, gay Malay Muslims do not necessarily coagulate and gravitate towards each other 
on the basis of their shared ethnicity or religion. Hence, the process of contacting one is 
interminably long as I would have to go through numerous acquaintances and various 
convoluted social networks. It was suggested to me that an online advertisement be 
placed, asking for respondents [Toh had employed such a strategy]. However, I was 
reluctant to do so. My thesis required sustained, long-term contact and I was unsure if 
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solicitation of such a manner would garner me the type of respondents who would be 
prepared to answer probing questions on religion and themselves. As I was not known in 
gay circles, attempts to sidle up to anyone who looked Malay at gay hot spots were bound 
to backfire. As Norita would later tell me:  
Its very cliquish you know, the scene  you go with your friends and then you 
sit at a particular spot and just stare at the others. It can be intimidating to those 
who come alone or for those who are unfamiliar with the scene. 
 
 
There were very few avenues which would invite an all-gay Malay Muslim audience, as 
Azwan would wryly remark to me: What? Have us all Muslim gays, gather in one room 
and pray? 
 
Given the lack of visibility, I had to plumb through personal contacts and apply gentle 
pressure to see if they would refer relevant respondents to me. This manner of 
methodology is an embarrassingly painful one, for both my initial (woefully small) pool 
of contacts and I.  While almost all of them unhesitatingly forwarded me some names 
upon my subtle inquiring if they had friends who are gay Malay Muslims, very few of 
their extended friends would speak to me. The fact that I am a heterosexual Malay 
Muslim female, an unknown in the gay circles here, caused some to baulk at even 
initiating a cursory attempt in engaging me. This was an unavoidable and unenviable 
position to be in. I could not explain more fully my research agenda and motivation so as 
to allay some of their fears of confidentiality and anonymity simply because the first 
contact had been refused.  
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Notwithstanding my lack of credentials to qualify as a (gay) card-carrying member, there 
were those who saw no value in the study that I was proposing. Holding fast to the 
principle that sexuality is a private matter, it was, understandably, counter-intuitive for 
them to share their thoughts with me. 
 
I met all 14 respondents face to face except for Iskandar. Interviews often lasted more 
than an hour. Follow-up interviews sometimes stretched to two hours and repeat meet-
ups were de-rigueur. Away from the stifling pressures of interviewing, I have had dinners 
with most of my respondents (those who have grown accustomed to me and my study) 
and I began to appreciate and understand the person and personality behind the responses. 
It was a process about two years in the making and they were always willing to share and 
reveal parts of themselves, which they would not ordinarily reveal. For that, I remain 
always in their debt. I have to stress that my respondents, although selected at random, 
all presented startlingly similar characteristics to each other. They are generally young 
adults (late 20s to early 30s), are educated and economically independent. I stress this at 
the outset so that the comments and attitudes of my respondents towards same sex 
sexuality and Islam are appropriately located as stemming from and being influenced by 
this socio-economic framework.  
 
I am not denying the instrumentality of class in influencing or even pre-determining 
ones experience of political and social life and note that the experiences of my 
respondents could be class-biased. However, the manner in which leisure/social 
opportunities are structured in the gay circles here very much centre on opportunity and 
access. The pink market is many a marketers gold mine and the contemporary picture 
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of a gay Singaporean is one who is urbane and educated. While I realise this feeds into 
the class stereotype, it does overwhelmingly point to the constriction of spaces for a gay 
Singaporean to be anything but middle class and for the purposes of my study, the very 
real difficulty of finding anyone who falls outside this socio-economic category. I have 
not sought to consciously engage only the middle class gay Malay Muslims and by 
extension to summarily exclude those who fall outside this privileged station. This seems 
to be an anomaly not due to interviewer bias but one which seem to have been built into 
the whole enterprise behind purposeful social/leisure interaction in the gay circles here. 
Thus despite the general randomness of my sampling, the consistency in which their class 
stations could be replicated conveys very strongly this implicit socio-economic 
segregation. 
 
However, while I concede that class might operate as a crucial determinant in the 
experiences of gay Singaporeans as they navigate their way through public and personal 
acceptance, class might not figure so prominently as a determining factor behind parental 
rejection. I qualify this to be true for my respondent sample, as parents from a better-
educated background need not necessarily unequivocally accept their gay children. (see 
Appendix  A). 
 
This thesis was made possible through the grace and generosity of my respondents. 
Guided by George Gerbners  (1998) theory on the basic functions of storytelling, these 
personal recounts are central to my questions, in that they: (a) reveal how things work, 
(b) describe what things are and (c) to tell us what to do about them.  When taken 
together, these three functions, illuminate the all important but invisible relationships 
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and hidden dynamics of life, [also] descriptions, depictions, expositions, reports 
abstracted from total situations  and also about value and choice (Gerbner 1998:75). I 
have, however, refrained from eliciting stories from the general Malay Muslim public, 
by way of doing straw polls en masse with regard to the personal perception of 
homosexuality in Islam. I could have angled the inquiry to focus immediately on the 
possible responses a Malay Muslim parent may have when he/she realises that his/her 
child is gay.  This is because while the doctrinal assessment of homosexuality is exacting 
and precise in its condemnation of homosexuality in Islam, the practices and attitudes of 
the laity may differ considerably.  Malay Muslim parents of gay children may find it 
possible to come to terms with their childrens sexuality. However, it would be difficult 
to determine the true feelings of Malay Muslims here towards homosexuality and Islam 
as it would be purely conjectural and often what people say is not related to what people 
would do. However, as a sidebar, in a study commissioned by the then Ministry of 
Community Development and Sports in 2001, an overwhelming majority of Malays (94 
per cent) found homosexuality unacceptable.15 I will not attempt to replicate a similar 
study and have instead chosen to draw out the general attitudes of Malay Muslims here 
with regard to homosexuality and Islam via examining the position taken by the Islamic 
Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) and through the public airing of the issue in 
newspapers and television. 
 
 
                                                
15A/P David Chan, from the Department of Psychology in the National University of Singapore conducted 
the study, titled Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans (2001). The study was a longitudinal survey 
involving 1481 respondents. Based on a nationally representative sampling frame of Singapore citizens 
aged 15 and above, a disproportionate random stratified sampling procedure was used to identify and 
approach respondents. Malays formed 26% of the total respondent sample. 
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1.6 Profile of Respondents  (Details at Appendix A) 
Kayleen: 26 years old. She is steadfastly private and quiet. One of my other respondents 
had this to say of her: You know, I never knew she was one of us. She was always so 
good and proper. She never did give off any vibes that she was gay. And I was in the 
same secondary school with her for years! I suspect it has a lot to do with her mother and 
family. When I told Kayleen this, she laughed hysterically. Yah, I was always good in 
school. Very proper and quiet. Like I didnt draw attention to myself. I mean, I had to be. 
I wasnt sure. And theres my family to think about. 
 
Zaman: 33 years old. The intrepid traveller. His honesty and uncomplicated approach to 
life is endearing. He is soft-spoken and has a wicked sense of humour. But his personality 
is marked by a deliberate weariness, as if exhausted by the travails of the (gay) life that 
he has led. 
 
Roslan: 31 years old. Soft-spoken and rather shy, Roslan was a picture of perfect poise 
and calm while recalling dramatic and tumultuous events in his life. His serenity is no 
doubt aided by the love and support of his family (abiding and devout Muslims) despite 
his persona non grata status within the Malay Muslim public and Islam. 
 
Erin: 29 years old. I stalked her via email after meeting her at a play which was staged by 
a local theatre company which had adapted an award-winning script, heartily endorsed by 
GLAAD (The Gay and Lesbian Alliance against Defamation). Erin remarked later: I 
was wondering who this girl was who was smiling maniacally at me. And I was 
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wondering if you were gay or straight. Erin is hysterically funny and obscenely easy to 
get along with. She is warm and engaging and brutally frank about her snapshots of life. 
  
Netty: 27 years old. She viewed me with a healthy dose of scepticism and was suitably 
reserved when we first met. She has strong opinions and is very comfortable with her 
identity and has no qualms in disclosing that she is gay. Her uncompromising attitude is 
no doubt buttressed by the fact that she is able to separate religion from sexuality. By her 
own admission, I am not a very good Muslim. I drink, I smoke and most times I dont 
pray. For me, being a Muslim is more of a personal conviction that Allah is God and 
Muhammad his Prophet. I mean, religion is always a part of me. Just that at this point, 
maybe I am not reminded of it so much because I dont really practice. 
 
Azwan: 33 years old. He is voluble and rarely needs any prompting. He has a caustic 
tongue but the prickly exterior hides a very committed son. Okay, so I am a gay. Big 
deal. Like I told my father, which straight son or daughter of yours provides for you the 
way I have? I love my parents, and it pains me when I am judged by the fact that I am 
gay. But I believe God is fair and he will see this when he judges me later. 
 
Hasyim: 27 years old. He came up to meet me in our subsequent meetings, sporting a 
crop of freshly dyed hair. His ash blonde locks gave his parents a fair amount of grief: 
Yah, they were going on and on about how improper it was. Hasyim takes an active 
interest in social affairs relating to gay spaces and sites in Singapore but only as a 
backbencher. When the issues strike me, of course I have something to say. And I will 
post messages on the newsgroups or make my stand known in some form or another. But 
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to go public with my message and my stand, sorry no. I am not able to handle that kind of 
intense pressure. But more importantly, I believe being gay is a very personal issue. No 
need to take it up in the public sphere and debate about it.   
 
Mohd: 27 years old. He was extremely hesitant about meeting me and was extremely 
tight-lipped when I ventured into more personal territory. He very reluctantly agreed to 
meet me and this was after an intense public relations campaign mounted by a mutual 
friend who assured him that I would honour and respect his privacy. Later on, he let on 
that his reticence was because he never did confront the issue of sexuality and faith.  
 
Norita: 26 years old. Despite her diminutive frame, she is a powerhouse of spitfire 
independence. She is paying for her own flat (co-signed by her mother, as singles in 
Singapore cannot have sole proprietorship until 35 years of age) and has been 
economically  independent since her teens. Her strong assertive opinions, liberally laced 
with her impish smiles belie the tough existence she has had. She makes no apologies for 
the way she chooses to live and tells me: I dont have to answer to anyone. I have 
always been independent. As long as I am satisfied with how I live, I dont need someone 
elses approval.  
 
Iriana: 27 years old and deeply respectful and reverent towards her religion. She believes 
deeply in the inherent grace and truth of Islam. She is honest and engaging and 
deliberates over each query carefully. She says the key is to keep things separate. I 
want to be out because I want to be myself. I dont want to rebel against my religion. I 
respect my religion. I respect people who are [of] my religion a lot. So I dont want to 
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throw this kind of thing in their face. I dont want to relate Islam to lesbianism or being 
gay. Being gay is something that I choose to embrace. Like I dont want to have a name, 
like Jewish gay or Christian gay.  
 
Melissa: 28 years old. She held my gaze and asked point blank: What is it exactly that 
you are doing? Her tone is decidedly less conciliatory than my other respondents and her 
gruff nature proves to be quite an obstacle. This is simply so since she refuses to be 
categorised. Similar to Mohd, she refused to have our conversation tape-recorded. She 
proves to be an interesting counterfoil to my other respondents who have had issues in 
reconciling Islam and same-sex sexuality.  
 
Su: 26 years old. She is equipped with lethal volumes of self-deprecating humour. Her 
sexuality in the workplace is a non-issue, but when it comes to small family gatherings 
her single status comes under intense scrutiny. When it comes to Islam, on her own 
admission, [I] am not so pious, lah, but I do know that being gay is wrong in Islam but I 
believe that I am a Muslim still.  
 
Aisyah: 26 years old. Aisyah impressed me with her conviction to her faith and her 
unerring belief of its fundamental truths. The tudung that she wears, she told me, acts as 
shield: When I wear that and make comments like, oh, shes a babe, it is less likely or 
unlikely to be taken as a gay remark. So my comments, which sometimes I cant censor, 
are taken in an entirely different context. Since I cant be gay, sometimes words just slip 
out and wearing the tudung helps shield me from people knowing that I am gay. 
Although when I met her and in our subsequent meetings, that ubiquitous piece of cloth 
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was nowhere to be seen. Aisyah sheepishly said, I wear it when I go out of the house but 
when I hang out with my gay friends, I dont wear it, lah. It draws unwanted attention.  
But the wearing of the tudung is a visible and constant reminder of her faith and the 
commitment that she has towards it. As such, it is a signifier for the dilemma Aisyah 
faces in bridging these two dissociate realities. 
 
Iskandar: 22 yrs old. He is extremely reserved and only agreed to correspond via email. 
He is in a bind over his faith and his sexuality. He believes that there is a possibility that 
he may be straight and this would most likely be motivated by my religion and my 
increasing doubts about finding true love in the gay world.  
 
In the following chapter, I will examine the ramifications of being Malay and Muslim in 
Singapore and also of the societys attitudes towards same-sex sexuality. I will categorise 
the second chapter as public space seeing as to how it contains and recapitulates broad 
machinations and ruminations with regard to the definition of being Malay and Muslim in 
Singapore. In the third chapter, I will be focusing on my respondents replies to the 
questions posed on the conundrums they faced, if any, when placed in situations of 
potential conflict; within the familiar (general society) and the familial (friends and 
families). The third chapter will thus be accordingly marked as private space to indicate 
my respondents own personal odyssey through faith, family and society. In the fourth 
chapter, I will be examining more closely the role and impact of Islam in their lives and if 
the yoking of Islam to a larger struggle for legitimacy within Islam is an acceptable 
proposition. The fourth chapter therefore is a recount of the possibilities that may or may 
not happen when the public and private meet. The last chapter would recapitulate what 
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had been discussed thus far and posit possible ways ahead in the development of 
mobilisation strategies for local gay Malay Muslims. Throughout this thesis, I hope to 
clearly show the extant pressures exerted by society, state and self in being gay, Malay 




































This chapter deals with the public face of homosexuality in Malay society. It includes a 
brief look at the changing levels of tolerance towards alternative sexuality in Malay 
socio-cultural ideas, in the move from pre-colonial to colonial, and then to post-colonial 
modern state, as well as the way that this post-colonial state has constructed a particular 
idea about Malay identity that influences Malays in the way that they deal with 
homosexuality as an issue. In 2003, the then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, made an 
announcement about the Singapore governments stand on homosexuality that surprised 
Singapore society and has had repercussions in a number of ways. Not long after this, the 
Sunday edition of the Malay daily newspaper in Singapore featured a month long look at 
homosexuality among Malays which gave me some insights into how my informants 
confront the public face of their sexuality, as a religious and ethnic minority in 
Singapore. These will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
I will then be giving a composite sketch of the constructions of ethnicity and religion for 
the ethnic Malays in Singapore. Under-girding such constructions would, of course, be 
the larger theme of control and the preservation of normative boundaries. Arising from 
this, one can also see how sexuality and same-sex sexuality is understood within 
Singapore. In so doing, I hope to explain the interplay of factors that make stepping out 
of the normative boundaries difficult for this group of model minorities.16 
                                                
16 I say model minorities because in every National Day Rally speech since 1991, the ruling premier would 
take the time to congratulate the Malay community if it had done well and to also motivate to go further. 
The case of the Singapore Malays being upheld as a community of progress was seen very clearly in 2001 
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2.1 Sex and Sexuality in past Southeast Asian Malay Societies 
The Malays throughout time were not a group which took an overtly moral/didactic 
approach towards sex and sexuality.17 In an article in Time, a Malaysian sociologist at the 
University of Malaya, Hadi Zachariah, remarked that, while Islamic leaders may never 
accept homosexuality, there are deep wells of tolerance in the ethnically diverse nation  
even among the Muslim majority, who are mostly Malays. There is a Malay culture and 
there is an Islamic culture and they are not quite the same. Malay culture is very 
tolerant.18  Reid (1988:153) notes that Portuguese accounts, dating back to the 16th 
century, reported that Malays were fond of music and given to love, that pre-marital 
sexual relations were regarded indulgently, and that virginity at marriage was not 
expected of either party. Su, one of my respondents, said:  
 
If anything, I think the community back in the 70s was like seriously 
sexy and very open. Do you remember the tight kebayas of the past; it was 




Malay films of the 50s and 60s would clearly show women in figure hugging kebayas 
and would also often showcase perempuan joget (cabaret dancers) who sometimes 
 
                                                                                                                                            
when the charges made by Singapore-born academic, Zubaidah Rahim in her book, The Singapore 
dilemma: the political and educational marginality of the Malay community, 1998. Assertions made by her 
on the socio-economic marginality of the Malay/Muslims were picked up across the Causeway. This 
prompted a strong response from the Singapore government and from the Malay/Muslims themselves. The 
consensus was that the Singapore Malay Muslims have done very well for itself in Singapore given the 
meritocratic and self-help framework. See speech given by PM Goh, 21st January 2001 at a tribute 
organised by the Malay/Muslim organisations for his 10 years in office. Speech available from 
www.sprinter.gov.sg 
17 The term Malay has been a contentious one and I am aware of the difficulties surrounding its definition 
and content. Nagata makes the point that the Malays seem to be associated with most of the early states of 
the Western Archipelago of the Malay Penisula and Sumatra (1981: 97) and it is doubtful if Malay ever 
referred to more than a category of people, having in common just a language and certain non-primordial 
characteristics of culture (adat). (1981: 98) In this thesis, I take Malay to refer to Nagatas geographical 
approximations. 
18 Refer to David Liebhold, Coming out Into the Open, TIMEasia.com, 2 October  2000 
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formed the principal characters in the movie. Often, these perempuan joget would find 
and redeem themselves with the love of an upright man. I am aware that the instances 
above were indicative of heterosexual behaviour, which fit in quite neatly with hetero-
normative ideas of sexuality, and thus not necessarily indicative of the tolerance that 
the Malaysian sociologist was speaking of. However, this was reflective of the kind of 
freedom or sexual licence that they enjoyed in the past, compared to the greater 
policing of female sexuality and morality in the contemporary Malay societies of 
Singapore and Malaysia (Peletz 2002:237). 
 
There have been no studies to date that have focused exclusively on the social lives of the 
transgendered, transsexuals or of gay persons within the Singaporean Malay context in 
history. Anthropologist Jaspan (1969:22-23) however notes that Southeast Asians are far 
more tolerant of personality deviations, abnormality and disorder  Homosexuals and 
transvestites are treated with kindness and an amused tolerance.  Supporting this is 
Douglas Raybecks anthropological studies in the 1960s in Kelantan where he found 
that the Malays regard[ed] homosexuality as peculiar, different and even somewhat 
humourous but they did not view it as an illness or a serious sin (Raybeck 1986:65). 
This particular reading is interesting as Kelantan is generally regarded as the epicentre of 
Islam in Malaysia, with levels of practice and interpretations considered to be the most 
rigorously faithful to the dictates of Islam. Raybeck also found specialised homosexual 
villages in or near the state capital (ibid:65). These were not penal colonies where the 
homosexual and the other gender transgressors were banished to, but where movement is 
relatively fluid and residence is completely voluntary. Furthermore, there were no reports 
of moral marauders or mobs, protesting against such specialised residences.  
 38 
 
Peletz (1996:123) also interestingly documents the attitudes that a village in Negri 
Sembilan had towards pondans.19 He notes that there is both considerable tolerance 
and acceptance for the pondans. However, he does stress, sexual orientation is not a 
primary marker of the pondan category, which is, in any event, a mediating rather than a 
supernumerary status (ibid:123). This would explain why although the villagers seem to 
be rather frank while discussing the exploits of two famous pondans in the village, the 
topics of discussion often center more on the pondans public copying of female 
mannerisms rather than any topic overtly sexual. However, Peletz does include a very 
unabashed recount of a very much married Zainal (who however, never did call himself a 
pondan but exhibits the mannerisms of one) on all matters related to the male genitalia 
and of his gay [Christian] friend who had invited him to a New Years Eve party, the 
occurrence of which he had kept from his wife. Zainal also spoke, with much aplomb, 
about having received pictures from his British estate manager friend on his newly 
circumcised penis, one duduk (sitting down), one berdiri (standing up), (ibid:128). 
Peletz also notes that Zainals masculinity and overall status were by no means 
compromised by the fact that he was a pondan and that this would have contrasted 
sharply with what one [would] find in western societies, where gender crossing of any 
variety typically entails a loss of status (1996:129). Peletz hypothesises that central to 
this non-plussed attitude is that gender is not a prominent marker or determinant of 
Southeast Asian society and culture. Male and female are often viewed in many contexts 
as complementary, rather than hierarchical and of far more pressing importance in 
                                                
19 The term pondan as used by Peletz (1996) refers often to a man who engages in activities contrary to 
his male gender roles. Thus, he may wear womens clothes; have sex with men or acts like a woman in 
many other ways. Peletzs fieldwork was done in the late 1980s. 
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determining the pecking order are descent, age, birth order and, in recent times, social 
class (1996:129/130). 
 
When looking back into time, one can find more instances of tolerance and acceptance of 
alternative sexualities. Transgendered behaviour apparently had a long and venerable 
history in the region (Peletz 2002: 241). These ritual transvestites, together with female 
ritual specialists, acted as a mediator between the living and the dead. The role they 
played was highly revered by the local people and the transvestites performed these ritual 
services dressed in female attire.  Unfortunately, as Peletz notes (ibid:241), very little is 
known about these ritual transvestites with regard to their personal interactions with 
others.  It is not known if they had indeed been engaged in same-sex relations in either 
sacred or secular contexts or if they had relations with not only one sex, but both.  
More importantly, there is no information on their own intimations of their identity. It is 
not known whether they had really felt for the function at hand. Thus, although we have 
reports of transgendered behaviour, and the general esteem which they enjoyed, their role 
seemed to be a largely ritualistic one. The modern equivalent of transvestites is bapuks 
and this is indicative of one the major misconceptions surrounding Malay gays in 
Singapore. Bapuk is a common Malay term to describe an effeminate man and it has been 
generally considered that most gay men are bapuks. However, the mere existence of 
transgendered ritual behaviour in the past does in some way  point to a larger and a more 
varied sexual terrain in the Malay world.  
It is hypothesised that the relative privilege and tolerance enjoyed by such gender 
benders, lies in the respect and belief of pre-modern Southeast Asia on the duality of 
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nature. It is made up of both male and female essences of wholeness, purity and gender 
totality and [thus] reflects the unfractured universe posited to exist before the advent of 
humanity and difference (L. Andaya 2000:35-36). These liberties were systematically 
curtailed through the intensification of commerce and state building  and also the 
heightened centrality in courtly realms and beyond of Islam, Buddhism and Christianity 
(Peletz 2002: 242). The loss of liberties (sexual or otherwise) was thus attributed to 
increasing state authority and the intensification of orthodox religion. And due to the 
spread of the male oriented, legalistic, hierarchical world religions (B. Andaya 
1994:106), it gradually muscled out any provisions or considerations for women and 
transvestites in public ritual life. Their previous role once deemed sacrosanct and above 
reproach came under intense scrutiny and was deemed superfluous in this new world 
order. These trends above were best documented for the Philippines, with details for the 
rest of Southeast Asia largely sketchy. Colonialism brought with it missionary activity 
which superseded the ritualistic manner of apprehending and practicing religion. 
Consequently, religion became a tool for political nationalism. Religion, when tailored 
for this purpose, had to be retro-fitted to the cause of overthrow and conquer; thus 
restricting spaces, which were more readily available in the past for the active 
participation of women (and the transgendered).  
Thus, this process of change, which saw the intensification of state power, the increasing 
authority of religious orthodoxy, coupled with the pronounced, albeit regionally variable 
impact of colonial rule, western missionary activity (Peletz 2002:242) pruned away 
much of the sexual licence of the past (Scott 1998).  Recalling the observation that Peletz 
(1996) had made with regard to the respect that pondans had enjoyed in Negri Sembilan, 
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he had also inserted the cautious reminder that such liberty would not be enjoyed for 
long. Peletz writes of the increasing religious pressure which had permeated Malaysia, 
having taken the form of legislative measures as well as scholarly conferences. Kelantan 
introduced a law making it an offence for Muslim men to act or dress like women and 
likewise for the state of Penang (1996:131). Therefore, one can see the gradual 
encroachment of religious orthodoxy onto the terrain of tolerant Malay culture.  
 
I have attempted to furnish a brief sketch of the past sexual history of Southeast Asia. 
The intent is not to provide a picture where the past was the apotheosis of a truly 
democratic and open society. While there may be compelling documentation of 
alternative sexualities (recall the earlier point on homosexual villages in Malaysia) being 
tolerated or venerated in some instances, we have no information on the subjectivities or 
desires of the individuals who were involved in or simply observed the rituals at issue 
(Peletz 2002:241). However, it does positively reflect the contention that external agents 
of change have played an instrumental role in redefining the matrix of relations which 
enmesh a particular society. So, while in the past we note a remarkable level of tolerance 
and respect for these ritual transvestites and the considerable allowance in the perimeters 
of morality, the situation in present times is very different. Certain agents and factors 
have come into play to form the social reality that is today. That is a hardening of 
positions on morality and religion.  
 
The fact that the state has been an important external agent effecting change in the 
institution of sexuality means that this agent has to be subjected to further academic 
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inquiry and scrutiny. I will now describe the states present design on the face of ethnicity 
and subsequently on religion in Singapore. There is a need to therefore plot out the 
cumulative factors that were behind the formulation of the ruling partys (Peoples Action 
Party) policies and pathways of action for the various ethnic groups in Singapore. We 
must examine how the party has shaped and reified boundaries of being Malay in 
Singapore. I will outline that its subsequent policies have had an indelible impact on how 
Malay Singaporeans have sought to integrate and endear themselves to a populist and 
nationalist ideal of social and economic dynamism.  
 
The Malays, although a minority in Singapore, if one were to believe the public relations 
blitz launched by various Malay Muslim bodies, is a society motivated by progress. It is 
mindful of the need to assimilate and integrate into its place within multi-cultural 
Singapore.20 In short, the society is portrayed as homogeneous, buoyed along the streams 
of prosperity and intent on being a model minority. Within the Malay bloc, this discourse 
of progress has become an all-consuming obsession and has fed into the crafting of 
Singaporean Malay. This motivation had its roots deep in newly independent Singapore.   
 
2.2 The PAPs founding ideology and the impact on Malay society  
There is a need to first understand the backdrop behind which the PAP assumed power in 
1965. Singapore had never been envisioned as a nation-state, independence was not a 
concept that had much ideological nor material allure (Chua 1995:9).21  Faced with the 
dislocation from the economic core that was the rural hinterland, coupled with a plural 
                                                
20 Refer to Report Card on Malays Convincing, Straits Times, 23 January  2001 
21 See Brown (2000:93) for the political, social and economic conundrum that the newly minted Singapore 
faced. 
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society which had no collective imaginings of a shared past or future, Chua (1995:18) 
theorised that the PAP was quick and adept to thematise them into an ideology of 
survival.  Hence, the general populace had to be re-ordered and bounded into a tightly 
organised and highly disciplined citizenry all pulling in the same direction (Chan 1971). 
That common, all purposeful goal was to be economic development. This was an ideal so 
exacting and enticing in its fulfillment and all encompassing in its promise. 
 
While having identified the singularly all encompassing goal that all its citizens could 
strive for, there was need to also ensure that there was in place an even-handed, 
transparent approach when dealing with Singapores multi-ethnic character (Hill & Lian 
1995:19). Cognizant of Singapores geopolitical situation which had been referred to as 
its double minority situation, the ruling party institutionalised multiculturalism, 
representing so-called Chinese, Malay and Indian cultures (Chua 1995:59) so as not to 
be seen as privileging Chinese interests.22  When multiculturalism was recognised as an 
important founding tenet in Singapores philosophy, it also meant that ethnicity became a 
fundamental concept of existence and that emotional issues of language, education and 
religion [would] come to the forefront (Mauzy & Milne:100).  To pre-empt any charges 
of favouritism, the PAP pushed and promoted aggressively the concept of meritocracy 
and consequently, the institutionalisation of para-political structures (self help groups and 
statutory bodies such as MUIS) to help guide and monitor the progress of each ethnic 
group. This has greatly affected Malay Muslims in Singapore because the achievement of 
socio-economic progress has served to become the definitive index for how far it had 
                                                
22 See Mauzy and Milne (2002:99). Double minority status arises over Singapores geopolitical standing 
where the Chinese are a majority in Singapore, but a minority in the region. Conversely, the Malays are a 
minority in Singapore but a strong majority in the immediate region. 
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integrated and progressed within society. Chua (1995:105) sums it up as a general 
orientation to a deep sense of competition with others for relative advantages in 
consumption[which] manifests itselfin a constant personal upgrading of educational 
qualifications. This orientation will soon leave a persistent mark of distress and 
disability on the Malay Muslims in Singapore as shall be explained below. 
 
2.3 Fashioning the Malays: The Lure and Desirability of Socio-Economic Progress. 
When Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, the Malays of Singapore found 
themselves disposed of their privileged position. The leaders of newly independent 
Singapore found themselves with a politically and racially fragile system of affairs.  
The PAP rulers, despite their commitment to parity of status for all ethnic components 
and its much-vaunted concept of multiculturalism had to accord to the Malays a special 
status. Their special position was given due recognition in Article 89 in the Constitution 
of Singapore where: The Government of Singapore shall exercise its functions in such a 
manner so as to recognise the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous 
people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government to 
protect, safeguard, support and foster and promote their political, educational, religious, 
economic, social and cultural interests (Vasil 2000: 96). 
 
The state has tried to circumvent centrifugal tendencies of race motivated difference 
and discord through the very public principle of meritocracy. Ackermann (1997:37) notes 
that the overarching symbols of success achieved through business and employment were 
palatable for all and more importantly eminently suited to legitimise a system of 
domination and suppression, both within a nation and within an international system.  
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Thus, all Singaporeans became bound to a common principle of merit and socio-
economic success but the Malays of Singapore have been consciously singled out as a 
minority which must integrate and progress as the nascent nation state was especially 
sensitive to Malay communalism (Hill & Lian, 1995:170). Thus, it became that the 
official policy for the Malays in the post-independence period was guided by the 
ultimate objective of their integration within mainstream society, within the framework 
laid down by the ideology of multiculturalism and meritocracy (Betts 1977:162).  
 
Malays who had previously thought that some level of preference would be accorded to 
them thus had to re-orientate and accept this principle of equality of opportunity and 
advancement for all. (Hill & Lian, 1995:102) However, this guiding philosophy, so 
unbiased and unproblematic on paper, threw up several crippling and essentialist 
stereotypes (elaborated in proceeding pages) which have continually plagued the 
Singapore Malay Muslim. Ackermann (1997:80) refers to this as the Malay cultural-
weakness-orthodoxy. This had much to do with the colonial and post-colonial constructs 
of the Malay which were shared by the ruling parties of past and present (the 
colonialists and the PAP) and within the successive generations of Malays themselves. 
 
 The continued and constricted identification of the Singapore Malay to an overarching 
and enduring ideal of socio-economic progress limits the expression of alternative issues 
for which there could not be an immediate possibility of resolution and success. Hence, 
homosexuality would hardly be featured and dissected in the very public and sustained 
manner that other well-documented social ills of the Malays (drug abuse, juvenile 
delinquency or educational concerns) were subjected to because it is not a situation that 
 46 
they themselves see as resolvable. Its unresolvability is not desirable, as most problems 
besetting the Malays must have an end in sight, lest it be thought as yet a further example 
of its failure. The preoccupation of the ethnic Malays with tangible demonstrations of 
success (mostly manifested in reels of statistics showcasing excellence) has much to do 
with the prevailing belief that there was something acutely and inherently deficient to 
being Malay. Compounding the silence which surrounds homosexuality and limiting the 
facets of its representation is the additional presence of Islam. I will elaborate on the face 
and moulding of Islam by the state in the later pages. For now, I will revisit this cultural 
weakness orthodoxy model. This premise of thought and action has influenced much of 
the Singaporean Malays psyche and public positioning.   
 
The Malay cultural weakness orthodoxy model 
A central tenet of meritocracy would be opportunity for all.  The PAP believed that in 
order not to privilege any ethnic group, it is necessary to provide for a level playing field. 
Given this equal terrain of opportunity, all have a fair chance to succeed. As mentioned 
earlier, meritocracy is a necessary adjunct for the principle of multiculturalism by basing 
rewards on achievement rather than on race or culture (Mauzy & Milne, 2002:56). 
Clammer (1998:72) points to the pre-eminence of ethnicity as a classificatory and 
regulatory tool in Singapore but as Brass notes (1990:2) there was a concerted effort to 
increase the number of attributes and symbolic references that they have in common 
with each other. The key attribute of meritocracy and that of its attendant cousin, of 
socio-economic parity and progress had the advantage of being non-partisan and 
appealed to all the ethnic communities of Singapore, notably the Malays.  
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The principle of meritocracy rests on two basic foundations. One, that everyone is 
capable of achieving socio-economic progress (as the state defines it). Two, that any 
inability to do so must then point to the presence of some unalterable and intrinsic flaw 
that have prevented one from entering this gilded hall of prosperity. For the Malays in 
Singapore, bogged down by the historical weight of cultural deficiencies, the principle of 
meritocracy looks set to be an indictment against their ability to level up and progress 
with the rest of Singapore society. Eager to prove their detractors wrong, they have tried 
harder than the rest of the ethnic groups in Singapore to demonstrate their commitment to 
meritocracy and socio-economic progress. Meritocracy has become a strategic tool in 
socially and politically disciplining the Malays. 
 
The Malays in the 1960s and 1970s were lagging behind in the pursuit of socio-economic 
progress and according to the dictates of meritocracy, were charged with their own self-
betterment. In 1970, the Ubah Sikap (literally Change [your] Attitude) group rose to this 
challenge.23 The name of the group itself was telling. It boldly proclaimed that the 
attitudes of the Malays were, in fact, the primary stumbling block to their achieving 
socio-economic progress and prosperity.24  
 
Tania Li (1989) has exhaustively detailed the conceptions which have continually 
plagued the Malays. They were persuaded to locate the source of their socio-economic 
estrangement from larger society, not on the state, not on the Chinese, but within 
                                                
23 Betts (1977:266) saw this as a small informal group consisting mostly of English educated, modernist 
Malay intellectuals. It saw itself as the epitome of what the Malay community had to have (what they need 
to change) in order to achieve socio-economic progress.  
24 Tania Li (1989:171) gives a recount of these attitudes. The Malays were obedient, contented and 
without inquiring minds. Malays have been involved in religion and gracious living and [were] 
unconcerned about material progress.  
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themselves. The Malays were believed to be indolent (Li 1995:166). This had its roots in 
the colonial observation that the Malays were divorced from direct participation in the 
economy, unlike the Chinese, who went after business opportunities with 
(un)characteristic fervour (ibid:166). Therefore, the Malays were unfavourably 
categorised as a constantly under-performing ethnic minority. This was a picture that the 
Malays themselves, past and present have bought into. I will not be revisiting the basis 
for this perpetuation of these conceptions; it has been done earlier by noted academics, 
notably Syed Hussein Alatas (1979), but I will be drawing upon this to anchor more 
concretely the act of being and doing Malay in Singapore by very briefly summing up the 
principle behind the establishment and institutionalisation of the self-help group for the 
Malays in Singapore; MENDAKI. This will help explain and elucidate more clearly the 
perimeters of Malay identity in contemporary Singapore.  
 
MENDAKI : The socially progressive model of action 
The state has instituted designated self-help bodies which act as parents de jure for each 
ethnic group.  The first self-help group for the Malays, MENDAKI (Council for the 
Development of Muslim Children) was established in 1982.25  The raison d etre of this 
group reveals the deep-seated and hard to dislodge cultural assumptions towards the 
(in)ability of the Malays in achieving progress in education. At its inaugural congress in 
1982, a suitably damning quote was given which laid out in full colour the ills of the 
                                                
25Other self-help groups for the various ethnic communities soon followed suit. The Singapore Indian 
Development Association was formed in 1991 and the Chinese Development Council was formed in 1992. 
The 73-year-old Eurasian Association was given a matching grant in 1992. Each of the self-help groups, 
apart from CDAC, receives a matching grant from the government to fund their various socio-economic 
programmes. In addition to government subvention, the self help groups receive contributions from their 
Singaporean ethnic charges where a certain amount, pegged to the income level of the giver, would be 
deducted monthly from the Central Provident Fund Account. One can choose to opt out of this 
contribution to these self help groups but administratively it can be a hassle. See Mauzy & Milne, 
2002:112 
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Malays. They are poor in education and training, poor in terms of money, poor in brain 
power26 MENDAKI has been around for over 20 years now and has become the 
accepted spokesperson on socio-educational issues of the Malay Muslims in Singapore. I 
will not be going into the mechanics of MENDAKIs programmes but I would like to 
highlight the significant consequence of having MENDAKI for the Malays. Long 
plagued by the lack of socio-economic progress, the minority Malays could have been a 
majority problem for the nascent nation state. However, through the deft use of 
meritocracy and multi-culturalism and the strategic move of instituting self-help groups 
for each ethnic group, the state has managed to defuse potentially divisive, competing 
ethnic loyalties (Brown 2000:102). Each ethnic group was charged with their own self 
betterment, not to be more unlike each other, but to be more Singaporean in their 
common pursuit of socio-economic progress. Thus, the way ahead for the party and the 
rest of the ethnic communities of Singapore was the formulation of an all-encompassing 
ideal that would be race neutral and universally desirable; socio-economic progress 
achieved through meritocracy.  
 
This then laid the groundwork for the remoulding of the Malays in Singapore where the 
edges of potential disgruntlement (of being dispossessed) were cobbled away to fit a 
larger, non-threatening and all rewarding ideal of socio-economic prosperity. Rewards 
and problems therefore were interpreted, conveyed and assessed against this backdrop. 
Hill and Lian (1995:168) aptly sum up the precarious position of the Malays vis-à-vis 
the state (precarious because it always skirts outside the realms of respectability) by 
                                                
26 See Tania Li (1989:175) for quote from a well known Malay intellectual, Zainal Abidin Bin Ahmad, who 
wrote about the Malay problem in the 1940s, where the Malay problem was characterized as having 
stemmed from a variety of deficiencies; mental, economic, social, personal. 
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observing that the government sought to assert the compatibility of Malay identity 
within a common national framework. And what this common national framework was 
is the achievement of socio-economic excellence. PM Goh, having assumed the position 
of Prime Minister of Singapore in 1990, has without fail, since 1991- 2003 made pointed 
references to the Singaporean Malays in his National Day Rally Speeches, on the need to 
constantly better themselves and in the same breath commended them on their 
commitment to progress. Thus, reiterating my earlier point, issues of considerably little or 
no relevance to this socio-economic mantle (such as same- sex sexuality) are treaded 
upon gingerly by the Malays and broached only perfunctorily.  
 
I have mentioned that since 1991, former PM Goh has addressed the Malays without fail 
in each of his National Day Rally speeches (a privilege which the other ethnic minority 
 the Indians  could not claim to have). The Malays appreciate the fact that the state 
would even deign to encourage and more importantly, sometimes even publicly 
commend (when it shows some glimmer of progress) this chronically underperforming 
ethnic minority. Such high level of support should definitely be reciprocated (lest the 
Malays were thought to be ungrateful) with an even greater commitment to fulfilling state 
ideals. I have mentioned very briefly the significance and meaning behind the 
establishment of MENDAKI and the impact which it had on the re-ordering of being 
Malay; that is to be socially and economically progressive, within already circumscribed 
fields. As mentioned earlier, there is a need to also examine the workings of official 
Islam (as sanctioned by the state) on the Malay Muslim public. This will lay down clearly 
the prescriptive slant of the state towards Islam and how it has defined the boundaries and 
meaning of being Muslim in Singapore. 
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Like MENDAKI, MUIS reflects and promotes the nationalist agenda of the state. The 
states enduring logic of pragmatism must ensure that the Muslims in Singapore are 
bounded and bundled into an administrative machinery which works within tightly 
defined perimeters. This ensures that dissenting voices would not gain an audience in 
public court. Thus, any voices, which speak outside this realm of legitimacy is often 
labeled as being dissenting and of being un-Singaporean. I will explain how this is so 
through the examination of MUIS vision, its strategic priorities and core principles.   
 
2.4 MUIS and the Singapore Muslims- The Representation of Official Islam 
MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura or the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) is 
a statutory body set up in 1965 under the Administration of Muslim Law Act. MUIS 
serves as an important intermediary between the state and Muslims in Singapore. 
However, MUIS ability to represent a viewpoint antithetical to the state has been 
systematically stymied. This is because only the President of Singapore has the right to 
appoint the President, the Mufti (the religious head of the Muslims in Singapore) and the 
Secretary of MUIS (Hill & Lian 1995:168).  With this administrative privilege, the state 
has ensured that MUIS objectives and programmes are in line with the national 
objectives.  
 
I will not be charting MUIS history since its inception. Instead, I will be looking at the 
public positioning of MUIS in recent years (recent taken to mean in the past three years 
or so, since the eruption of the tudung (headscarves) controversy) to more aptly anchor 
and locate its (new) vision, strategic focus and core principles, as alluded to earlier. It is 
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only when one examines the above against the backdrop of recent events could one then 
fully appreciate the meaning of being Muslim in contemporary Singapore and the re-
orientation of religious beliefs into a more coherent and rational form. 
 
MUIS vision and mission  A community of excellence 
Casting a cursory glance at MUIS website, one is struck at the bold, expansive ideals of 
MUIS.27 Central to its premise of existence is its promise to set the Islamic agenda, 
shape religious life and forge the Singapore Muslim identity. All this it sets out to 
achieve while being guided by the core principles of integrity, consultativeness and 
inclusiveness.  Its promise to deliver all these has to be understood against several 
events which have rocked Singapore. The first was the tudung controversy where four 
primary school girls faced suspension because they had turned up wearing tudungs at 
their primary schools in 2002. This was an act which the state perceived as a flagrant 
flouting of circumscribed, implicit norms surrounding religion and religious practice. 
This issue was picked up by the Malaysian press and politicians across the Causeway 
who took the opportunity to denounce the move (of banning the tudung) as blatant 
discrimination against Muslims.28 The state deemed the wearing of the headscarf in 
schools as detrimental to the shared, public space that each ethnic group in Singapore 
occupies. The then Minister of State (Community Development and Sports), Yaacob 
Ibrahim said: religious freedom has to be guided by a greater need for integration, and 
racial and religious understanding and tolerance.29 Thus, what Singaporean Muslims 
                                                
27 MUIS vision is in building a community of excellence. Its mission is to broaden and deepen the 
Singaporean Muslim Community's understanding and practice of Islam, while enhancing the well being of 
the nation. See www.muis.gov.sg/english/corporate_info/vision_mission/VisionMiss.aspx?pMenu=2 
28 See, Politicians and groups criticize Singapore over tudung, Straits Times, 31 January 2002 
29 See, Malay MPs call for careful approach to tudung issue, Straits Times, 27 January 2002 
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perceived to be a greater alignment to the values and principles of universal Islam in that 
they wanted to be more like their Muslim brethren elsewhere, was instead understood as 
wanting to be more different and differentiated within the context of Singaporean society. 
Thus, the referential framework for being Muslim in Singapore is site specific. It must be 
rooted and contextualised against Singapores multi-ethnic, multi-religious and secular 
framework. Therefore, attempts to publicly present any form of religiosity which is 
perceived to be at odds with this nationalist schema has often been roundly decried. Thus, 
the modern Muslim has to show more concretely than before, of his/her identification and 
alignment to Singaporean ideals; of inclusiveness and integration.  
 
The effect is not felt on individuals alone. There has been a resultant pressure on Islamic 
institutions to reform as well. Following the collective leadership proposal mounted by 
the AMP (Association of Muslim Professionals), Majlis Pusat organised a closed-door 
session with the then Senior Minister Lee, Malay Members of Parliament and community 
leaders in March 2001.30 I will not be discussing the collective leadership proposal but I 
will be focusing on the outcome of the dialogue session where the then Senior Minister 
ended his speech with this poser to Malay Muslims of Singapore:  did they want to 
support the present policy of gradual integration, or [did they want] to differentiate and 
distance itself from the larger society? 31 And the examples of this differentiation were 
                                                
30 The call for collective leadership was bandied around by AMP in its First National Convention in 1990. 
However in its Second Convention of November 2000, it made public the call for leaders, elected by the 
Malays themselves, to help uplift the fate of the ethnic Malays in Singapore. It was roundly slammed by the 
government as a clear example of politics that would deepen the communal divide. See, Racial Politics 
will undermine Singapore, Straits Times, 6 November 2000 
31 See, Integration has brought benefits to all, Straits Times, 4 March 2001 and Integrate or separate  
Malays pick, Straits Times, 4 March 2001 
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participation in mosque activities and wanting madrasah education. 32 What ensued 
soon after was a statement issued by Malay community leaders, reaffirming their desire 
to multi-racial integration.33 
 
This attempt to integrate and showcase commitment to state ideals was swiftly picked up 
by MUIS. In its November-December issue of its official newsletter, its then President 
Maarof Salleh, was quoted (in his opening address at an exhibition entitled, Spirit of 
Community  Mosques of Singapore at the Asian Civilizations Museum on 16th 
November 2001) as saying that MUIS is consciously and constantly developing 
mosques as centres of Islamic excellence. [But] mosques also play a positive role in 
enhancing strong community bonding and cohesion among Singaporeans through [their] 
annual open house.34 The pace of integration and commitment to this ideal was greatly 
accelerated with the arrest of 15 Jemaah Islamiah operatives in December 2001. 
Following the arrest, then Prime Minister Goh announced the set up Inter-Racial 
Confidence Circles. Its main aim was to bring together religious and community leaders 
to help build trust, understanding among races. 35 
 
MUIS responded to the task with commendable alacrity. Its annual report of 2003 
proudly noted that public talks and educational activities were held for the non-Muslim 
community to promote Understanding Islam and its Practices. Similarly, two Shared 
Perspectives Seminars were held for Mosque Management Board members and the 
                                                
32 SM Lee made these remarks at a dialogue session, following his speech. See, We are not unchanging 
immovables  SM, Straits Times, 11 March 2001 
33 See, Malay leaders want more integration, Straits Times, 11 March 2001 
34 See, A Mosque Like the Leaning Tower of Pisa, Warita Nov/Dec 2001, available from 
http://www.muis.gov.sg/webpub/warita2001/nov-dec/page24.html 
35 See, New push to strengthen racial ties, Straits Times, 30 January 2002. 
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asatizahs (a collective noun for religious teachers and leaders). Its objective was to 
establish a platform to share with these participants the geo-political, social and 
economic challenges facing Singapore as a nation.36 While one could rightly point out 
that it was not only the Singaporean Muslims and the mosques which embarked on these 
public education courses, one should remember then Prime Minister Gohs exhortations, 
following the JI arrest that Muslims in Singapore, make an effort to participate more 
actively in non-Malay/Muslim activities and to remove barriers that reduce the 
common space. 37  Hence, it was incumbent upon Singaporean Muslims, its leaders and 
institutions to demonstrate visibly their commitment to being inclusive and integrated 
into Singaporean society. A further mark of difference was that while other places of 
worship  temples and churches  opened their doors and conducted public educational 
courses, it was significant that only the religious personnel of Muslim bodies were to 
undergo the shared perspectives seminar. This is a separate and visible attempt to 
showcase mosques and religious personnel as being attuned to Singapores state of being. 
Therefore, this puts to rest the fear that mosques and religious personnel were insular and 
divorced from the considerations of living in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious landscape 
such as Singapore. Thus, there has been an all-round and continual effort to demonstrate 
Singaporean Muslims abiding commitment to the integrationist ideal. This mode of 
conceptualising Islam fits in neatly with the configuration of religion as laid out in the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, in that religion has no political functions or 
role, except for inculcating moral values consistent with state building; honesty, industry, 
filial piety(Clammer 1998:13). 
                                                
36 Taken from MUIS Annual Report 2003, page 29 
37 See, Forge Closer Ties, Tackle Irrational Fears, Straits Times, 30 January 2002 and Singapore at risk 
if races assert separate identities, Straits Times, 3 February 2002. 
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The Progressive Malay Muslim 
Thus, central to this re-engineering process, is the crafting of a non-threatening, non-
destabilising Islam. The state has managed to do this on two fronts, first, by once again 
yoking Islam to a developmental, socio-economic purpose and the second (after 
September 11 2001 and the arrest of the Jemaah Islamiah operatives) by a more sustained 
courtship and co-option of Islamic bodies (primarily MUIS) to put forth a model of 
progressive Islam, one that would not be out of place in multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
Singapore. The broader reading would, of course, be that now, more than ever, 
Singaporean Muslims must be in tandem with the state when it comes to policy directives 
and maneuvers. This impacts the way in which same sex sexuality in Islam can be 
discussed here as it influences the public and private perimeters of being Malay and 
Muslim in Singapore.  
 
Given the conflation of ethnic and religious identity, where the Malay and the Muslim are 
seen to be an immutable whole, there exists an almost relentless and insidious pressure 
for the Malay Muslim to be socially and economically progressive and to be 
integrationist and inclusive. So, the ethnic Malays of Singapore are continuously being 
depicted as having had to continually struggle to arrive, due to some inherent cultural 
defect which had considerably impaired its pace and potential to succeed. The 
Singaporean Muslim must show that he/she is Singaporean, by highlighting the inclusive 
and open facet of Islam. Thus, he/she is to be tolerant and open, any attempts to 
showcase otherwise would be roundly dismissed as retreating behind particularistic and 
necessarily divisive lines of religion and ethnicity. This would explain why the gay 
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Malay Muslims existence would not come under sustained scrutiny and threat by the 
larger Malay Muslim society. 
 
Firstly, due to the saturation of the socio-economic model of progress into the grain of 
Malay identity, any inquiry into homosexuality is bound to be short-lived as it would 
short-circuit the much vaunted path to progress. It would not be beneficial to the larger 
Malay Muslim public in Singapore to try to trial homosexuality seriously (i.e. by painting 
it as social, meaning developmental problem) as it would only serve to blight them even 
further. It is not a social and moral contagion that the Malay Muslims are eager to 
claim as one of its own. 
 
Secondly, given the fact that being Muslim and Islam have in the past demonstrated an 
inherent capacity to destabilise the delicate political and religious order of Singapore, the 
Malay Muslims themselves and their leaders are under even greater pressure to 
demonstrate their avowal and enamor of state rhetoric. Given that the state has openly 
come out to embrace gay (foreign) talent and one mans statement (then Prime Minister 
Goh) that homosexuality is natural, Malay Muslims in Singapore and its column of 
leaders would continue to uphold its veil of silence. Or in a carefully calibrated attitude of 
religious orthodoxy and political prudence, they will only say very little. This ensures 
that the depiction of homosexuality within the larger Malay Muslim society revolves 
exclusively around the theme of individual sin and private salvation.  
 
In the analysis of the news reports and the comments of my respondents in the 
proceeding pages, one can see these factors of social discipline at work. The Malay has 
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been disciplined to see that the only quantifiable and definitive marker of being 
Singaporean enough is to achieve socio-economic parity with the rest of the ethnic 
communities. The Muslim has also been similarly disciplined to see that the value and 
end aim of Islam is in achieving greater integration within Singapores multi-religious 
folds. There is very little room for politicising and problematising homosexuality to be 
other than an individual affliction for which the remedy is to be between the afflicted and 
God. Malay Muslims in Singapore have far more pressing issues worthy of their time 
than homosexuality. This shall come up for constant reinforcement in the comments of 
my respondents. Having established the referential framework for being and doing Malay 
and Muslim in Singapore, I will now turn the attention proper to the discussion of same-
sex sexuality by the media and responses from the Malay Muslims in Singapore. 
 
2.5 Sex and Sexuality in Contemporary Malay Muslim Society 
I was already one year into my research, and had established good rapport with my 
informants, when the weekend edition of the Malay newspaper started a series about 
homosexuality in the Malay community. This showcasing by Berita Minggu in a four part 
special on homosexuality affecting Malay/Muslims took my respondents by surprise.  
This feature special on homosexuality was seeking to discover the multiple faces of the 
gay trend amongst Malay/Muslims and it ran for over four weeks beginning from 11th 
May 2003. The Malay daily has been upheld as being one of the four pillars that most 
give strength and shape to the [Malay Muslim] community (Zainul Abidin Rasheed, 
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1991:9) and it remains the only vernacular medium for the Malay Muslims.38 Aisyah 
recalls:  
When I saw the article, I was honest to god, freaked out. I mean, my 
mom reads the Malay papers, you know. So I was like praying that she 




Iriana recalls:  
  
 When I saw the articles, I was upset. This is a paper that is read by all 
the makciks and the pakciks (aunties and uncles) and they are going to 
be fed with all this rubbish. It certainly isnt a fair and accurate 
description, like saying that all sissy men are gays, but this is the only 
resource that they have. 
 
Zaman notes:  
The first (article) is okay. To have the second and third one, you sort of 
wonderummm, what is the intention behind it? What was the trigger 
factor?  I mean like, prolonging it into four weeks of you know. There 
are other issues which bear much more merit than this and the fact that 
its over two pages (his hands sweeps and cuts the air in front of him in 
broad strokes) and spread over four weeks consecutively. It tells me that 
the reporters are ummm, riding high on the hype.  
 
As I have said, my respondents were largely at a loss in trying to understand the rationale 
and need for the showcasing of the articles. In a conversation with one of the writers of 
the articles, she revealed that the newspaper had canvassed for respondents by placing a 
small advertisement in its pages for its four part special several months ahead of its 
publication in May. Its aim was to just highlight the issue in the community, it wasnt to 
condemn them or anything. The editor subsequently clarified that the special was to be 
a learning guide which would serve as a mirror into the present realities of the teenage 
                                                
38 The daily average circulation (in August 2003) for Berita Harian and Berita Minggu was 61,177 and 
68,209 respectively. 
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world, from which we all can learn.39  Zamans comments of other issues bearing more 
merit points to the need for problems/issues debated in the Malay Muslim public to have 
both legitimate and rational undertones. As Zaman would later point out: issues of 
[greater] merit would be teenage pregnancies, drug abuse and so on. These are easily 
identifiable and palatable issues, which could be brought under control through a wide 
array of preventive and rehabilitative measures. Zaman, being one of my older 
respondents, said in the 80s, they had run similar articles of men cruising at Changi 
beach, so its not anything new. In 1997, Berita Harian similarly ran a series of articles 
which focused on homosexuality.40  Given the consistently sensational tenor of these new 
reports, it gives one a rather skewed and limited portrayal of the issue.  
 
The stories followed a format, the first: showcasing (relationships) of gay Muslim men, 
the second: featured Muslim lesbians, the third: success stories of turning straight and the 
fourth: public reactions towards the features and the gay phenomenon. It was a visually 
arresting read, accompanied by illustrations of posed gay couples and pixellated images 
of gay men and women. At this juncture, it would be best if I sketched out more fully the 
vernacular medias representation of this gay trend which was spread out over four 
weeks. The first hint that the regular Sunday morning read would be anything but 
ordinary was the eye catching colour caption on the front pages of the weekly edition of 
11 May 2003. It featured two dolls, bridegrooms, and the tagline that gay relationships 
amongst Muslim teenagers have been a rising trend of late.  
 
                                                
39 In Berita Minggu, 18 May 2003 
40 Ismail, Nizam, Gays busy in Bedok Area, Berita Harian, 23 August 1997 
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The first installment 
The first installment (spread over two pages) portrayed the world of Malay gays and the 
opinions of psychologists (Berita Minggu, 11 May 2003). These experts emphasized 
that while there isnt a readily available formula that could be dispensed to overcome this 
anomalous behaviour, positive influence exercised and generated by parents could prove 
beneficial and critical in motivating change. For instance parents should take note that if 
a girl is constantly surrounded by girls, and hardly has contact with men, and is aware of 
the existence of same sex relationships, then that proclivity (to deviate) shall be 
ignited/inflammed (Berita Minggu, 11 May 2003). However, on the same page, a Dr 
John Elliot, a lecturer in National University of Singapore, dismisses the common 
stereotype that failed heterosexual relationships act a catalyst for same sex propensities. 
These statements when pitted together do little in furthering understanding of gay persons 
as the indeterminacy (is there or isnt there a root cause for homosexuality?) causes 
palpable confusion. 
 
The first installment also contained three other stories on same sex relationships amongst 
men. There are two personal recounts and the other is a third party charting of a life 
history of a gay man. The latter is accompanied by a half page illustration of an 
effeminate boy, with rouged lips and cheeks, playing with dolls and the article was closed 
captioned with these words, since young, he has always liked to play with dolls, Barbie 
dolls and wear makeup to school (Berita Minggu, 11 May 2003).  The first story details 
the blossoming relationship (initially platonic and eventually romantic) between two 
men, 29 yr old Dino and 23 yr old Sufi. Both were professionals and have been in this 
long-term relationship for three years and have had intimate contact with women before 
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but Dino expresses his discomfort and awkwardness and feels that he was lying to 
himself and the girls, since he was more attracted to men (Berita Minggu, 11 May 
2003). Both of them hope for longevity in their union. 
 
The second story featured the relationship of Firdaus a 21-year-old National Serviceman 
and his 26-year-old partner which threw up some interesting comments and conclusions. 
Firdaus believes that it is best for us to be what has been ordained/pre-determined for us, 
rather than to suffer, denying our destiny. (Berita Minggu, 11 May 2003) He recalls the 
times when [he] did not know how to play football. I only liked to play the games that 
girls playedI have no interest in minah-minah.41 The interesting twist came when he 
blames himself upon learning that his good friend, an all star athlete and sterling student 
is also gay. Firdaus is disturbed and distraught with the news that the aforementioned 
friend is now cruising the alleys for mates, I blame myself because I may have 
influenced him. (Berita Minggu, 11 May 2003) 
 
While such a statement may strike most (gay and/or straight) as hogwash, one of my 
respondents, Aisyah, expressed a similar wave of guilt and responsibility. She says,  
One of the reasons why I didnt want to have that relationship with my 
good friend was umm, I didnt want her to become crooked. Because 
she has crushes on men, talking about how some of them are so 
handsome and I didnt want to come along and then make her fall in love 
with women only. I mean, shes like normal you know. I saw myself as 
being responsible for making her crooked.  
 
                                                
41 Minah minah is local lingo meaning Malay girls. It is quite derogatory and dismissive in meaning. It 
usually refers to or conjures images of Malay females who are excessively coy, overtly feminine and none 
too bright. 
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This sense of moral responsibility towards a close friends descent of doom precipitated 
by the undue influence of the gay lifestyle is a rare sentiment. To date, only Aisyah has 
expressed regret and responsibility for leading her ex-girlfriend (former close 
heterosexual friend) down that thorny path of lesbianism. The rest of my respondents 
though groaned at the absurdity and incomprehensibility of the statement. Iriana notes, 
 How can anyone else turn anybody else gay? Its not a disease you 
know. Like some kind of infection that you can catch just because you 
are around me.  
 
Firdaus (in the article) also conveyed the anguish and confusion experienced by his 
mother and that she always advises me not to be remiss in my prayers and Quranic 
recitations to calm and ease my mind. (But) each time, I read the Quran, I am wracked by 
feelings of guilt and can only hope that God forgives my transgressions. These words 
took centrestage and the intent to foreshadow and foreground the recurring theme of 
redemption and reprieve and the necessity of heterosexuality becomes very clear. This 
recount ended on a tone of gay insouciance bordering on the blasé, with Faizal, a 20-
year-old gay man who notes, While the Malay gay phenomenon is not a novel/new 
apparitionit has always existed. Its the society who has been closing one eye, 
preferring to believe instead that it is improbable and impossible. (Berita Minggu, 11 
May 2003) 
 
The journalists were however trying hard to alert the unaware Malay Muslim public to 
this Malay gay phenomenon. They had helpfully provided a concise guide to gay 
hangouts in Singapore. The journalists very thoughtfully provided a run down on the gay 
spaces of Singapore: among them were the pool, shopping centres, cafes, the gym, 
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nightclubs/dance clubs, the infamous Ann Siang Hill, Serangoon Road and Desker Road. 
This list attracted considerable mirth from my respondents. Hasyim responds, 
They listed every conceivable place, where every makcik (aunties) and 
pakcik (uncles) can be found. IS everybody in those places gay? And 
Desker Road? I mean come on, that is for transsexual prostitutes or has-
been ones. Not for gays. It is slipshod reporting, no facts, and just runaway 
fiction. And the pool! I cant even begin to describe how ridiculous that is. 
The days of us soliciting for sex underwater or wanking off in public pools 
are gone lah. We have saunas now you know. 
 
Zaman retorts with,  
Oh no, must not let my parents catch me in these places. You know, wait 
they think I am gay or something. 
 
In the third party report on the life history of a gay man, the spotlight swung to focus on 
Haikal, an 18-year-old gay man who expressed his desire to undergo hormone therapy to 
accentuate his feminity.42 Haikal admits that he is a pondan. Since secondary 
schooland (he) has had no interest in rough play/contact sports, but is often in the 
company of female students. The term pondan in Malay cultural lexicography usually 
refers to an effeminate man, or a cross dresser but hardly refers to an exclusively gay 
man. What is disturbing about this piece is the attribution of hormonal manipulation (to 
be more feminine) as a marker of homosexuality. The inclusion of this story as a feature 
on the gay trend is misleading and shows up the confusion that surrounds the vernacular 




                                                
42 Translated from Dia telah mengambil keputusan sendiri untuk menjalani rawatan hormon untuk 
menyerlahkan kewanitaannya baru-baru ini, Berita Minggu, 11 May 2003 
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The second and third installment 
The second installment focused instead on lesbians and its primary missive seemed to be 
in uncovering the root causes of lesbianism. It sought to discover if the experience of 
having being schooled in an all-girls school actually contributed to this heightened desire 
for same sex gratification.43 Continuing with the narrative style of the previous article, 
case studies and personal recounts featured very heavily here. The two feature stories in 
this installment were on the experiences of two teenage girls. The first girl (20 year old 
Nadia) had discovered that her sister could possibly share the same [lesbian] tendencies 
while the second is a bitter 18 year old (Dahlia) who is disillusioned, scarred by 
unfulfilling relationships with self absorbed, selfish men. I will not be delving any deeper 
into these personal recounts as I had done for the first installment. This is, as I believe I 
have adequately conveyed the sensational and misinformed manner of reporting that has 
consistently marred the discussion on the gay trend by the vernacular media here.  
 
The third installment informs and persuades that one can indeed stop this moral 
freefalling that is symbolized by homosexuality. It featured personal recounts of a gay 
man and a lesbian, both of whom are expressing sorrow at their past lives. It begins 
with 23 year-old Yazid who has had sexual relations with 20 men (mostly one night 
stands).  Kayleen interjects with, 
20 partners? Wow, where does he find all these people? I think the over 
emphasis on his promiscuity gives the impression that gay relationships is 
all about exploitation that is just plain unfulfilling. And that is not a fair 
representation. 
 
                                                
43 Translated from, Apakah yang telah terjadi sehingga menyebabkan mereka bercinta dengan kaum 
sejenis?Berita Minggu, 18 May 2003 
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 Yazid recalls being showered by gifts by his much older patron but despite the 
outpouring of such riches, he felt empty and worthless. He had to have a lot of discipline 
in faith so that it (the gay experience) will not be repeated and was thankful for the 
support of my friends who were continually advising me and supporting me and free[ing] 
me from the trap of gay desire.44 30 year-old Rina describes being a lesbian as, not an 
ordinary rite of passage for most teenagersit is akin to an addiction. Once you are 
trapped, it is hard to extricate yourself from the life that has become a part of your flesh 
and blood.45 Rina notes that it is indeed possible to change as she had indeed done so on 
her own accord. The moral thrust of this is not entirely accidental. While it maybe a 
personal odyssey for Yazid and Rina, there is little doubt that the note on which the third 
instalment had ended conveys and echoes the silent stand of the Malay Muslim public 
towards same sex sexuality.  
 
 
The fourth installment 
The fourth series summed up the response of select Malay Muslims (i.e. those who were 
motivated enough to write in to the daily). It became clear, as the weeks wore on, that 
some people believed that homosexual tendencies could be reversed. One reader 
recommended that Muslim leaders, religious organisations, Islamic bodies and youth 
                                                
44 Translated from, Saya perlu banyak berdisplin dan beristiqamah agar ia tidak berulang lagi. Mujurlah 
saya dikurniakan kekuatan rohani dan sokongan teman teman yang tidak putus-putus memberi nasihat dan  
dorongan. Mereka membantu saya membebaskan diri daripada perangkap naluri gay. Berita Minggu, 25 
May 2003 
45 Translated from, Ia bukan satu peralihan zaman remaja. Ia seperti juga masalah ketagihan. Sekali 
anda terjebak, susah nak keluar dari kehidupan yang seakan telah menjadi darah daging anda, Berita 
Minggu, 25 May 2003 
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organisations chart a plan of action of public education and preventative or containment 
strategies.46  
 
This vein of thought was shared by a senior social worker from Al Hijrah (a social 
service agency). The social worker said that gays face difficulties in their attempts to turn 
straight as some from this group of people may feel that there is no way out for them 
because they may have undergone a sex change. 47  The combining of multiple and 
distinct gender identities into one, and for it to mean being gay, is reflective of the 
underdeveloped framework of thought surrounding sex and sexuality. The idea and ideal 
where two sexes equals two genders equals two distinct sexual orientations is clearly very 
present in the Malay Muslim psyche. This lack of differentiation points to a real lack of 
understanding of the fluidity of sexual behaviours. I am not suggesting that this binary 
model of thinking is unique only to the Malay Muslims. Leong (1997:134) had similarly 
alluded to such a pastiche of identities but these are subsumed under a Hokkien (Chinese 
dialect) term, ah quah. Like bapuk (popularly referred to mean sissy), both carry a 
pejorative tag. The result, when one carelessly lumps gender and sexual variations into 
one indistinguishable mass, is a group [that is] ridiculed, condemned and made a 
spectacle of (ibid: 134).   
 
 Letters which were published and comments which made it to print applauded the team 
for being brave enough to bring the issue to public attention. A cikgu Suziena (cikgu is 
teacher in Malay) commended the features team for their bold move by showcasing this 
                                                
46 In Berita Minggu, 1 June 2003 
47 Translated from Malay, Sesetengah dari golongan ini mungkin merasakan tiada jalan keluar kerana 
mereka telah pun melalui pertukaran jantina In Berita Minggu, 1 June 2003 
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ill, thereby ridding the misconception that the only issue of pressing concern affecting 
Malay Muslim youths today are drug abuse and promiscuity. However, the attention on 
the issue soon petered out and no more was heard on interventionist or developmental 
programmes expressly tailored for this group of sexual deviants. 
  
Thus, in reference to Zamans earlier point that Malay Muslims in Singapore had far 
more substantive issues to worry about, the socio-economic rationale had been so 
ingrained that it would be difficult for threads of debate to be picked up if it did not 
demonstrate such easily identifiable and comfortable properties. This was clearly 
internalized by my respondents who spoke of the need to focus on more pressing social 
ills rather than devoting airtime and print space to same-sex matters. Zaman continues:  
I really dont know what use these articles are for us. If anything, it 
might push the gay community even further into a corner. With all this 
publicity or awareness, mothers and fathers might watch their children 
for all the danger signs. And teenagers going through normal puberty and 
are confused, might think they are definitely gay. There are other issues 
worth covering right? Drug use, teenage pregnancies. Why waste all this 




The rather dour response by the Malay Muslims to homosexuality could be due to the 
consanguinity of the ethnic category Malay with the economic deficiency mythology. 
This would explain why the coverage remained within the realm of the private and 
personal and rarely ventured beyond the traditional schema of sin and salvation. It would 
not do for the Malay Muslims here to bring yet another social ill into its fold, especially, 
when it is attracting more attention at the present time.  As Su wryly notes:  
Talking more about the subject doesnt reflect upon them because, for 
some reason, Malays take everything personally. So, if this is a 
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problem in the Malay Muslim community, you know, it makes 
everyone in the community look bad and so they just sweep it under the 
carpet. 
 
And the ethnic Malays have been taking things personally because they have been told 
that their failures are almost always attributable to themselves. But also of great 
motivation I believe, is the belief of the Malay Muslims themselves that homosexuality 
remains a private matter. They believe it is a religious one for which God shall be the 
sole adjudicator. Picking up on Zamans point that his sexuality is a private one, 
unsurprisingly enough it is also a common refrain amongst all my respondents. There is a 
Malay proverb that aptly captures why they are generally reluctant to publicly speak on 
the matter. Seperti membuka pekung di dada roughly translates to revealing the open 
sores/cankers on your chest. As any believer of Islam would know, homosexuality is 
indeed a sin in Islam and, hence, there is already divine foreclosure on the matter. This 
has a profound impact on the future patterning of resistance or mobilisation pathways 
of the gay Muslims in Singapore. I will elaborate on this on Chapter Four. 
 
Since homosexuality cannot be broached in the same throw away manner as the very 
public drug problem discussion, it remains outside the realms of public discussion.48  
Given that the state has adopted a more approving stand towards homosexuality  
although it is a self-serving interest  Malay Muslims have to be careful not to overtly 
challenge these assumptions and therefore discussions remain rooted in the conventional 
                                                
48 The drug problem of the Malay community is a well-known and documented one. In the 1980s, it was 
brought to the attention of the community that a disproportionate number of addicts were Malays. A whole 
host of social problems could be traced from this single pathogen; latchkey children and overall distressed 
family units. Hence, it was packaged to be a major socio-economic ill. The Malay community then attacked 
the problem with an almost Messianic zeal, with former Member of Parliament Harun Ghani taking the 
lead. Just recently in March 2003, the Malay daily, Berita Harian, carried a front page article saying that 
the Malay community had successfully arrested the drug problem. 
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wrong versus right and never who said it was wrong?49 While there is no sustained 
public discussion on the issue, it does not logically mean that there is no condemnation or 
general abhorrence. Ironically enough, due to its muted representation, it has led to my 
respondents expressing a level of comfort and ease when existing as Malay Muslim gays. 
When asked if they felt marginalised from larger Singaporean society on account of their 
ethnicity, they were genuinely puzzled. The anonymity they enjoy has allowed them to 
quietly exist, without moral mobs and histrionics. As Su says:  
Sure, the community here is in denial about us. They know about us but 
they dont talk about us. And that is fine by me. The less said about us 
the better. It gives me the space to move around, the freedom.   
 
 
Their pariah status would instead be prompted and defined by streams of influence 
swirling around in larger non Malay Muslim spaces. The discursive statements of 
homosexuality being a disease and of gays being depraved would almost certainly have 
its roots within a religiously-laced moral sphere, but is not one which is endemic to ethnic 
Malays or one which is exclusively engineered and buttressed by Islam.  
 
As I have outlined in this chapter, due to the confluence of ethnicity and religion and all 
its attendant meanings of progress and piety (to the state), the Malay Muslims of 
Singapore find themselves under an even keener gaze to conform. The announcement 
made by the then Prime Minister on the naturalness of homosexuality, highlights this 
delicate position. The official admission that same-sex preference may very well be a 
                                                
49 However, I am not suggesting that the Malay Muslim community is a quiet, acquiescing lot. They have 
voiced objections to unfavourable state decisions. This could be seen most recently through the tudung and 
casino debate. However, it is important to distinguish between the profiles of the disgruntled parties in the 
Malay Muslim community. The tudung issue was brought to the fore by unhappy parents and individuals 
and the casino issue was debated about by PERGAS (The Islamic Religious Teachers Association of 
Singapore) and several individuals. There has been very little official intervention and opposition from 
the state endorsed religious body, i.e. MUIS. 
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natural phenomenon constricts the space available for Muslims here to say otherwise. A 
tacit disavowal of official policy is more injurious to the Singapore Muslims  given its 
current position. We can see this being played out clearly in MUIS official response to 
homosexuality. Before we delve deeper into the response, it would be fitting to situate 
more accurately the context and intent behind then PM Gohs statement on 
homosexuality. 
 
PM Goh and his comments on homosexuality in TIMEAsia 
There have been a fair number of misrepresentations on the then PM Gohs statements. It 
is not, as some had been led to believe, an open admission that homosexuality is now 
acceptable in Singapore. It is therefore important to revisit the context of PM Gohs 
statement that was part of a feature in a 2003 edition of TIMEasia. The article recounted 
the reinventing and re-branding strategies that Singapore had undertaken to remain 
competitive in a year known for its tough economic challenges. A key strategy that was 
highlighted by the magazine was on the luring and retention of foreign talent by 
Singapore and that it will do whatever it takes to attract talent.50  The magazine had 
noted that part of the concessions of the tiny nation state was to relax some repressive 
government policies that had previously been effected in the name of social stability. A 
key demonstration of this more progressive stance of the government was in its attitude 
towards homosexuality. Thus it was at this juncture that PM Goh had spoken his 
infamous words on employing gays even in sensitive positions in the civil service and his 
opinion that homosexuality is natural and that over time, people will begin to understand 
it. 
                                                
50 See Simon Elegant, The Lion in Winter, TIMEAsia, 7 July 2003, Vol 161 No. 26 
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 His statements were therefore largely for external consumption, it was directed at 
correcting outsider perception that Singapore was a morally oppressive society (which 
could have led to a fair number of talented gay foreigners into giving Singapore a miss). 
It was not meant to be a social manifesto of change for insiders, i.e. Singaporeans. It is 
however, interesting to note that the que sera sera attitude that he had expressed with 
respect to homosexuality has been depicted as a necessary pre-condition to retaining 
foreign talent. This does point to the hard-nosed pragmatism that has been a cornerstone 
of Singapore politics and policies. However, his statements had been interpreted by some 
Singaporeans (gay and heterosexual) that the floodgates had been opened. 51 However, 
there are signs that such a policy of allowance is not without its limits. The authorities 
recently denied a license for an annual gay Christmas party, a party that has been held 
without any difficulty for the past two years. The police cited the cause for the denial to 
be that Singapore is still a conservative and traditional society. Observers note that the 
move was a signal for gay Singaporeans to not push the limit of tolerance or else it 
may cause a backlash.52 Nevertheless, at the time of its utterance and eventual 
publication, his statements however caused a considerable flap and consternation 
amongst Singaporeans and religious organizations. We will now turn to the official 
response to the matter by MUIS and we can clearly see that it had a decidedly less 
avuncular and confrontational tone when compared to the Christians. 
 
 
                                                
51 See, Employing gays in civil service a tiny step forward, Straits Times, 6 July 2003 
See, Gays are still people, Straits Times, 9 July 2003 
See, Govt should rethink hiring of gays, Straits Times, 15 July 2003 
52 See, Gay party no-go a signal not to push limits, Straits Times, 19 December 2004 
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2.6  Homosexuality and Islam in Singapore  The Official Response 
The Muslim authorities reserved their comments until much later and only after the other 
religious groups had reiterated their position. The National Council of Churches issued a 
statement which essentially reinforced the hate the sin, love the sinner position. 
However, it also urged the government to maintain existing legislation concerning 
homosexuality and to continue its policy of non-allowance with respect to registration of 
homosexual societies or clubs. It also expressed strong hopes that the government 
maintains its policy of not allowing the promotion of a homosexual lifestyle and its 
activities. 53 This issue was hotly debated by some of the Christian camps in Singapore 
where a group of 20 Christians from different denominationsmet and agreed on a plan 
of action to tackle a volatile situation.54  This call to arms was taken seriously by some 
Christians who felt that it was their duty to speak out on a matter of public policy. 
Christians aggrieved by the situation included Pastor Yang Tuck Yoong and Dr Thio Su 
Mien. The former noted that homosexuality is a sin and it is far more rampant, militant 
and organized than most of us actually believe it to be. The battle lines are now drawn 
and it is time for the Church of Singapore to rise up and make a stand. Dr Thio echoed a 
similar position when he and eight signatories expressed their hopes that we should not 
allow our society to be eroded by the growing agenda of homosexuals in our society.55 I 
am not suggesting that this was the only view held by all Christians in Singapore; in fact 
there were other voices that preached tolerance and acceptance. But what I would like to 
emphasize here is the very different tack that had been adopted by the Christians and the 
                                                
53 Churches stand on gays, TODAY, 30 July 2003 
54 Gay backlash, Straits Times, 23 July 2003 
55 Also from Gay backlash, Straits Times, 23 July 2003 
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Muslims in Singapore when discussing homosexuality. The Christian response had 
highlighted a clear split between those resolutely against homosexuality and those who 
took on a more calibrated approach. In short, there was debate on the ground amongst the 
Christians while there was almost none in the Malay Muslim public. The statement issued 
by the National Council of Churches calls clearly for the government to maintain 
policies/legislation outlawing homosexuality while the statement issued by MUIS 
contains no such explicit remonstrations to the officialdom.  
 
The Muslims took some time after the Christians to address the tempest when eventually; 
an official statement was drafted and issued to the mosques. This statement was to be 
delivered during Friday sermons and the statement read: [that while]  convincing 
them to give up their lifestyle was difficult, it was not an impossible task.56  Thus, it is 
clear that MUIS sees it as not natural, but rather as an aberration. Continuing, the 
Assistant Mufti, Mr Mohammed Fatris Bakaram remarked: Its best for the community 
to tackle problems without alienating itself from the changes affecting Singapore. The 
reluctance of MUIS to become embroiled in this proverbial storm in a teacup is 
understandable and also consistent with the utility and expression of Islam in Singapore; 
one which is compatible and comfortable within a multi-ethnic, multi-religious context.   
 
In a separate statement, when interviewed by Detik, Ustaz Fatris revisited the same 
premise of tolerance and acceptance.57 He says:   
Humans are bestowed with the gift of choice and as such must exercise 
options accordingly. Two possible avenues to explore would be one, to 
                                                
56 MUIS spells out its stand on gay issues, Straits Times, 2 August 2003 
57 Detik is a current news affairs programme on SURIA. SURIA is a Malay TV channel. 
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take an isolationist stance and to segregate oneself from the changes. A 
militant stance would not be productive either, for to resist change is 
often futile. The best way then is to find spaces from where we can then 
direct and effect positive change.58 
 
Given the micro management of religiosity and ethnicity of Malay Muslims, a manifesto 
positioned to be so antagonistic and contrary to the official press release would only 
increase public scrutiny and official pressure. 
 
2.7 Malay Muslims in Singapore: Popular translations of faith 
But is MUIS operating in a moral vacuum? I have presented the official model of being 
Muslim in Singapore, but could the laity be several steps behind MUIS in terms of their 
religiosity/orthodoxy levels? After all, it was not too long ago that Judith Djamour 
(1959:15,106) had observed that the Malays in Singapore were less rigid when observing 
religious tenets. They drank alcohol, hardly understood Arabic prayers, mosque 
attendance was rare, few fasted throughout the whole Ramadhan month and the practice 
of zakat (a form of religious tithe) was almost non-existent. In the 1980s, Tania Li 
(1989:67) similarly noted that many younger Singaporean Muslims still did not carry out 
the five daily prayers, although they had fasted during Ramadhan.  
 
However, as Mutalib (1990:878) points out, the global Islamic revivalism of the 1960s 
and 1970s have pushed for Islam to be the dominant, if not exclusive, identity for its 
adherents. Additionally, it had also championed for the notion of a transnational ummah 
and pushed for the ingraining of Islam into every facet of ones life. This has 
                                                
58 His comments in their entirety, translated from Malay: Kita sebagai manusia yang hidup dalam satu 
zaman dengan pembaharuan yang begitu pesat, kita punya pilihan juga, sama ada untuk melawan arus, 
ataupun kita mencari ruang ruang untuk lebih membangunkan hidup kita. Untuk mengasingkan diri bukan 
satu pilihan yang bijak. Pilihan yang kedua juga bukanlah satu pilihan yag bijakpilihan yang sepatutnya 
kita ambil ialah bahawa mencari ruang and kita cuba mengambil perubahan yang ada ke arah positif itu. 
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considerably heightened the religious consciousness of the Singapore Malays. So while 
the conformity to religious orthodoxy may seem to be woefully lacking in the 1950s, it 
has been observed that there has been an increased public exhibition of religiosity. As 
Weber (1964:264) notes, Islam is a universal religion that places great emphasis on 
presenting ones faith publicly. And while there has been no religiosity index that could 
capture Malay Muslims awareness and practice of Islam, as early as the late 1980s, 
Bajunid (1988:116) pointed out, signs are [already] appearing of a growing conformity 
to the Muslim dress code among Muslim women in Singapore. This was also recently 
observed by Fong (2000) and in marked contrast to Djamours observation then that the 
practice of zakat giving was non-existent; MUISs zakat collection in 2001 was 
$13,728,577.59 
 
In Singapore, there has been much talk of the Arabization in the manner of dress of 
Singaporean Muslims. This is a populist revival, harkening back about six years ago.60 
The rush by those smitten by Arab culture to dress like their Middle Eastern counterparts 
had caused some considerable consternation among Malay Muslims here, who bemoaned 
the possible loss of the indigenous baju kurong as the modest garb of choice. I will not be 
debating the merits of one dress over another, but it does clearly show the spontaneous 
adoption of Malay Muslims here of all strains Muslim, wherever it may hail from. It 
points to a growing awareness and a conscious avowal to exhibit more publicly the signs 
of their piety. As Fong (2002:164) notes, religiosity is moving away from a gird of zero 
sum paradigm, and it is entering a perspective of multiple applications.  
                                                
59 Taken from MUIS Annual Report, 2001 
60 See, Is it cool for Spore Malays to go Arab? Straits Times, 25 April 2004 
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And one example of this multiple application is the growing insistence that Islam is a 
necessary and critical integer to being Malay. The confluence of Malay and Islam has 
been well documented and I have alluded to it earlier, but there have been signs among 
Malay Muslims of how paramount Islam is to the Malay identity. Islam provides the 
material basis for the concept of Malayness which can be seen through plans for an 
implementation of an Islamic banking system for the community, in the perennial need 
for Malay leaders to be Muslim and the inclusion of religious education in one of the four 
core areas that would help the community compete and progress better.61  
 
Also, in a recent Straits Times article, community leaders and key Malay Muslim figures 
were asked what makes a Malay icon. While their responses were considerably varied, 
they were unanimous about the importance of Islam. Religion was touted to be an even 
more important requirement than race. That was the reason, as the article noted, that, 
while discussing the issue of the New Malay (who is to be an embodiment of the Malay 
of the future), the first Malay beauty queen was deemed an unacceptable icon by no less 
than the Minister in charge of Muslim Affairs, Dr Yaacob Ibrahim.62  
 
This train of thought was also seen in a recent interview the Straits Times had with the 
current Speaker of Parliament, Abdullah Tarmugi who used to be the previous Minister in 
charge of Muslim Affairs. Asked if people expected him to be more religious or more 
                                                
61 Islam will still play big role in future, Straits Times 15 November 1999 
Nama awak sudah naik, Berita Harian, 1 March 2001 
Four pronged plan to help Malays compete, Straits Times, 5 January 2001 
62See, Excuse me, are you a Malay icon? Straits Times, 30 October 2004 
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Muslim than them, he candidly replied: Yes. In fact, some people saw me as not being 
religious enough.63  
 
Although I am careful not to make any absolute statements on the state of religiosity and 
conformity amongst the Malay Muslims here, the gap between orthodoxy and practice is 
slowly narrowing. Thus, I will argue that, despite the enduring appeal of the socio-
economic ideology for the Malay Muslims, it will be very difficult for successful gay 
Malay Muslims to be (publicly) accepted by their majority (heterosexual) brethren. The 
mantra of progress and development which has been consciously internalized by Malay 
Muslims in Singapore will not uniformly reward and embrace successful kinsmen who 
have, in the process, also turned their backs on Islam. This is not a reality, however which 
is peculiar to the Malay Muslim psyche. The persona non grata status is also 
unceremoniously slapped onto successful non Malay Muslims who do feel the 
overwhelming stigma of being gay in strait-laced Singapore. In an exclusive interview 
with the organiser of the biggest lesbian party in Singapore (Herstory), 33-year-old CT 
recalls her brave attempt in orchestrating a mini Mardi Gras parade outside Zouk in 
March 2001. This was a feat which has yet to be repeated because she notes: [some] 
hold very respected jobs so I do not want to get anyone into trouble.64 Success is not 
synonymous with mass appeal and acceptance even outside non-Malay Muslim spaces of 
Singapore. Hence, predictably enough, with the saturation of Islam into the Malay 
Muslim psyche, which subsequently defines the allowable perimeters of success, gay 
                                                
63 See, The Speaker tells all about his style, Straits Times, 14 January 2005 
64 See, Her Say page 79-80 in Mens Folio, September/October 2004 
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Malay Muslims will find it difficult to lay claim to a level of acceptance by the public, 
despite their obvious and tangible claim to meritorious milestones.  
 
Hence, given that Malays in Singapore are indeed demonstrating a renewed and broader 
appreciation in the interpretation and practice of Islam, one therefore would not be too far 
wrong in assuming that the laity does mimic the measured and rational approach as 
shown by MUIS on the issue of homosexuality. On a broader level, this calm and 
measured approach would, of course, affect the model for collective representation and 
action for gay Malay Muslims in Singapore. The vague and non-committal response by 
the leading official Muslim body, MUIS, ensures that gay Malay Muslims and, more 
importantly, the larger Muslim society, do not suddenly find themselves the object of 
scrutiny and possible recriminations.  
 
Unlike their Muslim counterparts, gay Christians have actively coalesced around these 
indeterminate, grey areas of human sexuality and have crystallized these nebulous areas 
into concrete programmes and areas of viable and visible action. This invites greater 
awareness and increased solicitation from both sides of the camp, pro-gay activists or 
those staunchly against. Since such a situation is absent among Malay Muslims in 
Singapore, my respondents do not feel disadvantaged or more stigmatised. Thus, this 
continued silence or inaction on both sides of the coin; personal or societal, presents a 
situation that is both a boon and a bane.  
 
Gay interest groups in Singapore are generally very apprehensive and hostile towards 
religious groups or institutions which take a combative stand towards same-sex sexuality. 
 80 
Islam, while generally understood to be a religion belligerent towards same-sex sexuality 
has managed to escape public scrutiny and pressure from the gay interest groups here due 
to the soft, balanced touch of MUIS and of course the non-plussed attitude of the 
Malays here. This lack of a perceptible threat from MUIS and the Malay Muslims in 
general has led gay Malay Muslims to feel relatively comfortable. This tacit alliance has 
allowed for the continued, comfortable and covert existence of gay Malay Muslims here.  
 
I have explained how the larger level policies and ideals of the state have systematically 
worked their way into the normative boundaries of being a Singapore Malay Muslim and 
how this had led to the creation of comfortable and sheltered spaces for gay Malay 
Muslims. In the next two chapters, I will be plotting out more concretely my respondents 
views about their private spheres of existence; their relationship with their families and 
friends; their place in larger Malay society and their (ambivalent) relationship towards 
civil society in Singapore. All of the above social scenes, coupled with the place and 
position that the larger Malay Muslim society occupies in modern Singapore (in relation 
to state defined ideals and norms of religion, ethnicity and sexuality) will go a long way 
towards explaining why the push for recognition and, more importantly, legitimacy 













In Chapter Two, I discussed the broader level meanings of being Malay and Muslim in 
Singapore. I also discussed the various responses towards homosexuality as was depicted 
by the vernacular media. This chapter shall illustrate my sample sizes private response to 
those categorizations and will also capture their personal journeys through faith, friends 
and family. This is important in helping to help shed light on my respondents coping 
strategies and how they adapt to prevailing public opinion on same-sex sexuality. This 
will go a long way in understanding the eventual patterning of resistance, if any, of the 
Singaporean gay Malay Muslim towards the less than favourable position that 
homosexuality occupies both in Islam and in the eyes of its adherents here.  
 
3.1 Pulp fiction  Response to Public Representations of Sexuality, Faith and 
Ethnicity  
Hasyim had written in to Berita Minggu to express his dissatisfaction with the skewed 
portrayal of gay men:  
I mean, since when are all gay men sissies? You cannot judge if a 
person is gay or not just by looking at the mannerisms, that is a 
completely wrong way of going about it. Then, you wont understand 
what being gay is all about. What worries me is that people will read this 
and think that this is somehow a definitive mark. The paper is being 
irresponsible when it perpetuates stereotypes like these. 
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He was also upset that the daily had chosen to report on a matter that he felt was 
inappropriate for public consumption and knowledge. Despite his impassioned note, he 
was roundly rebuffed by the editor.65  
Echoing the concern that the paper is leading naïve Malay Muslims astray, Aisyah says:  
Ya lah, I guess at some level, parents are made more aware of teenagers 
nowadays go through. Like gender confusion is so normal nowadays. 
But its also important that the right information gets conveyed, 
otherwise, they may make judgments based on all these faulty things. 
   
She continues:  
But my first thought when I read it, was Oh no! All these parents, 
previously clueless about this will then pick up on words like passive, 
actives, butch and all and then alarm bells will start to go off. I think 
its good that parents know, after all, they can be a positive influence. 
But its one thing to know, but then after that, what happens? While you 
have the knowledge, you dont have the skills. Not everyone wants to 
change. How do parents deal with that? 
 
Iriana then commented: 
The whole series of articles distorts the realities that are out there. The 
truth is while there is a very real conflict for some of us; they are 
amongst us those who truly believe that Islam and homosexuality need 
not be so harsh to each other. And not all lesbians are butches or 
femmes! 
 
Kayleen, who after poring over the articles over a considerable amount of time, looked up 
and said:  
Well, what do you want me to say? I mean, it is to be expected. This is 
a Malay paper, with their own set of opinions. Obviously, they are not 
going to be pro-us and suddenly say that they support us. They try to be 
balanced, but saying later on, that there needs to be compassion and 
understanding, but that is because they want us to change! 
 
                                                
65  In Berita Minggu, May 18 2003 
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I asked Mohd what he had thought of the articles and he responded: 
I didnt think much. I dont believe we can trust the Malay papers to do 
a good job of portraying what we are all about. Its about selling papers. I 
dont think they are interested in painting a picture that is sympathetic to 
us, if it means that the whole community is going to turn against them. 
 
 Generally, my respondents remain unperturbed by the tempest.  As Su cheekily notes:  
The Malay community is notorious for our short term memory. Ya, its 
all hoo and haa for now, but it will soon disappear and life will just 
return back to normal. 
 
Other than Sus wry observation on the amnesiac tendencies of Malay Muslims which 
would lead to a petering out of attention on the issue, Zaman offers his opinion: 
Attention will soon die out. Why? Because the rest of us, the ones who 
are truly living the life, wont respond. Why bother? It unnecessarily 
disturbs the community, it is better if they think this is still not 
happening. Because it will distract them from other more important 
things that needs to be tackled. Like terrorism for example. Important 
things like rather than whether it matters that there are gay Muslims in 
Singapore. 
  
I asked my respondents if they felt unfairly judged by the majority of Malay Muslims in 
Singapore and if they felt to be in a double bind on account of their ethnicity and religion. 
Iriana answers: 
I guess its like an unavoidable situation. When you are Malay, the 
Muslim part just comes naturally after. And we do come under greater 
scrutiny because religion is such a big part of who we are, as a 
community. Its not quite fair to say that I feel that I am not judged 
fairly. Because by my own admission, I understand that homosexuality is 
a sin in Islam. What I oppose to its the finality that the community 
associates with it. I believe fundamentally, religion is a private contract 
between you and God and only HE can judge you. The community can 
say all they want and I respect their right to say it. Because at the end of 





Of course, it is difficult to just sit back and take all this s**t. But really, 
whats to stop them from talking? Fact is, since Islam is such a big part 
of our lives, everything needs to be judged, you know. And although I 
am unhappy with the way that we are being portrayed, I wont raise a big 
fuss about it, because in a way, you are drawing attention to yourself. 
And you know; its not like we will ever be accepted. Judging on 
whether one is right or wrong is like a natural part because even I do it to 
other Malay Muslims. So I cant say, no, stop commenting on us, so the 





Religion is a huge and important part in the community. So their value 
system is located entirely within the religion, there is no escaping that. 
So yes, it does get frustrating because there is like so little space to just 
step out and be something else, but such is the situation. I mean, I am 
Muslim, so I understand the rules and what you have to do to be a good 
Muslim. You are just more watched here, thats all. But I take religion to 
be a private thing. I dont obsess over it. I can fully function as gay, 
Malay and Muslim in Singapore because I dont need the communitys 
endorsement for who I am and how I live. 
 
This strong undercurrent of independence and perhaps defiance is also articulated by 
Azwan: 
 
If you listen to what everyone says about you all the time, then you will 
be seriously f****d up. I own my life. How is my being gay affecting 
others in the community? God sees me and will judge me by what I have 
done. I care for my family, I respect them and I also respect my religion. 
But I am happy where I am. I have a good job, so my love life could do 
better (laughs), but I have great friends. These are the people that will lift 
me up when I am down. If I am down, let it be through my own doing. I 
wont let other people be the cause of my fall. 
 
 
Zaman sums it up when he says: 
 
Seriously, you shouldnt get upset by what the community thinks and 
says. Because they believe that they are being good Muslims and they 
are guided by that. It is their right to express themselves. Because we 
would also want that right, right? You cant be so insistent that it has to 
be your way all the time. If we start coming out and fighting each other, 
there will be no end. For me, I dont see any conflict in being gay in 
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Islam. Because, ultimately, I will be judged fairly by God. I live a 
fulfilling life and I dont let what other people say affect me.  
 
 
My respondents clearly draw their comfort and strength in being gay from outside the 
schematic norms of the Malay Muslim majority. It will be timely for us to remember that 
my respondents are part of the larger Singapore bloc, where multiple faiths and multiple 
ethnicities collide in an avowedly secular state. And clearly, the less than celebrated 
position of homosexuality in Singapore could be easily replicated (to varying degrees of 
course) across different faith groups and ethnic blocs. Therefore, it is not enough to rely 
on the amnesiac tendencies of the Malay Muslim society or to insist that the majority 
Malay Muslim group focus instead on far weightier social issues in providing for a 
comfortable living environment for my respondents. Therefore, it is important to plot the 
other sources of support that are present in their private spheres that have helped them 
achieve an enviable level of sanguinity about their none too favoured place within the 
larger Malay Muslim society. This will be an important factor when considering the 
attractiveness of legitimising same-sex sexuality in Islam.  
 
It is impossible to extrapolate any binding and overarching assumptions which would 
hold true for everyone, everywhere. I shall classify their experiences and reactions into 
three broad themes: self and sexuality, self and society (to include both personal and 
impersonal networks) and self and faith (the latter I will examine in Chapter Four). Each 
of my respondents will be given due mention but I shall not be presenting all 14 across 
the two themes. This selective airing is not for my wanting to impose any arbitrary 




3.2 Private Intimations on Public Representations 
 
I begin with the widely used and greatly explored realm of identity. For purposes of this 
thesis, understanding identity is a useful evaluative concept. It helps to elucidate the 
personal and political make-up of my respondents. Often, their interactions with others 
are very dependent on their inner mantle and mettle. This would explain why they adopt a 
laissez faire attitude towards the general disapproval which the majority of Malay 
Muslims have towards same-sex sexuality. I will be focusing on specific moments which 
highlight their acceptance of themselves and when that came into being. 
 
 I asked my respondents on the utility and attachment they felt towards identity tags or 
labels. All 14 have no qualms being identified as gay:   
No, they can call me whatever they want. Butch, gay, lesbian, 
whatever. I heard a new one just the other day. Carpet something..but I 
just cant remember what it is right now.(snaps her fingers in mock 
irritation) Yes, Yes, thats it! Carpet-muncher. I just heard that one, so 
its a new one for me. Isnt that just hilarious!66 [Aisyah] 
 
This is a basic building block to indicate their ease with themselves and often the key 
ingredient in fostering relations with others. However, while they had no considerable 
issues in admitting to themselves that they are gay, the transparency and the extent of 
how comfortable they were varies when interacting with others outside their personal 
fold. Aisyahs admission is more startling given that she wears the tudung (although in 
                                                
66 Carpet in this instance refers to the pubic hair surrounding the female genitalia. As there is no direct 
[natural] penetration in lesbian sex, cunnilingus is often employed.  
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our meetings, she never did). I then asked if she knew that the term (carpet-muncher) was 
a pejorative one. She laughingly brushed it off:  




Iskandar sees himself as:  
Both a gay and a homosexual. To me, it is the same thing. Its like the 
word person and individual. They both mean the same thing. These are 
only names/labels. I dont bother about such things and nor do I let them 
bother me much. 
 
Zaman continues: 
Actually, I didnt even know what this term gay is, until I started surfing 
the Internet. Because back then, everyone will just call us homosexuals, 
you know. When the AIDS scare happened in the early 80s, that was the 
noun of choice. Everyone was homosexual this, homosexual that. It 
became a dirty word. Since I am essentially the same person pre-AIDS 
and post-AIDS, I dont really let labels define me. 
 
All my respondents are blasé about the labels being bandied around for them, although 
Mohd indicated that he preferred a more delicate term, boy-boy to indicate a gay man, 
as it sounds less crass and harsh than just the term gay.  This, I reasoned, probably had 
much to do with the fact that among all my respondents, Mohd and Iskandar were 
probably the deepest in the closet and were still finding their comfort level. Mohd had 
told me that he wishes to just blend in and not to stand out.  As he says hesitatingly: 
I dont confirm or deny. I dont answer questions from people asking 
about my sexuality. They may think I am gay from the way that I dress, 
but I will not say if I am. Its a private matter. 
 
This guardedness reveals the deep-seated conflicts in those who have acknowledged in 
one part or another to themselves who they are but are unable to convey that awareness, 
for fear of reprisals or recrimination. I am highlighting the dawn of this self-realisation 
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and acceptance because, for some cases, it does highlight the acute structural and social 
differences in Singapore vis-à-vis other countries. For Kayleen, Iriana, Roslan and 
Azwan, being overseas emboldened them to initiate and establish ties with those in wider 
society. It was the more supportive environment, coupled with the anonymity they 
enjoyed, which were often the push factors that made them achieve a level of comfort 
with who they are.   
 
For purposes of this thesis, I am not delving deep into the psychological processes or 
ritualized aspects of this self-revelation and disclosure. Neither am I taking the 
essentialist position that this rite of passage (as some have termed it) is a distinctly visible 
and crucial necessity for gay men and women everywhere. I indicate this only to surmise 
and summarise the pertinent personal points on my respondents trek through life.  
 
3.3 Personal watersheds in identity 
-National Service 
A consistent theme that runs through all of my male respondents narratives is the 
instrumentality of National Service in the initial and subsequent determination of their 
gay identity. This is not to say that being conscripted into the army is a natural and 
definite inducement to homosexuality. Rather, the two and half years that my respondents 
spent in the company of men afforded them the opportunities to explore that frontier of 
themselves, which they have been all too aware of but much too hesitant to cross. Azwan 
says with his characteristic candour:  
You sure you are ready for this? It was quite wild, those times, I tell you.  
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And Zaman concurs:  
It was a period of exploring. I was curious, there were those who were 
willing. So when you put this two together, it was ummmgood lah. 
 
 
Azwan recalls:  
It was in NS, that I had my first real love [a Chinese man]. It was 
memorable. I didnt know [then] what being gay meant. So, I never 
asked him if he was gay or anything. It was his smile. He had a smile 
that I could not forget. We were together for two years.  
 
 
I asked if the relationship started off on a purely sexual basis. He answers:   
 
Yes, it was sexual, but it wasnt only that. It started off gradually. We 
were always together at the medical centre. So we leaned against one 
another and talked into the night. He was the jock type, but very sweet 
and then we got together. But we were very discreet lah.  
 
I asked Azwan if the all-male environment was really a gay Utopia. He said:  
 
Oh no! Back then, they were saying things like, Aiyoh, all these 
homosexuals will surely get AIDS  So while we are inside, we have to 
watch ourselves. When we are out, it was like a normal guy outing. We 
played soccer, football, normal guy things. Back then, we were less 
confident. I didnt know if it was right or wrong so I wasnt really too 
uncomfortable. So we acted like best friends. 
 
This was in the early 1990s. The social environment then was less free than it is now. 
Leong (1997:130) recounted the rash of exposés that were recapitulated in the daily 
tabloid, The New Paper, of acts thought to be grossly indecent where the perpetrators 
were caught and subsequently convicted. In the same vein, police entrapments were 
common. This period coincided with the height of the AIDS scare in Singapore, where it 
was still thought to be a gay disease(ibid:131). However as Heng notes, (2001:85) 
public harassment was somewhat variegated with the authorities intent only on policing 
the less discreet aspects of public cruising. In the late 1980s, as the economy of 
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Singapore began to gather more steam, the increasing affluence of the nation paved the 
way for the need for a more consultative, engaging and less didactic manner of 
government. Thus, despite the very real harassment which occurred, there was neither a 
grand scale nor a sustained witch-hunt for homosexuals in Singapore.  The 1980s, as 
Heng notes (2001:84), was a period for untrammelled experimentation in both the arts 
and activist scenes. (The AIDS epidemic was the push factor for a nascent form of gay 
activism in the form of AFA and gay themes were being explored and publicly 
presented). However, there was a very palpable sense of conservatism that pervaded 
much of Singapore then. Unlike present times, where strips of land in Singapore have 
been overtaken by commercial establishments which cater to an openly gay clientele, in 
the late 80s a disco which was frequented by gay men was given a week to wind up its 
operations (ibid: 85). 
 
Against this backdrop, National Service represented to my male respondents an 
opportunity to unearth more of whom they believed themselves to be and for most of 
them, this period of conscription was a brief respite from the world outside. Hasyim 
continues with his personal recount:  
NS was a period of exploration and confirmation. It was in NS that I saw many ways 
of behaving and realised that maybe I wasnt the only one who liked men. Being gay 
is like, ummm, just the way that I am. I dont try to find out a reason why I am gay.  
 
Mohd recalls that it was in National Service that he became acquainted with his best 
friend. So for him the experience of forced military conscription was less of a sexual one. 
The watershed which NS represented for him was more an emotional one rather than a 
physical or sexual odyssey.  This person remains a key confidante in his very cloistered 
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circle of friends. As mentioned, NS does present in itself a veritable wealth of 
opportunities for some of my respondents.  But, as they stressed, even as it did represent 
some form of emotional or psychological watershed for them, it did not induce their 
preference for persons of the same gender. Rather, it facilitated a selection and rejection 
process that gradually gave way to private and public recognition. 
 
The rules of engagement were much clearer in this hyper-segmented world where the 
spaces for intimacy and engagement would have already been carved out. The constant 
vacillating that gay men and women are subjected to while living in hetero-normative 
world is a well-known one. As Melissa says:  
Do you have people asking you if you were heterosexual? I think not.  
 
Overseas Sojourns, Local Revelations 
As mentioned earlier, an overseas stint is the other significant and formative experience 
in the lives of my other respondents. Kayleen who had struggled to establish if she was 
heterosexual or otherwise, had her brief sojourn in Canada [by way of a student exchange 
programme] to thank:   
Funnily enough, in Canada, I had the most support, even though, I was 
sorta by myself, but I had more support this than I was here. I think it is 
also societal, infrastructure and stuff. I was assigned to this host mother, 
who just happened to volunteer at this Gay and Lesbian Centre. I went to 
Canada, not intending to, it was supposed to be like a test period you see, 
cos I was pulled out of the influences here, so I figured that it would be 
to see who I really am, to see whether Im really gay, or straight with a 
crush, that kind of thing. The coming out group, umm, that was a turning 
point really It was done by these two volunteers, who were social 
work students  this workshop, its very much a counselling, social 
work thing, its more to accept who you are, whether gay or straight or 
questioning  and to realise that this decision is not bindingand the 
coming out group was really good, cos its where you meet all sorts of 
 92 
people. From bisexual, gay, questioning, single mother with a son, so 
thats really cool. 
 
The non-threatening environment and the diversity that the spaces bore witness to and 
more importantly had welcomed was a big push for Kayleen. She recalls:  
Over here [then], I wasnt out at all. I knew lesbians, but they knew me 
as straight. So Ive been straight, so I didnt question my sexuality until 
university. So here, theres nothing structured, no support, to help you 
struggle, grapple with your issues, to help you come out. Redqueen was 




Similarly for Iriana, going to Australia helped her to shed her inhibitions and gave her the 
opportunity to experience firsthand, the diverse sexualities at play. In Singapore, where 
hetero-normative norms are so pervasive, an organised display of difference would not 
only be odd, but also illegal. For Kayleen, the liberation that the new space afforded her 
allowed her to come into her own. Irianas journey, however, took on a different flavour. 
She was already convinced that she loves women, but had considerable difficulties in 
overcoming the straitjacketed spheres of being lesbian here.  
There was a time, when I bind myself. I was into really being a butch. 
Unfortunately, I was born with big breasts. Its genetic. So I would bind 
myself and the ends are Velcro, you see, it really cuts into myself and it 
hurts your spine. Over here, people have ideas on how butches should 
behave. They cant be too outgoing and expressive. Even in sexual 
situations, theres a role that you should play, the position that you must 
be in.[Iriana] 
 
When I moved to Perth, I marvelled at the lesbian communities there. 
Over there, they are more liberal. So it doesnt matter, like its 
acceptable for a lesbian to live together with a man. Basically, I think 
that in Asia, we have roles. Women are supposed to stay at home and 
men go out to work, you know, bull shit like that. I think lesbians grow 
                                                
67 Redqueen is a mailing list for women only and it is a prime avenue for lesbians to interact with other 
lesbians as it often organizes parties and other leisure programmes. 
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up around those traditional roles, so we pick up on that. So in western 
countries, people tend to be more flexible and androgynous in 
relationships.[Iriana] 
 
Whilst Irianas and Kayleens overseas experiences afforded them the possibility to see 
that to be gay was not an alien or alienating a concept which it is over here; the 
situation was different for Azwan and Roslan. Being overseas did not in a way, awaken 
them to this other realm of existence, it merely afforded them the opportunity to regroup 
and recollect their thoughts. Away from the stifling confines of home and all the 
cloistered spaces around, Azwan was sufficiently emboldened to say:  
I came out when I was 28. What I know about gay culture, growing up, 
was almost zero. Anyways, I learnt it all from books. What you read 
from the books now became so real and I decided to read more and open 
up more. And at the same time, I was planning to open up to my family. 
I believe that theres a purpose for us to be here. I knew the question of 
marriage would come sooner or later. Because when I came back, I was 
26, 27. [He went to Australia to study for a year]. So I knew, I had to 
come out when I came back. And they were on it already, Why dont 
you get married, bla,bla,bla and so on and so forthso I  just continued 
with my life as usual, but they were really freaking me out. So, ta-da, one 
year later, I broke the news to them. 
 
As for Roslan, he remembers: 
Later on, at the end of 95, after [the last year of University], I went to 
Melbourne to study for a year. But before I left, my mother and I, we had 
a talk, lah. My mom, she told me, she always known that I was different 
since young. So she told me, bad or good, I am still her son. Gay or not. 
She didnt want to lose her son. So losing a son is like a son passing 
away and she didnt want that. 
 
It was the bombshell that his mother had dropped, where she said that she knew, that 
Roslan said later that he was thankful for the escape to Melbourne. It was here, that he 
had the time and also the space to take in his mothers words and the impact which 
coming out would have on his family upon his return. Roslan comes from a deeply 
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religious family and when viewed from this angle, Roslan conceded that his mothers 
admission was not an easy one to make. As there was no turning back, the stay abroad 
helped him to prepare for any potential fallout that might happen in his family. He recalls 
the need to come out to his family:  
I just needed to, umm, during university, I had about two or three years 
of living a double life and that was when I came into the scene and 
discovering gay lifestyle and at the same time, I was also the President of 
the --- Society (a religious-based society) so you know what thats like. 
And my sister was the Vice-President of the --- Society that year and it 
was hard to lead a double life with her as vice-president. 
 
I am highlighting all the above experiences because it marked the first step in the 
eventual confidence and self-assuredness that are to follow. For others, this came with 
less distance covered, but was no less significant. Norita recalls:  
 I was engaged once and I broke it off after four years because I fell in 
love with a girl. So I was trying to figure out what was going on. Now, I 
have already confirmed that I want to be with a girl, I told myself that I 
needed to make up my mind if I want to be with a girl or a guy. Ive 
always had it easy being gay. So its not that important for me as it was 
for other people who had to try to acknowledge to themselves that they 
are gay and to tell other people. Its more harder for them, so thats why 
its more important. But for me, its easy. So for me, its more important 
to have a career so I can pay for my own home. A solid ground, thats 
more important. 
 
As Norita explains, it is easy for her because she does not see anything inherently 
wrong in falling for someone of the same sex and gender. In short, there is no conflict. 
This lack of guilt is no doubt aided by her family background, where the lines between 
conventionality and propriety were often blurred. So far, what has come across strongly 
is the gradual build-up in the level of candour and comfort that my respondents have had 
with respect to their sexuality. I am curious to see if this new found personal confidence 
would lead to a similar mien of public brashness as well. This will reveal much about 
their attitudes in making the personal political and this will serve to prepare the 
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discussion in the proceeding chapter where the possibility of plumbing your own private 
depths of emotion into public action will be reviewed more concretely.  
 
The (Non) Presence of Discrimination 
Iriana begins with:  
Discrimination here is more like policy-related. Like how you dont have 
people spitting at you in public although privately they may want to do so. 
I think you only feel like a minority if certain policies are unfavourable to 
you.  
 
Hasyim agrees with the relative non-threatening atmosphere of Singapore towards the 
gay men and women in general:  
No, its not like I am hounded or persecuted here, the discrimination isnt 
really that blatant. 
 
This conciliatory tone is one that is consistently displayed by my respondents when asked 
to comment on the perceived public disapprobation which exists with respect to their 
(private) sexual status. Netty says:  
I wouldnt mind helping out, if they (gay activist groups) want me to help 
out. But frankly, I dont see the point of it. Its like, why do you want to 
make a big issue out of a small issue  I dont see the need to flaunt your 
gayness. I dont see the point of showing people that you are gay. Like Ive 
said, its your own personal lifestyle, I dont see the need why you should 
show or tell people that you are gay. Im just a bystander. I dont see the 
point really. 
 
Thus, Nettys involvement remains on the purely private and personal.  
 
This is echoed by Erin who says:  
In this region, we can forget about really fighting for our rights and all 
that bla, bla,bla. Lets not rock the boat too much lah, you know. You can 
be out there, but not trying to change everybodys perception and all that, 
its just going to blow up in your faces. Yah, you can make a statement, be 
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comfortable with yourselves, but that doesnt mean you can change 
peoples perceptions. They have rights too. For me personally, I dont 
want to rock the boat too much. Its like, Ill just go along for the ride and 
anywhere MY boat takes me.  
 
Norita also carefully calibrates her stand, balancing the need to support issues of great 
interest to her and yet remaining mindful of the strides that the gay community has made 
here:  
Ive been out, Ive done my part, my own private part to come out to my 
family and Ive done my part to come out to my workplace. So when you 
talk about the whole public, well, because, I have done my part in my own 
private ways, I dont mind coming out to the whole public.  
 
She continues with a caveat emptor:  
But talking about us being accepted in the public sector is enough for the 
time being. I do want some umm, civil acknowledgement lah. But I think 
now, that its quite alright already. Its not that difficult here in Singapore 
We have lots of parties, lots of functions. Things are opening up, its 
more lighthearted now. Its fine now. I mean, its not great, but its better.  
 
Aisyah recounts:  
Cos its like, the more you push, the more these people [heterosexual 
Singaporeans] will resist. The thing is, they know of the existence of gays 
around so its their choice if they want to accept it or not. Why the need 
for you to push? Umm also, since when by demonstrating you can change 
the whole societys point of view? If anything, theyd be totally repulsed. 
Like Ive heard things like, Bloody lesbians. Trying so hard to push. Just 
leave us alone ah. As long as we dont bother you, then leave us alone. 
Why try so hard? 
 
   Kayleen offers her opinion:  
Umm, its a choice. Its a private matter, but its also a choice to keep it 
private. Cos making the personal public and the private political, well, 
you can do it on an individual level as well.  
 
While she is active in civil society groups like AFA and the other womens group, 
both platforms are not publicly identified as being gay crusaders. As she tellingly 
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reveals, she has made a choice. And the choice is to remain personally vocal while 
publicly muted:  
In whatever little time I have, I do some work for AFA, and --- (the 
womens civil society group) as well. Theres so little bandwidth left over 
to do other stuff. [Kayleen] 
 
 
The consistent theme which runs through the narratives is one of moderation and in some 
instances, a resolute silence. A balanced, low-key approach is preferred, if at all, in 
publicizing gay-related issues and concerns. Zaman notes:  
Gay rights, as long, as its not, what you call this, as long as, its not like 
Zulfikar lah68. Yah, Id prefer subtle, gradual ones then, I would totally 
support. Like AFA, I would support, I think theyre doing a good job.  
 
Their distinct distaste for anything brash, loud and showy in highlighting their presence 
and arrival on the scene is very much influenced I believe with the lack of overt 
discrimination that is present against them. So while the situation can be egregious on 
certain fronts (with respect to homosexuality still being thought of as a depravity), in so 
far as their personal lives are not compromised, they are reluctant to engage in any public 
push for legitimacy. As I weave through the personal networks of my respondents, I 
can see clearly the primacy that they place in having fulfilling private spaces which 
mitigates the need to transform the public into a similarly hospitable and charitable space. 
Thus, in view of this sexual and personal nirvana, there is little that those outside with 
their misguided comments and lopsided commentaries can do to unsettle their calm mien.  
 
 
                                                
68 Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff was the personality most engaged in the tudung debate. He has roundly 
decried the states actions of disallowing tudungs in school and has since migrated with his family to 
Australia. He is currently an Honourary Research Fellow at Monash Asia Institute and a coordinator of the 
Association of Democracy in Singapore. 
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3.3 Friends and Lovers 
We have the ability to choose the friends we have. For my respondents, social networks 
become the all-important lifeline, especially when faced with deep-seated pockets of 
hostility. I had asked if there was a certain preference which they employed when 
choosing their friends. I wanted to know if they naturally gravitated and mixed almost 
exclusively with those who are gay themselves. However, it seems not to be so. Friends 
are chosen and preferred depending on the emotional need present at the time. For my 
respondents, having a diverse network of friends suits them best, given the wide range of 
issues that they face.  
 
Netty says:  
I have more straight friends than gay friends, thats for sure. But I 
wouldnt bring my straight friends out with my gay friends. I mean, they 
are different. Both are important to me, but they fulfil different roles.  
 
When probed if it was due to her non-disclosure of her sexuality to her straight friends, 
she brushed the suggestion aside. It was, as she explained to me:  
They just dont get along, lah. Nothing to do with me. It is more their 
personalities dont click.  
 
 
Kayleen offers her perspective: 
 
My closest friends are straight. From my JC days. (She named three) So 
we are all very close. We got closer after JC. We get along well. We 
accept each other and we love each other as we are  its that reasoning 
if they reject you for who you are, then they arent really your friends. 
[Kayleen] 
 
The purpose behind seeking gay men and women to join this cosy coven of friends is a 
simple one. Kayleen continues:  
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After having being in the [lesbian] circle for so long, I know more gay 
people than I did in the last three years. Its definitely more important to 
know and have gay people as friends. As close as I am to (she names her 
straight friends), I cant talk about some things on the same level that I 
can with gay friends. I mean, although the support and understanding is 
there, its not even about that, its about appreciation. It is very different. 




Azwan agrees on the need to have friends who are gay themselves:  
 
There are four of us. I mean, we have seen each other through the worst 
and best of times. We hang out and bitch a lot. We cry when 
relationships go bad and celebrate when things are good. This is not the 
same kind of understanding that you can get from straight friends. 
 
If indeed there was a certain predilection towards a certain group of friends, in this case, 
gay, it was because it is a conduit to the larger gay circle out there. This is apparently 
critical if you are a lesbian. Picking up on Kayleens point that an initial brush with gays 
opens up that window of opportunity to meet and greet more gay friends, Iriana agrees:  
We lesbians are very different from gay men. Like, its more sexual for 
them, so they can cruise. We dont cruise. I think its more emotional for 
us. So going to gay bars and clubs, its difficult to meet people unless 
you already know someone there. 
 
This gets a ringing endorsement from Norita:  
See, in gay bars or clubs or when you to parties, you go in groups. So 
they usually sit in their cliques and just watch each other. So theres no, 
or like very little, of just marching up to some girl and buying her a drink 
and then get to know her or something. Its possible, but you must be 
really drunk to try that. 
 
 
Aisyah backs it up with her statement:  
In this stage of my life, I am more into making friends than anything, 
the hearts worn out. So am only interested in making friends, like we 
talk, we all know what we are talking about, and we all joke about the 
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same stuff. Its very rare to meet and make gay friends, unless you go to 
a gay club or event. 
 
While it is clear that my respondents have a preference for one group of friends over the 
other (sexuality wise), I asked if they had deliberately sought friends or partners based on 
similar ethnicity and faith. Kayleen answered:  
You know, thats funny. It made me remember when I was with Ellen, 
who was of a different faith and a different race. And she asked me if my 
mom would have minded! I looked at her, and said, I think this is the least 
of her concerns! 
 
The opinion is varied on the above. Erin concedes:  
That having someone of a similar faith and background can certainly be 
good, because we both would know the difficulties it comes when you are 
both Muslim and gay. But it can also be bad, lah. Its like a double-edged 
sword.  
 
Agreeing, Aisyah remarks:  
My ex-girlfriend was Malay and Muslim and she taught me to be a better 
Muslim, to pray and to learn more about my religion. But its also very 
hard because its like when you are getting intimate, you hear, haram, 
haram In fact, we broke up because we both wanted to return to the right 
path. But as you can see, Ive failed. But I am still trying.  
 
I had wanted to see if friendships or relationships forged with others of a similar faith or 
ethnicity was necessary or preferred to help reconcile any doubts or resolve any conflicts 
which may have arisen in view of Islams stance towards same-sex sexuality. Evidently, 
this is not so.  Iskandar puts it bluntly:  
Religion has never played a part in choosing partners for myself. My core 
group of friends are straight. They have always been there for me. Gay 
friends are definitely important. They can definitely understand what Im 
going through, but somehow when it comes to emotional support, they are 
rather unreliable.  
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Almost all of my respondents (with the exception of Iskandar) have been in serious, 
monogamous relationships at some point of their lives. However, as most of them 
ruefully note, it is extremely difficult to build a long-lasting, fulfilling relationship. As 
Erin notes: 
Well, when my last relationship ended, and this was one which had 
lasted for five years, I was so depressed. What made this worse is that she 
had fallen in love with another girl. I had always suspected that 
something was not quite right and I had questioned her a couple of times, 
but she had always denied it, over and over again. Until one time, I 
pressed her to tell me the truth and she confessed. It was like someone 
had completely knocked the wind out of me.   
 
Azwan chips in with his own story of a failed relationship: 
You know, it is when you get older, that you meet more seriously 
screwed up men who want nothing more than a good time and just mess 
with your brain. I didnt plan on being involved with ---, after all, he is a 
married man but when he followed me into the toilet one day and well, 
we struck a conversation, I just found it difficult to pull away. It didnt 
matter that all of my friends were saying that I ought to leave him cos he 
was just out to use me, I was so blinded by love and I truly believed that 
he cared for me. See, the wife obviously doesnt know that he is gay and 
he has kids, which makes it a lot worse cos I feel guilty about wrecking 
this mans marriage. But he played so many mind games with me that left 
me so exhausted and so drained. 
 
Azwan, however, gave his two-faced partner the heave-ho soon after and promptly 
packed his bags for a shopping spree in Hong Kong. This personal volatility that is 
experienced in relationships is one that is consistently replicated among my respondents.  
As Kayleen recalls: 
Well, when it ended, I took it really bad. Ellen isnt the type who is 
upfront about who she is and we had to keep our relationship very low 
key. When she dumped me, I became quite depressed. I hopped on a bus 
to Johor and from there, just picked another coach at random and made 
my way halfway across Malaysia. This was just an impromptu thing, I 
took off my work and about 16 hours later, found myself in another 
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totally different place. So now, I dont throw all of me into a relationship. 
If anything, its just about the sex. It makes it less complicated, that way.  
 
 
Su relates an equally bizarre ending to her previous relationship: 
 
Well, she got married. And get this, I actually attended her wedding. My 
friends cant stop making fun of me, its like I am destined to fall for 
straight, confused girls. (laughs). Well, I am not bitter that she got 
married. I encouraged her to marry the guy, because when she was with 
me, she already was in a committed relationship with the guy. Because of 
this overwhelming sense of responsibility and love that I had for her, I 
told her that I didnt want her to screw up her life and said that she really 
ought to marry the guy because he has been good to her all these years. 
Well, she listened, got married and while I was happy for her; I will be 
lying if I said that it didnt hurt me. But in the end, I have to think of her, 
her future. So thats why I ended up at her wedding, making small talk 
and Malay jokes with all the makciks (middle-aged ladies) there. 
 
Zaman then shares this very astonishing revelation: 
 
Well, I have been celibate for the past four years now. It really isnt that 
difficult. Sure, sex is important but I think quite over-rated. When 
relationships end, it really becomes quite dramatic, you are left feeling 
drained and if it ends badly, you end up emotionally scarred too. So for 
me, being celibate has helped me to focus on making myself happier and 
it really isnt too difficult once you get into it.  
 
So when their personal lives go awry, they seek comfort in the order that is their work.  
As Hasyim notes: 
At work, it is strictly no-nonsense. I dont share with my colleagues that 
I am gay and they dont question me either. At work, you have to conduct 
yourself professionally; your personal life becomes quite divorced from 
yourself when you are at work. Sure, there are other gays at my 
workplace but we dont hang out together. And if I do bump into them at 
parties, which have happened before, we may say hi but when at work the 
next day, its like last night never happened. Thing is, although I dont 
face any discrimination at work, you still have to be careful. With the job 






Aisyah who works in a strait-laced environment shares: 
Well, because of what I do, I am not open about my sexuality at work. 
And since I do wear the tudung, that in itself reduces speculation from 
other people. But I was so surprised when two of my close colleagues 
could guess that I am gay and told me so. So with them, I am open but its 
not like I can announce to everyone at work. It is good that I have these 
two that I can rely on, but I doubt I will open up to anyone at work, 
anytime soon. 
 
However, for Su, her sexuality is an open book at her workplace: 
 
Well in the beginning, I didnt make a big deal out of it. I wouldnt want 
to lie on purpose, so I did not come out to my colleagues and they didnt 
ask either. I guess, its like over here, they may speculate but they wont 
march up straight to you and ask. But over time, I came out as I became 




This scenario of relative peace (and anonymity) which my respondents enjoy in their 
workplace is not indicative of a complete lack of hostility and prejudice that may exist in 
the workplace. Tellingly enough, the fact that some of them do not voluntarily share that 
information with their colleagues reveals much of the unpredictability that comes with 
publicly revealing ones sexual identity. However, it is fair to summarize however that 
none of my respondents feel that their work atmosphere is oppressive and to date, there 
has been no blatant shows of discrimination against their sexual preferences. This is 
related to the point made earlier that sexuality is a private matter and it remains a matter 
for personal adjudication. This we shall see very clearly in Chapter Four, when faith and 
sexuality is discussed. 
 
                                                
69 The rainbow flag has easily become one of the most identifiable markers of pride for gay men and 
women. Evidently, it first appeared in the San Francisco Gay and Lesbian Freedom Day Parade in 1978. 
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I have charted how my respondents navigated their way around themselves and their 
familiar spaces. Evidently, while their high and low points are not exactly similar, what is 
consistent is the ease and relative comfort in which they have managed to ingratiate 
themselves to these available spaces. No doubt, this is aided by what has happened in 
broader Singapore. While there will be reservoirs where still waters of morality run deep, 
there has been an increased awareness of same-sex sexuality in Singapore and an 
increasingly visible presence, both politically and commercially.70 
 
 My respondents have generally been able to deflect whatever blows the anonymous 
spaces of the public have lobbied against them. They remain non-plussed about the 
sometimes reactive and regressive response that Singapore society has towards 
homosexuality. Their confidence and settled-ness are also related to the increasingly 
more developed gay community in Singapore in which they have cultivated extensive 
links of friendship/acquaintanceship and whose hallways they now navigate with 
considerable ease.   
 
3.4 Navigating the Gay Community 
While the air of fear and public reprisals (by way of police entrapment) was a common 
feature in the 1980s, the mood is considerably lighter in the new millennium. There are 
numerous establishments that cater to a gay clientele and the Internet has opened up more 
avenues for interaction. Gay Singaporeans are gaining a presence and the bonds of a 
community seem to be present. I will not be going into the various conceptual models 
                                                
70 The Straits Times carried a lengthy article on the increasing lure of the pink dollar to Singaporean 
retailers and businesses.  The pink dollar refers to the gay portion of the consumer market. See Li Xueying, 
Chasing the Pink Dollar, Straits Times, 17 August 2003 
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of what constitutes a community, since the aim of this thesis is not to uncover if such a 
consciousness is present amongst gay Singaporeans. My interest is rather to highlight 
local observations on this (loose) collective of gay Singaporeans and my respondents 
links to them.  
 
Winder (1994:2/3) surmises through his fieldwork that there is a sense of shared gay 
identity among a significant number of gay men that has been manifested in the 
existence of unofficial organizations, social networks and in the sharing of similar 
attitudes, values and beliefs. Sim (2003:38) however sees otherwise with his observation 
that we [gay men] are a disparate bunch. There are club bunnies hanging out in the clubs 
every weekend, the gym studthe home bunnies...the jet setters. Within these subgroups 
are various identities that it is impossible to claim a homogenous identity. 
 
 Incorporating both of these observations, Kartini Rahman (2002:51) argues that while 
there is such an incipient awareness of similarity and solidarity among lesbians in 
Singapore, there are also points of contention. It is interesting to note that local studies 
debating community amongst gay Singaporeans often explore the workings of this 
concept on gay men or on gay women only. Recalling Irianas earlier point about lesbians 
being different from gay men, it seems that gay Singaporeans seem to be split along 
gender lines. In fact, Redqueen (a mailing list for women only) arose because of a 
conflict that had begun on Signel, dubbed the Singapore gay news list. The women on 
Signel had begun to resent some of the topics and nature of discussion on Signel and 
thus Redqueen was formed (ibid:42). When I asked my gay male respondents if they had 
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lesbians in their circle of friends and vice versa, the responses were invariably mixed. 
Zaman responds with: 
Well, yes, I have lesbians as my friends because of the activities that I do 
where I will see some of them who are regulars. So over time, we socialize 
and become friends. But its not like I seek them out consciously or that 




I dont discriminate against who I want to hang out with. But its like, 
because of the way that I get to know people, usually through Redqueen or 
friends of friends who are most times, lesbians, I dont meet that many gay 
men. Also, gay men are different from lesbians in that we have different 
interests and perspectives, so there isnt that much common ground. 
 
  
The divisions do not seem to be confined to just gay men and women. There seem to 
divisions even within the ranks of gay men and lesbians (see Kartini Rahman 2002). 
Iskandar observes: 
The gay community here is rather looks oriented. Thus monogamous 
relationships are volatile and people change partners quite often. They fail 
to know the true meaning of love but instead devote their attention to 
looks and bed skills/sex positions (top/bottom). 
 
Azwan supports Iskandars observations with his musings: 
 This is a hypocritical place, where they judge you on your looks because 
they are cruising for one night stands. And the market is now hot for hunky 
young things, which I am sadly, not la. 
 
 
But despite its various shortcomings, my respondents have established firm links with 
this flawed collective.  It is necessary they tell me to have a feed and a grip into a 
larger community. Iskandar shares: 
Yes, it is very important to know other people and to have friendships. I 
use the Internet, the chatrooms as a way to establish these links. Other than 
these options, there are the clubs or spas or cruising grounds. 
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As Norita relayed to me: 
Sure, we need to go out and see who the others are in our community. Most 
times, its usually house parties or club events. Like the recent Butch and 
Femme Hunt.71 When you go to such big events like these and you keep 
going, you will bump into familiar faces. And from there, you will begin 
talking and your networks will grow. You can see all sorts of types there. 
Different races and what not. So thats when it hits you that wow, the 
community is so much larger than yourself and it helps your confidence you 
know. Because you know that you are not alone. 
 
Netty agrees that the expanded avenues for enjoyment offer more opportunities 
for lesbians to meet: 
Well, Ive always been a clubber. The difference is back then, you go to 
straight clubs with your gay friends. But now, its so easy to just hit gay 
clubs with your gay friends. So it is more free and so much easier to meet 
people. So its like a mixed bag of people that you meet. So people of all 




There are of course other avenues, apart from the usual gay bars or clubs to expand ones 
social circle. Zaman who is active in several special interest groups (mainly to do with 
sports and the outdoors) points out that involvement in such groups similarly facilitates 
awareness on the diversity present in the community and acts as a lubricant for further 
interactions. The added advantage is that these groups often attract both gay men and 
lesbians and therefore one is able to develop friendships across the gender divide. I 
attended one of the activities that was organized by one of the interest groups and was 
struck at the diverse profile of the participants. There were gay men and lesbians of 
varying age groups and ethnic profiles. Zaman says: 
The community has opened up a lot these past few years and so now we 
have the space and confidence to organize ourselves. There are other 
opportunities for enjoyment and interaction, other than just bars or clubs. So 
                                                
71 The Butch and Femme Hunt are popular yearly events for the lesbians. It is in fact modeled after 
conventional beauty pageants where the hunt is on for the one most deserving to be crowned Butch and 
Femme of Singapore. 
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in a way, it is less superficial this way because we do all have an interest in 
the outdoors and sports and we can also meet other people who we may not 
necessarily bump into. So we all get to really enjoy each others company 
because we are all genuinely interested in the same thing. 
 
 
However Erin observes: 
 
In the beginning, yes, it is exciting. Cos you are so happy that there are 
others like you, and that you are not alone you know. So when there is a 
party, you go. A house party, you go. Basically, any event where there are 
other lesbians, you will turn up. But when you have settled down with 
someone, you begin to cut back on your appearances. You would just rather 
be with your girlfriend or your close circle of friends and so you lose touch 
with the rest of the community. Because I am quite a sedate person, so I 
would rather just chill at home. In fact, I think I will grow old with a cat for 
company. You know, the long-standing joke about how you will just end up 
single with a cat for company. So thats why when you break up, its quite 
hard to just get back into it. Sometimes, I see myself in the future, growing 
old, alone, with a cat for company. Sad, right. 
 
My respondents are aware and informed on the various ways and reasons as to why a 
connection to a larger collective is desirable. As Iriana notes: 
There is certainly change in the community. When I was 17, the 
community was very small and seeing how it is 10 years down, its 
completely different. I think the media played a part, when it placed us in a 
moment of time, it helped us to be aware of each others presence and we 
begin to notice other people like us. So now, you can see butches walking 
hand in hand with their girlfriends, openly. So there is this confidence you 
know, to show publicly who you are and it is good for us. This kind of thing 
rarely happened when I was a teenager growing up. 
 
However, my respondents only identify with the largely social element that contact with 
this community has to offer. As outlined in the earlier pages, my respondents are not 
keen to translate their affinity with their community into public action. Iskandar sums it 
when he says: 
I suppose they [gay interest groups] have their own agenda to follow, and I 
am indifferent to that. Ive not seen any major contributions made to the gay 
community.  Sexuality is a private choice. There is no need to tell the whole 
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world about it if no good is going to come out of it. We still live in a rather 
conservative society. Fighting for such rights will only result in backlash. 
There is no immediate need to fight for our so called rights, as I feel were 
not being oppressed by society. 
 
My respondents generally refuse to be drawn into the hullabaloo that often accompanies 
public agitations for gay rights by local gay advocacy groups. They remain sanguine 
over the inroads that the public has been slow to make and instead place a larger premium 
on the more intimate spaces which they inhabit and invest much time and energy in 
making these sites hospitable. One of the most important sites for them privately, is their 
relationship with their families. 
 
Families are often considerably more difficult to negotiate. Generally, most [Muslim] 
families would baulk at the knowledge that their children are gay. They are often thrown 
into a melee of confusing emotions. And as we will see in the following pages, the 
presence of religion is not an insurmountable factor in the acknowledgement and 
acceptance by families of same-sex sexuality. While my respondents confirm that they 
are discreet outside their families, (with or without their parents knowledge about their 
sexuality) this is not the primary motivation behind their continued silence and reluctance 
to identify religion positively with their sexuality. Thus, it remains that we have to look 
beyond the parochial concerns of the family to explore the viability of reconciling Islam 
with same-sex sexuality. 
 
3.5 Its A Family Affair  My Not So Secret Life 
For Roslan, his father believed that his friends indubitably and invariably influenced him:  
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The part about friends influence, see umm, ah, my father he found a 
pornographic video at home that I left accidentally in the video player and 
he saw it. So he had a talk with me the next day, asking me where I got it 
from and I said it was from my friend. He told me to return it and not to 
contact him anymore. So he assumed that I was interested in these things, 
but not gay (he stresses the word gay) and he just hoped that it was an 
educational experience. But when he asked me out for lunch, I think he 
thinks that its because of the influences, that I became gay. But I clarify 
that I always have been like that since I was a boy. Ive always known that 
it was a sexual attraction since primary school. 
 
Unlike Roslan, Melissa was not subjected to the same parental suspicion. Much of this 
has to do with her parents unflinching acceptance of her sexuality:  
Sure, they know about it, since I dont hide it. My sis is gay too but the 
difference is, I respect my parents enough not to parade my girlfriends in 
front of them. Like my sis she brings them in and into her room and we all 
know what happens in rooms. Respect, thats whats important. My 
parents give me the freedom, and dont hassle me about my sexuality, so I 
think its fair that I return the favour. 
 
Melissas family apparently gives her the necessary space to breathe and exist peacefully 
within the family. The considerable latitude that they give to their daughter, as she 
admits, has much to do with the tenuous hold that Islam has over her family and herself:  
I dont practise. And I am a Muslim only because I was born one. I dont 
believe in the philosophy, but its easier to just remain status quo, than to 
go around renouncing it. 
 
This lack of emotive and affective attachment to Islam is familiar grounds to Norita. 
Owing to the rather haphazard arrangement of roles and expectations, (I think I am more 
of an adult than my mother is sometimes) Noritas relationship with her mother is a 
delicate balancing act. Her mother has accepted her daughter is gay and has stopped 
pressing her to turn straight:  
It wasnt that simple initially. My relatives were actually bugging my 
mom, why are you letting your daughter go astray like that. Like I said, I 
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dont mind telling my mom that I am gay, I dont mind talking to my mom 
about that, but I dont want them to be talking to my mom. Let it be me 
telling my mom. Its been three years since, and its alright so far. Its died 
down now lah, died down, so its okay lah. But it was, it was really sad for 
my mom then so I feel pity for her. They [my relatives] were arranging 
marriages for me. Arranging marriages is very common in my family. And 
after they find out that Im, Im somehow not straight, they tried to 
arrange for me, with two different men already! 
 
The cordial relations that mother and daughter enjoy now have much to do with, as 
Norita readily admits, the rather subdued influence of Islam. As she recalls:  
It was my daddy who taught me how to pray, and for a while I read the 
Quran and prayed cos he was around, but since the divorce, I dont do it 
anymore.  
 
Religion became a residual attachment and gradually became absent. Norita did not, on 
her part, until recently, actively pursue her faith. Hence, she was spared from having her 
identity and sense of reality spliced between living for the earthly pleasures or for the 
divine good. 
 
But, as some of my respondents show, the presence of religion within the home is not the 
determining factor in securing acceptance from their families, although it is definitely a 
significant factor. For some, it is the primary reason why some of my respondents choose 
to continue to remain silent. But as shall be seen, it is not because they feel 
disadvantaged or cowed by the strong, unflinching stand Islam has against 
homosexuality, but their silence is most often out of respect and deference to their 
parents belief in Islam. In short, they do not wish to taint or compromise their parents 
belief in Islam by confiding to them that they are gay.   
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For Roslan and Azwan, their families know they are gay. The process for Roslan was 
uncharacteristically difficult, as his family is devoutly religious. He has always enjoyed a 
close relationship with his family and had firmly believed that being gay was a non-issue 
and was unaware of the controversy that exists. Upon gradual exposure, he became 
keenly aware of the scathing commentaries on same-sex sexuality.  
In JC, although I knew I was gay, I didnt know about the gay lifestyle. 
But Ive always been interested in Islam. So in university in final year, I 
became the President of --- Society in university  and I had a 
boyfriend that year as well in that final year. So I want to get out of this 
double life, I just want to get out of this double life. So the main issue 
was because my parents didnt know. So I thought once I come out to 
my parents, eventually they would be okay. Then I can tell my sister and 
so on.  
 
 
The disclosure on Roslans part was precipitated mainly by the destabilising impact that 
the constant vacillating between the respectable persona of the religious youth leader by 
day and the covert reality of a man in love with another by night. Roslan felt very 
strongly that he should not be made to feel like it was an unpardonable sin to love another 
man. But surprisingly enough, his parents, specifically his mother, beat him to the task 
and sought his confirmation that he is gay.  
 
Roslan is now in Australia and he is mercifully spared from inquisitive queries of well 
meaning relatives who are perplexed that he is still single. While his family has grown to 
accept his homosexuality, they are not keen to have this made public knowledge. Their 
acceptance of their son was motivated mainly by the love they had for him. Such 
magnanimity and, more importantly, discretion cannot unequivocally be expected from 
far removed kinsmen concerned and curious over the fate of one of their own who never 
seems to want to get married. 
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Similarly, for Azwan, coming out to his parents was precipitated by him feeling stifled by 
the prevailing sensibilities which decried homosexuality as an odious peculiarity:  
They point an accusing finger at us and say, Oh, hes one, theres 
another, hes also one. That kind of stuff. But, they dont see the whole 
picture; they only see parts of the picture, and harp on it. Its not fair, I 
believe. Maybe, perhaps no matter whats being said, all these so-called 
ulama-ulama (learned men of religion) is saying all these things, but I 
believe I think, we are here for a purpose, I dont know. I mean, we may 
not know what the purpose is right now, but it will come to light later on. 
For all I know, we could be involved in population control. Because of 
the limited resources, I mean. Why not? Who knows? Its something that 
feels so right, but it doesnt agree with the public. I dont enjoy that. 
Whats there to hide in the first place? 
 
Azwan has drawn up a circumference of importance.  It includes those who fall resolutely 
in the centre like friends and family, and those that are kept firmly outside. His family has 
decided to accept him, but they have kept this from their relatives. He understands their 
rationale and accepts that those outside his immediate circle would not be able to 
appreciate him for who he is. It is not an easy process. Occasionally, he would receive the 
odd remark or two, about the grave sin he is committing but as he calmly puts it:  
So what. It doesnt matter what people say. My conscience is clear. For 
so long as I can live my life responsibly, I dont give a damn. 
 
Recounting the details of him informing his family over his sexuality, he says: 
I broke the news eventually lah, I told my closest sister first, the fourth 
one. So I told her, and she was like a bit disappointed but she believed 
that I can be cured, so I tell her she needed to re-educate herself. So I 
gave her all the articles to read, and then she just kept her mouth shut 
after that. She tried, tried to broach the subject of religion, of Islam, and I 
said, let me go to Hell then, its okay. Let me book the first flight to Hell 
then, its ok. She doesnt condemn now, doesnt advocate. So shell just 





His parting shot clearly shows that coming out to his family boosted his confidence: 
Im out. At least one thing I am glad is that people can accept me for who 
I am. For that, Im glad. Im out in the sense that Im out to people who 
matter to me. Strangers, strangers, I dont care. Opening up, I feel, made 
me more confident, psychologically, its kinda like, like, instead of being 
looked at as a weirdo, its now fine, its now okay. You are still you, after 
all. Thats whats more important. That I can be who I am. 
 
Of the 14 respondents, only the families of Roslan, Azwan, Norita, Netty and Melissa are 
aware of their childrens sexuality. For the rest, it is a careful act of contrivance and 
feigned ignorance. However, it does not mean that their families are completely ignorant; 
there is an implicit awareness that their children are withholding something. As Aisyah 
wryly notes:  
These are parents you know, they have that sixth sense on things, and 
they know when something is wrong, but sometimes they dont want to 
push it, you know.  
 
The reluctance to confront and bring matters into the open has much to do with the 
notions of sexuality being very much a private matter and a religious matter. Hence, any 
manner of interceding should be done within the sinner and God itself. Also, related to 
the point made in chapter two, the wider Malay Muslim bloc has no referential 
framework on how best to raise the matter of homosexuality with their children. It is not 
a social problem, for which there are clear prescriptions and rehabilitative measures. It 
is essentially a religious one.  
 
An awareness of the above is manifested very strongly in families who have been able to 
accept their childrens sexuality, as they are not always able to overlook the inherent 
sinfulness of the act. As Azwan notes:  
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I still get lectures from my sisters that what I am is wrong.  
 
But what facilitates and eventually secures this acceptance is the long-standing belief that 
Islam is inherently redemptive. As long as one remains a Muslim and discharges most of 
the responsibilities equated with being a Muslim fairly well, the possibility of reprieve 
and absolution from sin is absolute. Thus, in accepting the fact that their children are gay, 
means to also accept there will be punishment in the Afterlife. Ultimately, however, 
forgiveness shall be had by all. However, for parents who are not able to accept the fact 
that their children are gay; it has much to do with the fact that they are not able to see 
beyond the recriminations that lie in wait for the sin and sinner in order to see the 
eventual reprieve that is to follow.  
 
The above has much to do with the lack of legitimacy for same-sex sexuality in Islam. 
This then gives rise to a palpable sense of helplessness and, correspondingly, an acute 
sense of conflict for Muslim parents. So for parents who are not able to accept the fact 
that their children are gay, it is because they remain unprepared for the finality of sin and 
judgment which would be cast over their children. Muslims in Singapore commonly 
believe that homosexuality is a condition that can be cured because it is an unnatural 
affliction. Thus, if these parents are to willingly accept the homosexuality of their 
children, it means that they have (a) not fulfilled their obligations as parents in guiding 
and rehabilitating their children and (b) they are then condemning their children to the 
finality of sin which could have easily been avoided had they sufficiently intervened. For 
these parents, acceptance is equivalent to collusion of condemning their children to Hell. 
And this remains a deep and personal anguish. The key difference between parents who 
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are able to accept and those who cant, is the inability to abdicate responsibility. Aisyah 
says: 
Of course, for any parent to accept that their kid is naturally gay is a 
tragedy. Already, when your child is a homosexual, it is very difficult for 
them to accept that youve strayed. At the end of the day, they always 
think, when my children die, where would they end up. They dont want 
me to go to Hell, but thats where we end up.  
 
Kayleen corroborates Aisyahs statement:  
 
Its not like my parents dont know; my mother has never directly raised 
the issue with me, but shes not completely clueless either. Its more like if 
she asks me outright and I have to confirm it, where and how do we go 
from there? Its like the point of no return, you know? 
 
Over the next few pages, I will be highlighting the responses from those who have chosen 
to remain silent over their sexuality to their families and their rationale for doing so.  
 
 
3.6 Its A Family Affair  My Still Very Secret Life 
 
For Kayleen, the very first mention of the word lesbian came, ironically, from 
her parents: 
 
I learnt about what lesbians are from my parents. Cos my mom, she had 
a gay, lesbian friend and eeee, umm, thats another tangent (I learnt later 
that this private musing brought her to the recollection that her mothers 
friend had attempted to pick up her friend, who is a good two decades 
younger) and anyways I asked, what is a lesbian and my mom said, a 
woman having sex with another woman and I went eee, so gross. I was 
very young, like maybe in primary school. So this was my first idea or 
introduction towards this concept. So strange ah. 
 
Kayleens family is strongly religious. She has come out to her younger sister, but has not 
made any such overtures of full disclosure to her parents. Her father has not spoken to her 
since she was 18 (she says, its part the sexuality thing and also because our characters 
are so different, so we just dont get along) and her relationship with her mother is 
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somewhat of an oddity. Her mother had signed her up for religious classes (yes, I think 
she secretly hopes that I will see the light from this) for which she had faithfully 
attended. They take trips together and her mother has made some pointed references to 
her sexuality, but Kayleen has managed to artfully evade answering directly. She sums up 
the rationale for her dodges with this line, point of no return. 
 
Su and Aisyah also hail from very conservative, religious families and they have not, nor 
do they intend to come clean to their families. Both, are however, not estranged from 
their families. Their situation is compounded by the fact that most Malay Muslim 
families, if not all, firmly believe that one of the traditional responsibilities which a good 
Muslim daughter ought to fulfill, is to get married.  
 
Su recalls:  
She [her mother] mentioned it, as some one-off thing, in a moment of 
anger lah. Well, they did like once, threaten me a couple of years ago, 
where you know, where if I didnt change my behaviour  well, Im, 
slightly more, well, not as feminine as I could be, not as feminine as the 
average June, thats what, that I am slightly left off-centre. And ya lah, my 
mom she was saying, if I dont change my behaviour or dressing, she will 
marry me off to someone  But if it ever came to that, I will not hesitate 
to move out of the house and they know that. Im sure they know. 
 
The potentially explosive issues of marriage and babies is a real one for my 
respondents and the emotional badgering they receive on account of this reflects the 
conventional mores of Malays in Singapore. But this is not a situational dictum exclusive 
only to Malays as they are only a small fixture in the overall hetero-normative structure 
of sexuality and reproductivity. What looms much larger in their families is religion. I 
had asked if it was possible their families may very well have the capacity and resilience 
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to accept their sexuality; being guided by the experience of Azwan and Roslan. This 
possibility was greeted by some of my respondents with vigorous head shaking, and an 
emphatic string of nos. Aisyah says:  
No way, not my family. Not my relatives. Like I said, theyre totally 
Islamic. If the Quran never said anything about you should accept people 
with their sexuality, no such things for my family. Never. Not at all. 
 
She continues:  
Of course, sometimes, I get tired. I wish, why cant I just open up and let 
my parents know. And then, I dont have to answer anyones questions 
anymore. So yes, I get tired sometimes, but at the same time, I know that if 
I do open, I cant take back and I, I dont want that. Its, its not something 
that I want to die as, I dont want to die as a lesbian.Ya lah, I think its 
possible [to turn straight]. I am hoping that God will make it easier. 
 
Aisyah differs considerably from the rest of my respondent base, as she definitely 
believes turning straight is a possibility, the other being Iskandar, Yes, I do see myself 
turning straight. It would most likely be motivated by religion and my increasing doubts 
about finding true love in the gay world. This is fuelled by her deep conviction in Islam 
and the palpable sense of guilt that she feels. Turning straight for Aisyah means: 
Maybe get married or something or maybe be celibate. Just not a lesbian.  
 
In this sense, her decision to remain in this ambivalent and ambiguous state does not so 
much allow her to continue with being a lesbian, but rather it is a temporary measure to 
buy herself some time (or more) for her to stop being one. 
 
As I have mentioned earlier, all my respondents have said that parents being parents have 
the intuitive sense to know when their charges are hiding something from them. Aisyah 
recalls:  
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My father, he had an idea. Like I mean, every now and then, he would 
still go, Ni, mesti, masih, masih, suka perempuan! (loosely translated to 
mean still liking girls) Like you know, masih, still have an interest in girls 
because you are still rejecting that guy and this guy and of course, I will 
go, No lah! Crazy, that was in the past.  
 
She continues:  
No, its not like that they found out that I had a girlfriend, that would 
totally blow their minds, but they found out that I had a crush, a little crush 
in secondary school and this other girl had a crush on me  and we 
corresponded through letters. And during JC, my first girlfriend, of course 
they didnt know that she was my girlfriend, she wrote me letters and I kept 
the letters and he happened to find one of the letters and wahhhhhhhhh, hell, 
oh man, my dad was so mad, he was so angry. He was, See, I thought you 
stopped it already, after you left [an all girls school], thats it already! You 
and your nonsense again, he went bla, bla,bla. Of course, I had to lay off 
for a while, lay low but umm, I think its because they themselves want to 
believe that I am not, so its easier. So thats why I am always on my toes. 
 
Aisyah has a brother, who is turning 25 this year (2004) and he remains unaware of the 
episodes between her parents and herself. She says: 
And whatever lesbian problems I had with my parents, with them going 
on about me liking girls and all that stuff, my brother has no idea. Cos 
they didnt want to tell my brother, that I am you know, the stuff. Like I 
said, they think its a phase thing, so they dont think its necessary for 
him to know. 
 
This line of reasoning and rationalising by the parents is a common refrain. This is 
especially true in situations where lack of disclosure is absent. This stems from the deep-
seated conviction that the personal remains rightly so and should not be subject to 
partisan inquiry and judgment. This is very much tied to the awareness and the realisation 
that same-sex sexuality offends the very genteel sensibilities of Islam. 
Like I said earlier, my family will never accept it. If the Quran never said 
anything about, like, you know, that you should learn to accept people for 
their sexuality, then theres no such thing for my family. Never, never, not 
at all. No chance at all. Thats why I dont even try to push it. Thats why I 
dont even expect society to accept. So same goes for my family because 
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theyre totally, totally Muslim and theres no such thing as lesbianism or 
homosexuality in IslamNo way, is it permissible. Totally not. I mean, I 
am also aware that Im a lesbian but Im also aware of the fact that I am not 
supposed to be one. Like my father would say, (deadpans in an ominous 
voice), these are all the whispers of the syaaiiitannn (Satan). [Aisyah] 
 
With the above admission, it is clear what the primary reason why non-acceptance, non-
articulation in the Malay community does not faze or frazzle my respondents. For 
Melissa, it is her lack of connectedness to wider Malay Muslim society and a general lack 
of emotive attachment to Islam. But for the rest of my respondents, for whom the 
allegiance to Islam is present, it is because they themselves do not believe in the 
acceptability of homosexuality within Islam. Thus, with them not even able to accept that 
homosexuality is not without sin in Islam, it would be a complete stretch to have other 
Malay Muslims accept it as well. Malay Muslims in Singapore are unable to express 
same-sex sexuality without the accompanying moral and religious considerations. As 
highlighted earlier due to the continued and strong influence of Islam which has given 
rise to the Malay Muslim dyad, it would almost be impossible to see same-sex sexuality 
outside this moral/religious realm. And this is what my respondents clearly understand. 
They are fully aware of the difficulties in broaching same-sex sexuality without inviting 
the ethico-religious standpoint as well.  
 
I have just painted a variegated tableau of experiences when it comes to friends, family 
and sexuality. Admittedly, these vignettes are not representative and neither are they 
intended to be. I merely wish to highlight the different configurations of confronting the 
issue: denial, negotiation, complete and open acceptance or subversion. Will it then be 
possible to mine the potential of the private to help re-constitute the public? I am keen 
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therefore to see if Islam could be utilized as a premise and subsequent vehicle for change. 
Their responses towards using Islam for this end, by way of establishing religious gay 















































In Chapters Two and Three, I discussed the public and private perimeters of being gay, 
Malay and Muslim in Singapore. I had also pointed to the (unwitting) tripartite 
relationship which exists between the state, Malay Muslim society and MUIS which in 
turn, has led to the creation of a comfort zone for gay Malay Muslims where, save for a 
few public airings, the exposé by the vernacular media  they remain largely safe from 
outright harassment and vilification. In this chapter, I will be looking more specifically 
into the latent potential present in the realm of sexuality and faith which has been 
successfully harnessed by faith-centric, gay advocacy groups, such as Al-Fatiha, into 
becoming broad-based conglomerates of shared motives and motivations. Guided by 
feminist theory, which has consistently argued for a redefinition of the public via a more 
sensitive and calibrated co-option of the private, this chapter therefore seeks to review the 
inroads that have been made in Singapore with respect to secular gay advocacy groups. 
This chapter also examines whether there are elements in Al-Fatiha which could be 
appropriated and adapted given the current situation. 
 
I have alluded to the allure and increasing popularity of Al-Fatiha (The Opening, a 
word taken from the first chapter of the Quran). It was initially a virtual newsgroup, but 
was officially founded as an organization in 1998 in the United States.  It is dedicated to 
Muslims who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, questioning, those 
exploring their sexual orientation or gender identity and their allies, families and 
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friends.72 Since its inception in 1998, it has grown exponentially to establish local 
chapters in the US. It has reached out to the Southeast Asian region, where there is a high 
concentration of Muslims by establishing newsgroups such as Al-Fatiha (Malaysia) and 
Al -Fatiha (Indonesia). In a line lifted from its official website, it is also seeking to hold 
in collaboration with its community members in Indonesia  an international 
conference in Surabaya, marking the first that an LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgendered) Muslim conference has been held in a predominantly Muslim country.  
 
Al-Fatiha is not the only Muslim support group for gay men and women. The Internet 
plays host to a wide range of virtual outfits which seek to represent various moral and 
ideological positions on same-sex sexuality and Islam. Al-Fatiha is highlighted because it 
has positioned itself very successfully as being the most public outfit in the push for 
legitimacy and acceptance of gay Muslims within Islam. It would seem natural therefore, 
at this juncture, to introduce the modern attitudes of various Muslim countries towards 
homosexuality for it is against this religious and political backdrop that we have to situate 
and position Al-Fatihas position and strategies of resistance and re-presentations.  
The treatment of gays and same-sex acts vary from (Muslim) country to country. In Iran, 
the prescribed punishment for sodomy is execution, provided that the two perpetrators of 
the crime are willing partners of sound mind (Avery 1997:115). However, for the above 
to happen, there has to be corroborative accounts from four witnesses (four righteous 
males). The safeguards against perjury are dauntingly harsh. Also, proof of lesbianism 
or musahiqa (rubbing) is the same for homosexuality between males, but the death 
                                                
72 Taken from Al-Fatihas official website, http://www.al-fatiha.org/ 
 
 124 
penalty will only be enforced after the act has been repeated four times. The punishment 
is quashed if a lesbian repents, before the witnesses give their evidence (ibid:115). To 
give a summation into how deeply polarising the matter is: a recent United Nations vote 
in 2003 on homosexual human rights, (proposed by Brazil, with support from various 
European Union countries with America and Canada among them) was rejected by 
Malaysia and other disapproving Muslim countries. These countries are Pakistan, 
Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia..73 I will briefly highlight what Al-Fatiha is seeking to do 
and how they seek to garner support for their cause.  
 
 
4.1 Al-Fatiha  Making the case for gay Muslims. 
Al-Fatiha takes its name from one of the most important verses in the Quran. It was 
started by a young man, a 19-year-old of Pakistani descent living in the United States, 
Faisal Alam, who felt increasingly estranged and strangled by the incompatibility and 
tension between Islam and same-sex sexuality. Fuelled by desperation and abject 
loneliness, he logged onto the Internet and asked if there was anyone else out there who 
felt equally stifled and lost at the apparent conflict of being Muslim and gay. He was 
surprised by the flood of responses and emboldened by the support which he received 
from others caught in a similar bind, the Al-Fatiha Foundation was established in 1998. 
His mother, however, when eventually informed of his sexuality refused to accept him as 
her son.  
 
                                                





Al-Fatiha seeks to challenge the conventional wisdom of condemning same-sex sexuality 
and instead appeals to the core precepts of Islam: of wisdom and compassion. Al-Fatiha 
takes pains to emphasize the lack of materials explicitly condemning homosexuality and 
introduces subjectivities into how this knowledge is culled, presented and ordered. As 
Faisal notes: The Quran has historically been misused to justify hatred, despite its basic 
messages. One of the biggest reasons so few Muslims have come out is they believe 
Islam and homosexuality are incompatible. There is nowhere in the Quran that condemns 
homosexuality. Islam has always been about acceptance.74 
 
Al-Fatiha appeals to the common principles of equality, justice and peace. It also seeks to 
highlight that much of the moral turpitude that surrounds same-sex sexuality does not 
stem from Quranic injunctions, but that it is culture-specific and hence attributable to 
human intervention and creation.  He says: Much of the prejudice and discrimination 
against gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people in Islamic societies is culture-based 
and does not stem from Islam as a religion The noble and fundamental principles of 
respect, human dignity, tolerance, understanding and justice in Islam have been ignored 
when dealing with the issue of homosexuality and gender identity.75As such, it does not 
seek to convert people to its position by re-working religion per se, but instead, angles its 
efforts towards persuading people to subscribe and support the original aim and 
principles of Islam. I believe Al-Fatiha is cautious of attacking too vigorously the 
position of moral absolutism in Islam for it is equally difficult to disprove one as it is to 
absolutely prove the other.  
                                                
74 Taken from Muslim and gay, 22yo starts Islamic gay association, Al-Fatiha, http://www.al-
fatiha.net/xymag.html,  




Al-Fatiha is an increasingly vocal and visible proponent in the demolition of prejudice 
and discrimination against gay Muslims. It has been increasingly featured in foreign news 
reports and has been lauded as a progressive activism outfit. It seeks to do what had been 
done many years earlier for Christian and Jewish gays. I wanted to see if this manner of 
representation was palatable for my respondents and possible in Singapore. To do so, it is 
necessary to see the larger model of civil activism in Singapore.  After which, I would 
then discuss how civil activism is understood and operated by Muslim organizations in 
Singapore. By presenting the different models of activism present in these two spheres, I 
hope to better present why the model of gay advocacy mounted by Al-Fatiha would face 
considerable difficulties in being successfully launched here. So, I will be looking at the 
possibility of transplanting Al-Fatiha onto Singapores shores by first detailing the 
external scaffolds which represent the allowable perimeters of public discourse in 
Singapore and subsequently moving on to my respondents personal intimations of these 
perimeters.   
 
4.2 Civil Society and the Pink Movement 
Civil society is a much talked about, sometimes nebulous space in Singapore. It was used 
as a metaphorical signpost to mark two extreme ends of existence; the natural 
conditions of civilization thought to be uncivilized and the unnatural modes of 
government, especially despotism (Chua 2000:65). 
 
In Singapore, civil space is a mottled one. It is occupied unevenly by certain state-funded 
behemoths and various small groups. They have little or no state endorsement. In 
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Singapore, the difference between the two is often encapsulated in two terms. The former 
to mean civic society and the latter civil society. The first one carries tacit 
government approval and is generally non-political, social service-based. This would 
include the various self-help groups, clan groups and representative religious bodies (e.g. 
National Council of Churches). The second one usually occupies a more contentious 
space, having almost always come into being prompted by an agenda, which is often 
decidedly less pacifist and more activist. 
 
The very first mention of the term civil society and its employment by a high ranking 
government official came in 1991 when the then Minister for Information and the Arts, 
Brigadier General George Yeo, gave a speech, delineating the need for the above. BG 
Yeo however expressed a distinct preference for the term civic society and he avoided 
completely the term NGO (Non-governmental organisation), presumably because of its 
assumed anti-government stance. Nevertheless, he talked of a civil society mediating 
between the state and the individual (Tanaka 2002:206). 
 
The Singaporean government has been quick, in recent years, to understand the draw and 
potential of civil society. It stands as a useful counterfoil to the ubiquitous virtual, 
foreign-hosted protest sites that the state has (presumably) little control over. The state 
has also recognised that when faced with citizens who are well-connected, micro-
managing every facet of society would be an increasingly impossible and undesirable 
task. In this respect, then, as a nod to the notion of active citizenry, fringe spaces have 
been allowed to grow.  
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However, what does this specifically mean in terms of civil society actors and 
representation? The kind of participation the government seeks is mostly that of 
voluntary welfare organisations (VWOs) and grassroots organisations focused on local 
issues rather than action-oriented civil society groups concerned with national issues or 
advocating particular interests (Mauzy & Milne 2001:167). It is against this backdrop 
that gay-related activism ought to be understood and evaluated. 
 
As I have mentioned, with the gradual relaxation of the state stranglehold over public 
expression, certain civil society outfits which do not fall into the corporatist-cooperative 
model (ala the self-help groups) have sprouted in Singapore and have gradually asserted 
themselves. The Nature Society focuses on nature and wildlife conservation. Its bid to 
have certain developmental projects called off have failed but it has scored some major 
triumphs. This includes the establishment of an 87 hectare bird sanctuary at Sungei Buloh 
and the revocation of a plan to build a golf course at the Lower Pierce Reservoir 
catchments area (Mauzy & Milne 2002:159). AWARE was founded in 1985 and has lost 
more issues than it has won, but it has managed to get the state to relax its immigration 
rules for Singaporean women who marry foreigners (ibid:159). These two civil society 
outfits generally take on a non-confrontational approach, preferring instead to adopt a 
more consultative style of dialogue. They are generally respected, having been fronted by 
professionals and experts in their respective fields. 
 
PLU and AFA/AMPUH 
However, the path to legitimacy and acceptance is thornier for gay interest groups or 
fringe groups. I will be highlighting two outfits; People Like Us (PLU) and 
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AFA/AMPUH76. AFA, strictly speaking, is not a gay interest group. However, by virtue 
of its fringe service, public education on AIDS, it has attracted gay Singaporeans into 
serving and volunteering their time.  Before delving into these two groups, it would be 
timely to give a brief outline on what is needed for a society to operate lawfully here. 
 
An NGO could be registered under the Societies Act, Mutual Benefits Organisations Act, 
depending on its legal entity. Usually, 10 signatories are needed to effect application of a 
collective interest into a society (Chan 1996:217). The Registrar of Societies can reject 
applications, usually if it is deemed to be prejudicial to public interest. Thus, activities 
that fall outside established parameters of respectability would face considerable 
challenges to be heard (e.g., gay interest groups, such as People Like Us).  
 
PLU was started as a support group and a meeting ground for gays at a time when there 
was a developing sense amongst the gays of a community facing its own political and 
social issues (Chua & Kwok 2001:110). Its application to hold a public forum in 2000 to 
debate gay issues was rejected.  PLU has not been able to register itself as a society, 
despite garnering more than 10 signatories and it remains vulnerable to the charge of 
illegitimacy and subversion. Its latest rejection came in May 2004, a year after the dust 
had settled on the storm that then Prime Minister Gohs speech on homosexuality had 
stirred. The reason given by the Registrar of Societies was that as mainstream 
Singaporeans are conservative, it would be contrary to public interest to grant legitimacy 
to the promotion of homosexual activities and viewpoints, at this point.77 Clearly, while 
                                                
76 AMPUH stands for Anak Melayu/Islam Melawan Penyakit Unik HIV/AIDS. Loosely translated, it 
means Malay/Muslims fighting a unique disease, HIV/AIDS. 
77 Lydia Lim, Scoping out Societies, Straits Times, 17 July 2004 
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PM Goh had said that a more open policy had been set for the hiring of gays, the situation 
was clearly different for gays locally born and bred who are not interested in laying claim 
to Singapores economic pie, but to its socio-political one. 
 
Action for AIDS (AFA) positions itself as a resource centre for AIDS and is consistent 
with the sanitised version of sex and sexuality. It presents a highly medical, no-nonsense 
approach to understanding AIDS. AFA cannot be considered a gay voice as such. Its 
approach has been to delink AIDS and homosexuality, a relationship that some observers 
regard as highly problematic for its work in AIDS education (Chua & Kwok 2001:111).  
This inability to be a gay voice similarly afflicts AMPUH as well. 
 
I spoke to one Muslim activist in AFA who is one of the progenitors of AMPUH, a 
Malay Muslim support group for AIDS patients. He emphasized that AMPUH is not a 
support group for gay Muslim men and women. Its emphasis is on palliative care for 
AIDS stricken Malay Muslim patients. As he puts it:  
You dont want to be talking about religion and sexuality and the 
abomination that is homosexuality. Not when they are facing certain 
death.  
 
And he added that as most AIDS sufferers contract the disease through heterosexual 
contact, pursuing a gay-themed agenda would do little in garnering support for their aims 
and activities within the larger Malay Muslim society. AMPUH advises on the burial and 
last rites arrangements of the Muslim dead. It also tries hard to educate Malay Muslims 
that judgment should not be cast on people suffering from AIDS. Thus AFA/AMPUH 
stays clear from any political posturing on sexuality and instead publicly focuses on 
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dispelling myths and misconceptions surrounding AIDS.  Since the fight for 
representation has been consistently denied to PLU and AFA/AMPUH are unable to take 
it on, could some other legitimate interest group then take up the cudgel for reform? 
Perhaps, one could consider AWARE as a possible forerunner for the job. 
 
One of my respondents, who was active in AWARE, scoffs at this question. She says:  
AWARE is not a very safe place to come out, which is a very strange 
thing for a womens organisation. But I guess its a Singapore thing. But 
the irony is there are a few on the Exco committee who are [gay]. But no 
ones open, which is kinda strange for a feminist organisation. Cos 
overseas, thats where the dykes are. In womens groups. Here, it is 
hardly ever spoken about. Cos, its like, women here are already 
marginalised so much, we have other issues to grapple with. We have so 
many problems, that we dont even want to look at gay issues and what 
not.   
 
Her comments support the observation that AWARE is also viewed as an organisation 
which chooses its issues with care so as to avoid direct confrontation with the 
government. AWARE, has not for example, defended gay rights (Mauzy & Milne 
2002:160). Given that the physical landscape offers very little in terms of real 
opportunities for representation of same-sex issues, most gay interest groups have taken 
flight and fled to the Internet. I will not be elaborating on the face that this virtual fight 
has taken. But I will recapitulate briefly the concessions that the state has made to help 
defuse some of these pent-up frustrations.  
 
Yielding inch by inch 
In a show of strength and ability, Singapores first ever GLBT (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual 
and Transgendered) community centre in Singapore opened in December 2003. The 
centre will comprise of a library where visitors can borrow GLBT fiction and non-fiction 
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books, provide phone counselling and produce referrals to GLBT-friendly medical, legal 
and other services.78 This centre is co-located within the AFA (Action for AIDS) 
building and it occupies the upper floor of the AFA office. While its opening signals a 
positive beginning, there is no doubt that its presence was made more palatable and 
possible by its deliberate positioning as an info-resource centre and not as a deliberate 
promoter of  alternative sexuality. 
 
And in a nod to these concessions, there is a tacit agreement on the ground not to 
indulge in undue provocations. Gay Singaporeans say theyve never had it so good  
Now the government closes one eye to the existence of these places as long as the patron 
behaves. If the laws are still weighted against them, gays reason that the government has 
its compulsions  Tall poppies get their heads chopped off  the government has been 
very kind to us. I dont think we should breach that tolerance.79 This sage-like 
pronouncement was made by an owner of a gay club. It is one of many, which dot the 
Tanjong Pagar landscape.80 Accordingly then, in recent years, authorities have softened 
their stand on gays  at least unofficially  Indeed Singapore has several widely 
acknowledged gay hangouts and local homosexuals are especially active on the Internet. 
Police have largely discontinued their sting operation to flush out gays and officials 
consult more with groups with homosexual members, such as Action for AIDS. 81  
                                                
78 AFP, Singapore opens first help centre for gay community, 
http://www.pelangipridecentre.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=2 
 
79  We Ting, Jen  Sex in Asia: Boys Night Out, TimeAsia.com 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/sex/sexgay.html 
80 The increased presence of gay clubs and bars at Tanjong Pagar seems to be an accident. Pub owners 
looking for relatively cheaper rents and less saturated nightclub spaces chose Tanjong Pagar. Over time, it 
drew more gay clubs and bars and easily developed into niche area for the gay community. 




This picture of (limited) progress has done much to help defuse some of the tension 
bubbling on the ground amongst the more disgruntled gay Singaporeans. This has also 
led to a growing feeling that one should not prematurely push the boundaries for 
acceptance. So while certainly more can be done to humanize homosexuality, the 
change should not be initiated from the bottom up, but rather from the top down. This 
then does considerably dilute the lure and effectiveness of gay advocacy groups in 
Singapore. In having sketching the above, I hope to have painted a clearer picture of 
state-society relations in the negotiations for gay representation. Now, I will turn to 
document the face of civil activism in Singaporean Muslim spaces and show that a 
similar constriction (in terms of the perimeters of expression) is evident there as well. 
 
4.3 Model of Islamic Activism in Singapore. 
Civil activism in Singapore, as outlined earlier, is one circumscribed by a matrix of 
regulations and political sensibilities. Because the state monitors more assiduously the 
boundaries of being Malay and Muslim, Islam has to be used in a manner consistent with 
state ideals. This takes the conventional form of Islam being used to further socio-
economic progress. I have highlighted (in Chapter Two) that Islam has consistently been 
invoked to galvanise the Malay Muslims into action and excel along the path of 
meritocracy that has been vigorously embraced by the state. In Singapore, there is only 
one social service organisation which has consciously moulded Islam for a civil activist 
agenda and that is AMP, Association of Muslim Professionals. 
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AMP, established in October 1991, was the direct result of a brainstorming session at the 
National Convention of Singapore Malay-Muslim Professionals held in October 1990. Its 
establishment was proposed as a complement to the other self-help body, MENDAKI 
which was established in 1982. AMP modeled itself as a civil society organisation and 
self-help group to provide an alternative voice in the positioning and patterning of 
Muslim interests in Singapore. This was brought most clearly to the fore with its 
collective leadership proposal. This is where a body of non-elected Malay Muslim 
representatives partner the existing elected Malay Muslim members of Parliament (MPs). 
AMP felt that this proposal would have the inherent advantage of having an apolitical, 
independent process to achieve the upliftment of the Malay Muslim community.82 This 
proposal was shut down by the then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. AMP was then 
called for a closed-door dialogue session with Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew.  
 
I wish to highlight how the activist edge of Islam has been numbed in Singapore. As PM 
Goh noted in his rebuke to AMP, If you stick to socio-economic programmes, Ive got 
no problems. But if you talk about religion and having an alternative Islamic consultative 
forum outside MUIS, is that still apolitical?83 The proposal was summarily rejected due 
to its perceived effect of undermining the existing Malay Muslim leadership and also for 
critically posing a threat to state managed religious orthodoxy as exemplified by MUIS 
and MENDAKI. This clearly underscores the potential destabilising effect that Islam 
could pose to the multicultural rubric. The state has legitimised its rejection of the 
proposal by reiterating the negative impact that it would have on racial integration. As 
                                                
82Refer to Dont undermine gains made by Malay MPs.  Straits Times, 6 November 2000 
83 Refer to Straits Times, 6 November 2000 
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noted by the Prime Minister: The more you emphasize your separateness, the more 
others will leave you alone. Over time, some communities can sense that many of you 
would rather be different because your religion makes you different. 84 
 
Predictably then, AMP has carefully moderated its previous stance of providing 
alternatives. It reaffirmed in very emphatic terms that the AMP will continue to 
remain focused on education, on social development, on training the Malay Muslim 
community. 85 Thus, in many respects, AMP have redirected and repackaged the 
energies of the religion to carefully echo the designs of the multicultural state. Its goals 
have become quintessentially Singaporean (Siddique 2000:138). Thus, it is clear that 
the rough edges of civil activism, especially when engineered within the folds of an 
ethnic/religious-centric group, have been chipped away so that it fits into the neat 
perimeters of multicultural Singapore.  
 
This becomes very clear when one looks at a recent paper seeking to document how the 
participation of Malay Muslim professionals in the civic organisations movement [have] 
helped to promote state-society synergy (Ibrahim & Abdullah 2002:51). The unabashed 
acknowledgement and preference for this model of co-operation reveals how the Malay 
Muslim psyche understands and reproduces civil activism. The paper first recalls how the 
spirit of activism is an intrinsic part of the Malay Muslim identity by drawing attention to 
the time-honoured (Malay) tradition of gotong royong (spirit of mutual help and co-
operation). The authors surmised that this need to serve was very much influenced by 
                                                
84 Refer to Straits Times, 6 November 2000  
85 Refer to Straits Times, 6 November 2000 
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Islam. The relationships which had been forged, through the influence of Islam, have 
contributed to social cohesion and positive communal life (ibid:54). Thus, the paper 
implicitly denies that Islam is antithetical to integration and progress. In fact, Islam 
becomes the referential vehicle for progress and has spurred the Malay Muslims to be 
more civic-centred. 
 
What is significant in the paper is how this spirit of self-help and co-operation has found 
its greatest salience and audience in community-mediated structures. This  reinforces the 
integration and inclusion of Malay Muslims into the Singaporean mental and 
ideological framework. The authors recounted how this spirit could be visibly seen in the 
existence of badan khairat (mutual self-help associations, popular in the 1950s and 60s 
which looked after the poor, orphans and the disadvantaged), the establishment of 
orphanages, and MENDAKI. (ibid:55). These are organisations which no doubt serve a 
useful purpose, but one can see how Malay Muslim civil activism is disciplined to reflect 
only its (immediate and state) concerns.  
 
This, therefore, leads to a curtailment in the available spaces for representation as well as 
in the causes for mobilization. It is against this local backdrop of civil activism, that one 
has to locate the ends and aims of (foreign) Al-Fatiha.  I have briefly drawn attention to 
and explored at some length the meaning and preferred perimeters of existence of Malay 
Muslim civil activism. It will be difficult for Al-Fatiha to set up base here. It will face a 
credible challenge to legally establish a presence here and its model of activist Islam is 
clearly at odds with prevailing local sensibilities.  I shall now turn to documenting and 
exploring my sample sizes response towards the place of same-sex sexuality in Islam 
 137 
and ponder the possible pathways open to them, in view of their interpretations and 
representations of themselves as gay Muslims in Singapore.   
 
4.4 Same-Sex Representation in Islam  Sin as a Legitimate Representation 
Kayleen testifies:  
Im a lesbian one, Muslim, two. Its like one comes after the other. Its 
strange I know, but its a way to rationalise and make sense of things.   
 
Erin echoes the same sentiment:  
Personally for me, I try not to think about it too much. So you can say, in 
a way, that ah, umm, I am avoiding things. Its like an escapism kinda of 
thing, you know. Its like okay, umm, I know Im Muslim but Im gay, 
umm, so lets not mix these two together. You know, so youre either 
more Muslim or more gay.  So cos Ive know that Ive sinned, so I should 
be more focused.  
 
The cleaving of identities is a consistent theme and action for my respondents. In doing 
so, they can choose to continue to be engaged with the civil fight for legitimacy and 
recognition from broader society, if so driven. However, they also retain their 
commitment and respect for Islam. Evidently, they respect and agree with Islams stand 
on same-sex sexuality; where it is a moral transgression and a sin. This is borne out most 
visibly by Aisyah and her tudung. 
 
Aisyah points out that her veil acts like a shield:  
Its not like I am ashamed of being gay. No, to me, its not shameful or 
whatever. But when I wear the tudung, I guess it protects those who are 
not ready to know who I really am. It also protects me if I should slip up. 
Now, wearing the tudung does not make me less gay or whatever. 
Basically, it fulfils that part of me which wants to be a good Muslim. So 
its not repressing me or anything. 
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Significantly enough, the veil represents to her the dream of being a Muslim. She says:  
When I die, I dont want to be a gay Muslim, a gay. I just want to be a 
good Muslim.  
 
The commitment to Islam varies amongst my respondents. They do, however, share the 
belief that Quranic injunctions against homosexuality, buttressed by the hadiths are 
beyond reproach. Even the most religiously avuncular of the lot, Melissa, had this to say 
about those who seek to represent an alternative reading on homosexuality in Islam:  
For those who find it extremely oppressive or unfair, they should just do 
everyone a big favour and leave it. Theres no point changing something 




Norita agrees with the above:  
If they arent happy with how Islam is treating them, then go find out 
that would suit them, instead of trying to change it to make it easier for 
them to live as gay Muslims. 
 
Related to this is the abject feeling of impropriety and incapability which Muslims have 
in general in remoulding Islam to be compatible and congruent with their comfort 
zones. Amreen Jamal and Faisal Alam, of Al-Fatiha had raised the possibility of 
contemporary attitudes towards same-sex sexuality as culture-based and not one which 
has its roots in the Quran. However, there is a prevailing belief among Muslims that the 
word of God is final and that no re-workings are to be allowed. Whoever interprets the 
Quran according to his own light will go to Hell (Wensinck in Riddell 2001:35).  
 
Here, I will be looking at how my respondents apprehend and accept the permanence of 
sin which is attached to same-sex acts in Islam. This will explain the general reluctance 
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and refusal to align themselves to any position which claims otherwise.  Iskandar 
continues:  
Yes, Islam has zero tolerance for gays. Its something that bothers me 
constantly. But the Word of God is final and I dont think there can be an 
alternative conception of that rule. To be a good Muslim is to obey Gods 
rules. He has outlawed homosexuality. Frankly, theres no way out of this. I 
react with a sense of guilt. My life has been good so far and Im kind of 
ashamed that I continue to disobey His Law in this aspect. 
 
Eschewing the proposition of alternative representations of Islam, Erin says:  
Theres only one. Im not exactly very, very Islamic. But theres only one 
point of view. Its like skating on thin iceIts going to be difficult for our 
fellow Muslims to accept it. Even I have problems accepting such a position 
because Islam does not condone homosexuality. Its the lowest of the low. 
Its a definite burn in hell thing. 
 
The Quran doesnt often mention its condemnation of homosexuality, but my 
respondents have no qualms in accepting its veracity. As Kayleen notes:  
 
See, I dont even know where exactly that it says its wrong  I admit and 
I know that my religious knowledge is lousy lah  but you knooow, in 
some sense, that its wrong. And I guess thats my fear; to have it confirmed 
that you are doomed to Hell.  
 
These sentiments are shared by all my respondents. They reflect their acceptance of 
scriptural materials relating to same-sex sexuality, the durability of sin and the 
permanence of judgment. Given this, Islam is iron-clad in the eyes of my respondents in 
its immutability. Islams watershed event  is the Day of Judgment [which] is the 
principal motivating factor for human relief and behaviour in the human world (Riddell 
2001:29). Thus, the inevitability of judgment is paramount, its coming a necessary 
passage. Here, we shall see how, then, despite the seemingly ominous situation, my 
respondents make sense of their place in Islam being gay Muslims. There is a clear and 
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visible strand of action that enjoins these responses; that sexuality is a private matter; one 
which shall be determined and judged between God and his human charges.  
 
4.5 Same-Sex Representation in Islam Its Between Me and God 
 
As a Muslim, I totally believe that Islam is between me and God, so 
theres no interceeding ah. Cos ultimately, God can judge me if Ive been 
a good Muslim. The right to judge belongs to God alone. I dont see why 
people have to struggle. Because sexuality and religion are separate. 
There are two different things. If you are ultimately a good Muslim, or try 
to be one, then God will see that. [Zaman]  
 
Erin continues:  
Just because I am gay, it doesnt mean that Ill be condemned all my 
life. Because God, is like Maha Pengampun,Maha Penyayang (All 
Forgiving, All Loving) so and all that, so I should be forgiven 
somewhere, sometime, as long as I continue to believe in him. And I do. 
Its like everything that I have to go through, theres a reason for it.  
 
Mohd, who has become more religious with the demise of his father, is disturbed at any 
attempts to dislodge that bedrock of conventional wisdom. He does not want the issue to 
be discussed as:  
Its a matter between you and God. He judges you, no one else say that 
you are a bad Muslim or whatever just because youre gay.  
 
The finality of moral judgment does greatly perturb him. He says:  
I prefer partners of the same religion because we can communicate 
better, because we are having the same culture, the same religion and 
understand the fact that we are both doing dirty things. I need someone 
who can understand my difficulties.  
 
He continues:  
 
Its really tak bagus (not good/right) so if you have someone from the 




 Mohd exemplifies the paradox, which is present in my respondent sample. His religion 
obviously is a source of inner struggle for him. His sexuality is a situation which invites 
grief, and yet he is not moved or attracted to spaces, which are seeking to reconcile the 
two. His position is similar to that articulated by Iskandar:  
I would hardly consider myself a victim. Ive always believed that my 
homosexuality is my own choice and nobody forced me to be one. I just 
dont want to be judged by my sexuality, the moment its known to the 
wider Muslim community. Being a homosexual has never stopped me 
from achieving my goals in life.  
 
The clear and visible sentiment of self knowledge and awareness that ones purpose is not 
compromised due to ones sexuality has awakened in my respondents the need to be more 
accountable for their actions. They do this through a renewed and active commitment in 
God. That is why, despite Islams unwavering stand towards same-sex sexuality, my 
respondents are not in favour to either re-position Islam or to renounce Islam altogether. 
Iskandar emphatically conveys:  
No, never. My religion is my lifeline. I would not sacrifice my beliefs 
for my own convenience. To be non-religious is to have little or no 
direction in life.   
 
What then do my respondents make of Al-Fatihas manner of representation? What 
would their position be? 
 
Only three [Zaman, Iriana and Kayleen] of my respondents are familiar with the 
workings of Al-Fatiha. Zaman, elaborating on his position towards the group, says:  
I dont agree with them. Never would agree with them at all. Never, 
ever. Al-Fatiha, they are doing this already, pushing for rights. But I ask 
you, what kind of rights do you want? The right not to be vilified? Thats 
freedom of speech you know. My thing is, ultimately you are responsible 
for your actions. Fighting for it doesnt change things you know. See, for 
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me, I totally believe that Islam is between you and God, theres no 
interceding. 
 
Iriana responding to Al-Fatihas position notes:  
It looks like they are modeling themselves after the gay Christian 
movement, by trying to challenge what is contained in the Quran. But 
Islam is the true faith; I dont see how we can just change the words of 
God to just suit ourselves. The Christians can do that, but for Muslims, 
our religion is the final and true one.  
 
This echoes the statement made by Riddell earlier (2001:61) where Muslims consider 
that the revelation of the Quran which was given to humanity through Muhammad served 
to supplant all revelations which preceded it, namely that given to Adam, the scrolls of 
Abraham, the Torah, the Psalms and the Gospel. 
 
Shahid Dossani (1997) argues that religion has to be relevant and adaptable to fulfill its 
adherents needs. He argues for the expansiveness of Islam and points to the fundamental 
principle behind its existence. This is that it supplants Judaism and Christianity as the 
definitive bearer of Truth. Given its breadth and scope of purpose, Dossani argues that 
God understands that society changes and that therefore God recognises that humanity 
has evolved to a stage where it is acceptable for some people, including some Muslims to 
be gay (Dossani 1997:237). Thus, going by the depiction of Islam as understood by my 
respondents thus far, it does seem to convey the impression that Islam is harsh and 
uncompromising in its stand towards same-sex sexuality. Does this then contravene the 
humanistic and expansive potential of Islam as argued for by Dossani? Aisyah scoffs at 
the notion that Islam in unduly unforgiving and harsh: 
 I am confident that Gods judgment is equitable and fair. And because 




Given the intensity of her conflict, one would think she would be naturally predisposed to 
such a strategy seeking affirmation.  She says:  
I love everything about Islam, I find Islam to be totally, a totally perfect 
religion. Theres no loopholes anywhere. I love talking about my religion, 
educating others on what Islam is. Sadly, sadly, I am waiting to commit 
myself fully to Islam. Not to just find it beautiful, but to also practice it 
perfectly as well. 
 
Aisyah wishes to achieve the above by eventually settling down:  
I want to have a family. I need to see, I have to see my children as they 
would hold me, to keep me, to keep me on the right track. I need that to 
stop me from turning back to being lesbian. 
 
 
 She continues:  
Im still a lesbian in that, I love women but I choose to not want that to 
act on me. And I believe that if God can see that, to see how hard I push it 
away, then he will reward me. He will be forgiving towards what Ive 
done in the past.  
 
For others for whom the above strategy is not acceptable, Zaman offers this advice:  
Your prayers are the best way to link you and God. So I would advise 
you to pray, that is what is required by God. You dont have to have 
anyone intercede for you to do that. 
 
It seems to be then that the fight is to be a purely private struggle.  
Dont impose your comments on others. For Islam, I mean, there is no 
compulsion right? But once you are in it, everything is unto you. That part, I 
understand very well. Being Muslim myself and being gay, its a big 
contradiction. And I am fully aware of it. First of all, we need to get 
recognition, once we get recognition [to legally exist as gay men and 
women], it doesnt matter which God you believe in. So, to me, the first 
step we should be looking is to get recognition from the State. After that, I 




He continues:  
With what I know about Islam, I wouldnt want to use Islam as a platform 
for change. Islam has been around for a long time. Trying to re-interpret 
Islam, to slant it to support their gay agenda, thats not right. Its just not 
right. I know Islam. I know my religion well. I just have to put Islam one 
side and just accept the way that I am. I have no choice. I have to do that. 
 
Therefore, in the view of my respondents, an alignment and subsequent adoption of the 
aims and strategies of Al-Fatiha will ultimately mean that they will be dishonouring the 
very basic principles of being Muslim by not trusting in and surrendering to the will of 
God. My respondents also feel crippled by their lack of knowledge in Islam and feel that 
therefore, they will be in no position to even champion such a cause. Erin says:  
For one, who am I to say anything? I dont even pray five times a day. 
And youre gay some more. And you want to push this agenda? Thats 
just crazy. 
 
Would my respondents welcome the interceding from a more learned and authoritative 
source? Al-Fatiha, at its last international conference in 2002 in Washington, had a guest 
speaker who is a gay imam (a religious teacher and one who leads the congregation in 
the mosque in prayer). Once again, opinion that sexuality is a private matter between 
oneself and God was explicitly affirmed.   
Hasyim notes:  
Put it this way, Ive been raised as a Muslim since young, I dont claim 
to know it inside out. But theres no way that gayness would be allowed 
in Islam. So theres no way, that you can have a gay imam, no matter how 
learned he is, to support us, based on religion. No way. Thats it. You can 
have a gay imam who talks about Islam in general. Its really pointless to 
talk about being gay and being Muslim because its a dead end. People 
can tell me a lot of stuff, actually can, actually maybe but the point is for 
me, cannot means cannot. But I am gay still. So this is something private 
between me and God. 
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Erin laughed hysterically at the mention of a gay imam:  
Sure, (laughs), it would definitely make me feel better, if someone 
learned were to come out and say, its okay to be gay and Muslim. But 
sorry, if the main aim is to make a bunch of Muslim gays feel better, but 
theyre not going to make the rest of the non-gay Muslim community feel 
better. So theyre like treading on thin ice, lah. But I doubt, really doubt, 
being gay and Muslim is ever going to be accepted here [Singapore]. 
 
Norita agrees: 
Islam should be left the way it is.  Dont change it. I mean, its the way 
that God wants it. Islam shouldnt be changed just because there are gay 
Muslim communities around. You shouldnt be changing it to fit 
something else. Because (emphasis) you are following the religion, so 
you should be following all the rules which have been set. So then, why 
bother following that particular religion, go get your own. I mean, if you 
dont find this comfortable, and its not for you to follow, dont go 
changing it to suit you. Because religion is something very sacred. Thats 
the only sacred thing in life! Nothing in life is. So if you think being a 
Muslim is too difficult, then dont be a Muslim. Its not difficult for me. I 
just have to adapt. I choose Islam. Its me who choose Islam. We are the 
ones choosing the religion. So Islam should just be the way it was. 
 
It is clear that my respondents are unwilling to support both the agenda of Al-Fatiha and 
also its operational strategies. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, they think its an 
unnecessary manoeuvre given that their existence has not been threatened and publicly 
vilified. There is a palpable lack of any tangible threat which would necessitate some 
form of pre-emptive action. Secondly, they think that to try to remould Islam is 
distasteful and blasphemous. By tinkering with the divine pronouncements of Islam, is to 
tinker with the deliverance from sin that my respondents see as absolute and forthcoming 
from God. The following section seeks to understand the allowed and preferred 




4.6 Same-Sex Representation in Islam  Keeping the Faith and Peace 
 
As highlighted earlier, the Malay public is generally quite silent on same-sex sexuality. 
This is a position that my respondents are keen to preserve. Su explains the need to be 
discreet:  
If theres a blanket silence on the issue, then no one would know about 
it. When you put yourself out there, all its takes is just one person and 
your life might just get ruined.  You cant know for sure what would 
trigger the public. Its just very lucky that the Malay community is sooo 
not confrontational. We are soo not confrontational at all. When the 
whole terrorism thing broke out, did you even hear a peep from the 
community? Not so much as a hoot came out. Nothing. 
 
Iriana gives her view on what would constitute a good and fruitful discussion of 
homosexuality and Islam here:  
Such issues have to be dealt with yourself or find someone that you 
really trust and who you know will not give you a biased judgment, you 
know what I mean. And will not lead you to their beliefs and values. 
Someone whos open minded, someones whos willing to accept you 
they way you are and not push you. What I am trying to encourage is for 
the religious teachers to understand our lifestyle and I m telling them to 
encourage us, of course not, but to let us be individuals. We really do 
need some gay friendly ustazs and ustazahs around, not to convert us 
back to straights, but to give us a basic knowledge of Islam. 
 
The need for a more enlightened rank of religious leaders reveals how my respondents 
approximate the level of acceptance and understanding amongst Muslims here at present. 
As Iriana notes: 
Ive tried opening up to religious teachers here but they just intrude in 
your lives. They will not leave you alone. They just go at it until you just 
bend over and follow.  
 
 
Agreeing, Kayleen notes:  
Its like they are imposing their beliefs and that theres only one way, 




Hasyim deadpans:  
These are meant to convert them to straight. Its not self-help, it is self- 
torture. 
 
Conceding that much of the prevailing attitude of the Malay Muslim public is certainly 
not one of acceptance, it would be difficult to effect change at the institutional level. 
There is a current push by MUIS (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) to streamline 
Islamic instruction (to weed out objectionable strains of Islam from being preached). So, 
by mouthing off statements which hint at accepting homosexuality in Islam would not fit 
into the conventional orthodoxy as understood and practiced here. The New Paper 
recently published an article on services being conducted for the gay Christians in a 
Tanjong Pagar pub by (a) straight priest(s).86 Administration of Christianity in Singapore 
is not centralised under an apex body, unlike Islam under MUIS. Given the micro-
regulation which exists, such a situation seems improbable for Malay Muslims. 
 
The silence from the majority Malay Muslims is not prompted by their refusal to believe 
that there are gay Muslims in their midst. Rather, it is prompted by the realisation that, 
once unearthed, it would reach no satisfying end. Norita says:  
So what? I mean, its always been wrong anyways. You dont talk about 
it, you talk about it, it wont change anything. I think theyre somewhere 
caught in the middle. They dont want to make a stand because they 
might misrepresent the community. I know that the Muslim community 
want to say something but they cant. They want to, maybe they know 
gay Muslims themselves and want to speak up for them, but they cant. 
So theyre in a fix. 
 
                                                
86 Refer to Tay Shian, Prayers held in a pub: Gays okay in this Church, New Paper, 13 July 2004 
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The unwillingness to talk about homosexuality, for very different reasons, secures this 
social mirage of stability and calm. Here then, we can clearly see that theological and 
cultural boundaries (of religion and ethnicity) mutually reinforcing one another. While 
they dont share the same ideological sensitivities, they share the same normative 
boundaries which ensure that they toe the same doctrinal lines. As Iriana so passionately 
puts it:  
I respect my religion. I respect people who have faith in Islam. I am not 
going to turn around and throw this into their faces and say its okay to be 
gay in Islam. 
 
Su offers her explanation as to why public strategies to reclaim same-sex legitimacy 
within Islam would be generally impossible in Singapore:  
I know I dont live a very good lifestyle as a Malay Muslim, so I dont see 
the need to out myself out there so for people to read about or for people to 
judge. Even me, as a Muslim, I do judge others sometimes. If theres a 
backlash, you cant turn around and say, hey, I didnt know. And yes, I am 
happy that we are so non-confrontational, it would take a lot for the [Malay 
Muslim] community to come out and talk.  
 
Some may perceive the above situation as a reflection of the appalling state of ignorance 
and cowardice on both sides of the divide. However, as I have conveyed earlier, both 
share the belief that arbitration occurs only within the courts of the Divine. Given the 
enduring perception that homosexuality is a sin, private adjudication between the sinner 
and the Almighty seems to be the best strategy moving forward.  
Its better this way, rather than receiving public condemnation by the 
conservative Muslim community. Some things are better left alone, as it 
may result in social shock if the Muslim community finds out how vast 
the homosexual community is here. [Iskandar] 
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To sum up, my respondents do not dispute that there will be punitive action in the 
Afterlife as conveyed by the doctrinal sources. The Malay Muslim majority recognises 
this too. Given this understanding, both sides have maintained an armistice of sorts. 
Given the above situation, what then is the preferred mode of representation for the gay 
Muslims here? What is to be the face of the space that they want for themselves?  
 
Some of my respondents feel that a gay Muslim support group would be the best place to 
serve their interests. It should be a non-advocate group and everyone would be free to 
chart their own destinies within this space. There is no master narrative which binds 
anyone to this group other than a desire to talk about their problems, if any or merely to 
find companionship and support from others. This idea is not new. Zaman had thought of 
it about five years ago but the idea gradually fizzled. He explains:  
You have to have the right person to organise everything. Theres a lot 
of responsibilities. You are responsible for a lot of people and you have to 
be sure that you dont brainwash them and that you dont impose your 
thoughts and opinions on them. You actually have to open up and its like 
your role is to provide an avenue for them to voice out, to confront their 
fears. 
 
He continues:  
And I didnt get many Muslims who were interested in this. And also I 
am not the right person to because (laughs) I dont have a problem with 
my sexuality and religion. I just dont comprehend what the fuss is about. 
Also, I think because when they see its like a gay Muslim support group; 
they go ah, what is this? Are we going to read the Quran everyday? So I 
think theres a phobia, an afraid-ness. Also I think its hard to get people, 
to join and to also maintain it. 
 
This vision of a support group then is one which prides itself on the principle of free 
choice and free will. Everyone facing a sexual identity crisis, as Iriana puts it, will be 
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welcome and shall not fear that they may leave a very different person from who they 
were initially unless the change was initiated by themselves.  
This sits well with Kayleens notion of sexuality:  
My whole thing about sexuality, is I think its fluid. You can be more 
attracted to women at one point of your life and be more attracted to men 
at another point in your life and you can also be attracted to both at 
another point of life. I dont believe in the whole cure thing. Because 
theres nothing to cure. Thats so insulting, we are not a disease. 
 
Recognising this, Iriana has started a loose collective of interested gay Muslims:  
Actually, Ive already started it. I already did some groundwork on it. I 
had a name but (laughs) I forgot about it. But I had difficulties [pauses] 
getting people. Like for the committee members because apparently I 
have difficulty getting lesbians who can, ah, are equally lesbian and 
equally, ah religious. They are either lesbian all the way, or they are 
religious but in denial that they are lesbians. They are afraid basically, 
due to career, family and also the suitability of the support group. Its 
like, how will the society judge you and how your career, if they find out 
about it, how your career will be tarnished. The community is very small 
and not many people want to take up this particular responsibility.  
 
It is a nascent group, its numbers small and a semblance of a structure is still absent. But 
as Iriana notes: its a start.  But, it cant be made public for obvious reasons as Kayleen 
says exasperatedly: 
Theres this myth, where gay people start clubs just to turn decent straight young 
boys and girls gay. See, that it is the myth, that gay people go around recruiting 
people to join them.  
 
She continues: 
I think support groups are always useful to have. And Muslim support 
groups would be very good to have. And I like that idea where it merely 
supports. Its not recruiting people to be gay, its just basically support. Like 
whatever decision you take, you will get support and people will empathise. 




Hasyim agrees:  
I would want a self help group so we can talk amongst ourselves. To know 
everyone else and to know who to count on for support. And if you want to 
reconcile your faith, then thats your business as well. So theres no 
pressure here.  
 
The above clearly represents a more comforting alternative to whats available at present.  
Azwan remarks:  
I dont have faith in the preachers of religion. All they have is that fear, 
like dont do this, if you do this, if you do that, then youre going to Hell. 
Theres not forgiveness, no salvation at all. 
 
However, the above will, understandably enough, not have universal appeal. Erin remains 
doubtful and unconvinced: 
I know that its wrong. Why would I want to gather a group of fellow 
Muslims and talk about sins? And get slammed by everybody else. And 
its going to make it even more difficult for us to get accepted. Thats 
why were all quiet. Its still taboo, with a capital T-A-B-O-O and I dont 
think anybody would want to come and start this or be a part of this.  
 
 Another option has surprisingly surfaced for those uncomfortable with the public 
gathering of gay Muslims, no matter how supportive and non-adversarial it is. As-Salam, 
a new entrant into the field was formed in May 2004. It was not begun by any of my 14 
respondents here; but the individual who started the newsgroup is known to one of my 
respondents. Applications to join the newsgroup are screened. This is to protect the 
privacy of those who are on the newsgroup and to weed out potential moral hecklers. The 
transformative powers of the Internet in Singapore have already been showcased to good 
effect (Ng 2001). This is perhaps the first visible, far-reaching step that may then produce 
the loose, broad-based collective of gay Singaporean Muslims. What is interesting is the 
very different approach that is taken by the group. As-Salam seeks to transform the 
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manner in which sexuality is traditionally apprehended in Islam.87 In the following pages, 
I will visit some of As-Salams key propositions and what it could mean for the debate on 
same-sex sexuality and Islam in Singapore.  
 
4.7 As-Salam: Slaughtering a few sacred cows.   
Ismail, who is the founder and moderator of the group, kindly agreed to meet me to 
discuss some salient points behind As-Salams philosophy.88 I told him about some of the 
responses of my sample size on the immutability of sin present in Islam towards same 
sex-sexuality and he replied with: 
Well, that is the prevailing assumption because they have not been 
taught to think about it in another way. Because Islam here is taught in 
the traditional way, everyone from the religious teacher to his students 
accept that there is only one way to go about an issue. So it then becomes 
more important for the queer Muslim community to bring it up and to 
propose another way of looking about it because there has been a 
revolution in other places about how Islam should be interpreted and 
understood. So long as the majority is not educated about these issues, 
then it will not be helpful for their queer brothers or sisters, as is the case 
that we see here. 
 
I asked him about the history of As-Salam and the motivation for its formation. His 
answer floored me: 
Well, the idea behind As-Salam has been brewing for a couple of years 
now and the idea really came with the revelation with the AIDS figures, 
which showed that the disease, the HIV cases involving queer Malay 
Muslims, the proportion was 40 per cent, compared to the national figure 
                                                
87 In its own words, As-Salam Singapore is dedicated towards helping lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and 
questioning (LGBTIQ; or queer for short) Muslims living in Singapore to reconcile their sexuality with their faith 
through a safe and peaceful platform, i.e. a place of as-salam and we recognise that we can be both queer and Muslim 
at the same time, as we strive towards greater consciousness of Allah in our lives. We also advise and educate LGBTIQ 
Muslims to find and understand themselves through the positive teachings of the Holy Quran and the Prophet 
Muhammad's tradition. 
88Ismail is strictly speaking not one of my 14 respondents. This is because I have asked the 14 respondents 
personal questions related to their sexuality, faith and family but for Ismail, the questions are exclusively 
on As-Salam and its premise for action. I did not pose any questions personal to him as his agreement in 
meeting me was based on the understanding that none would be asked. 
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of 20 per cent. So, that was a certain indicator that queer Malay Muslims 
were not taking sufficient protection for themselves or it could also be 
because that they were more aware of the disease, so thats why they 
went more frequent testing, more than the gay Chinese or gay Indian 
groups. But then again, it could also be a question of self-esteem and how 
that relates their religious background and if they arent taking sufficient 
protection, I thought could it also be because they saw themselves as 
having low self-esteem and as having less worth than others in the 
community. 
 
So As-Salam really had its roots as an AIDS outreach programme targeted at this 
vulnerable group of gay Malay Muslims. The figures which Ismail revealed to me is not 
public knowledge but he had been privy to it due to his continuing work with the health 
authorities here on AIDS prevention.  Ismail elaborates further: 
If they can see they are not worthless because God created me this way, 
and it is not a curse and when they can able to see themselves as not being 
cursed, they will then have sufficient self pride. Then there will be a new 
sense of thinking where it goes that I will definitely want to protect myself 
and my partner and because I have this sense of self pride and self worth, I 
wont be driven away from Islam. And from then you can also see, that 
other than having sufficient protection, you can also practice abstinence or 
monogamy, which is strongly encouraged in Islam. So then you can have 
more health alternatives, instead of taking chances with casual one-off 
encounters. 
 
As-Salam therefore seeks to lay the foundation for a positive self-image for gay Malay 
Muslims. It wants to do this initially by promoting responsible sexual behaviour in the 
hope that a higher sense of self-worth would then flow into other aspects of their lives.  
The key message is still about HIV education and AIDS prevention and 
we will weave in the message that there is fluidity and variety in 
approaches which are grounded in Islam. 
 
 
Ismail therefore sees that to help achieve the subsidiary, but no less important aim, that a 
more progressive [his words] model of action is needed. After all, as Ismail continues:  
There has been very solid research from progressive foreign Muslim 
scholars about sexuality and gender. So why dont we build on this and 
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look to see how queer Muslims in this day can still be within the folds of 
Islam and can still practise all the five pillars. 
  
 
A consistent thread which runs through Ismails statement thus far, is an indictment 
against the current form of religious framework that has shaped much of public and 
personal knowledge on the form that a good Muslim should take. Ismail elaborates: 
People take the cue from MUIS and that is often the traditionalist 
approach and there is no contrasting or progressive approaches to Islam. 
Which is in a way, well sad, because you dont have a richer 
understanding of the nature of Islam which has always been very varied. 
Theres no questioning culture within the community and  that is why the 
over arching message that has always been drilled  by the preachers and 
religious teachers that other than hetero practices or preferences has 
always been wrong, has always been a perversion remains so influential. 
 
 
Buoyed by his belief that Islam should reclaim its critical mantle of inquiry, As-Salam 
therefore seeks to promote a model of Islam that is expansive and all embracing. As-
Salam, as Ismail reiterates often in the interview, is not waging a war against current 
theological understandings but seeks to initiate dialogue from within Malay Muslim 
society to the view that no one [theological/moral] position is more legitimate than the 
other. Ismail remains hopeful that such a dialogue can occur even from among the 
traditional ideologues such as MUIS. His optimism stems from the recently concluded 
(December 2004) MABIMS (the unofficial meeting of Religious Affairs Ministers of 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) to which MUIS played host. Each 
participating country pledged to build a progressive model of Islam.  
It is going to be difficult, no doubt, because there is no spokesperson on 
this issue, within the Malay Muslim community, preferably a scholar, 
who is well versed to speak on a more progressive interpretation of 
certain precepts of Islam. But I think, with a new generation of Muslims, 
who are more questioning and may be more critical of how Islam can be 
made relevant to contemporary contexts; then perhaps there could be a 
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groundswell, or a movement towards discussing issues from varied points 
of view, but still within the domain of Islam.[Ismail] 
 
 
As-Salam, at present, does not see itself as a forerunner for this position. This is because 
its present membership base is small (currently 24 members) and not all of its members 
are willing to leave the anonymous confines of cyberspace to stake a presence in the 
public realm. Further thwarting its ability to step up to the task is the middle class and 
gender conundrum. Most of As-Salams [initial] target audience; (gay Malay Muslims 
who have had put themselves at risk due to their unsafe sexual practices) are gay Malay 
Muslim men, seeing how the risk of AIDS transmission between women through 
intercourse is very low. Thus, gay Malay Muslim women would not be drawn to the 
initial premise and strategy of As-Salam.  
 
 
 Also, increasingly, it has been observed that the blue collar male worker  the lower 
income male  is increasingly being infected with HIV. They remain a vulnerable group 
because the present model of outreach seems to be geared towards urbane and educated 
heterosexuals. As-Salam, which maintains only a virtual presence, would face an uphill 
task in trying to reach out to the blue collar, gay Muslim men, given its choice of public 
interface (the Internet).  However, there are far larger stumbling blocks.  First, there is a 
possible lack of support from gay Malay Muslims who are not enamoured with the 
progressive (i.e. questioning) slant of Islam which it advocates (as we have seen with all 
of my respondents). Second, there is the lack of an accepting public on a critique of Islam 
and its tenets. Much of this has to do with the ordering of being Malay and Muslim in 
Singapore which I have outlined in Chapter Two. The current perimeters of being Malay 
and Muslim could prove impervious and impenetrable to the more progressive strains of 
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discourse that As-Salam is promoting. There are key differences between As-Salam and 
Al-Fatiha. The latter almost single-handedly takes on the fight to reorder some of the 
conventional and prejudiced theological and cultural discourse framing same-sex 
sexuality in Islam. The former clearly leaves it to those who are outside As-Salam folds; 
i.e. the Malay Muslim public to generate debate and to point the way ahead for a rethink 
in sex and sexuality within Malay Muslim society. As Ismail pointedly notes: 
Well, yes, thats true, we will be accused of blasphemy. Because if its 
going to be one of us pushing for a re-look into sexuality in Islam, much 
of what we will say will be discredited. So thats why we need 
progressive scholars, who have a track record on progressivism, and 
gender equality. And from there, we can bring in the message about 
gender and sexuality, so its not a direct confrontation. But what we have 
now is the traditionalist point of view, which is MUIS which is not very 
helpful because the religious teachers and the asatizahs are teaching that 
homosexuality is sin to the young now. So thats why other Muslims need 
to realize that religion is never not an absolute or rigid religion, it has 
always accommodated, whether on the basis of culture but more 
fundamentally, on the basis of knowledge, which is always been a strong 
emphasis in Islam. The first word to Muhammad was read and the 
prophet has said seek knowledge even to China. So thats the 
fundamental thrust, that is to re-look at this issue, not for anything else, 
but based on what we know in the 21st century. I am confident that the 
younger generation can do that. 
 
So, essentially, As-Salam seeks to empower gay Malay Muslims in their private and 
personal negotiations with God. However, in its bid to completely and publicly overhaul 
the prejudiced premise behind same-sex sexuality, the (heterosexual) Malay Muslim 
majority needs to take the lead. Ismail, therefore, hopes to ride on the progressive 
wave. Ismail hopes to build on the meaning of the word progressive and its 
manifestation. He wishes not only for a revolution in the way that same-sex sexuality is 
viewed in Islam in Singapore but a complete re-think on how meanings and knowledge 
are framed in Islam.  
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This chapter concludes with the summation of three key points. First, no matter how 
unfavourable the position which same-sex sexuality evidently occupies in Islam, 
questioning the veracity of the Quran and Hadiths is untenable for my respondents. 
Second, with the coalescing of ethnicity and religion  the Malay Muslim dyad  there is 
a constriction in the available spaces in the expression and organisation of same-sex 
sexuality here. The conservatism that permeates the contents of being Malay and Muslim 
in Singapore ensures that there will be no radical re-think on how same sex sexuality 
ought to be debated from a different Islamic perspective in the Malay Muslim public. 
Third  and most significantly  the constriction of spaces (political and social in both 
Malay Muslim spaces and wider society) and the conservatism in the interpretation of 
same-sex sexuality have lead to a protective bubble being formed around my respondents 
because there will not be a sustained and in-depth inquiry into their lives. My respondents 
clearly prefer these constrained spaces and for sexuality to remain an essentially private, 
religious matter thereby blocking the progress of an organic faith-centric, gay interest 
group such as As-Salam. The concluding chapter will recap these key points and posit 
















                                                         
This thesis has sought to understand the dynamics between ones religion, ethnicity and 
sexuality in a secular, minority Muslim state such as Singapore. Despite the rather small 
numbers  only 15 per cent of Singapores population are Malays  there exists a 
considerable and insidious level of scrutiny on the Malay Muslims. And this scrutiny, 
ironically, has lead to the creation of a protective mantle for (gay) Malay Muslims. 
Although homosexuality is largely decried as unnatural both in the secular spaces of 
Singapore as well as the sacred ones; gay Malay Muslims have been spared any sustained 
public recrimination from the larger Malay Muslim public.  
 
5.1 When sexuality and ethnicity collide 
I have shown that the above is predicated on two things. The first is Singapores very 
own multi-cultural ethos. In a multi-racial society, there is a pressing need to ensure 
stability and social cohesion. The state achieves this through careful calibration of 
[separatist] ethnic loyalties alongside a national agenda. To enjoin all the races towards a 
common and tangible good, ethnicity must necessarily be internalised and operationalised 
in socio-economic terms. Thus, Singapore Malay Muslims and greater society must stand 
for progress and success. These nationally instituted markers of success; a bettering of 
educational and income profiles become the buzzwords for integration and commitment 
to the Singaporean ideal. Thus, in a continuous bid to succeed, social problems of Malay 
Muslims in Singapore have to take on an angle of possible resolvability. A battery of 
ways and means to intervene and eventually eradicate the problem must exist or be easily 
invented. Also, in line with the cultural weakness orthodoxy model, they must assume 
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accountability for the problem. Homosexuality does not fit into this framework of action 
and consequently the community is reluctant to claim it as their own. As mentioned 
earlier, my respondents were genuinely puzzled and some upset over the depiction of gay 
Muslims in local Malay dailies because it was not geared towards a specific 
developmental purpose. It was not seen by them as a socio-economic ill. As Zaman notes:  
There are far more pressing issues. For instance, like the increasing 
radicalism of the Malays in Singapore. How can there be terrorists in 
Singapore? Another one is probably like the increasing number of Malay 
youths who are distancing themselves from Islam, you know, a lot of 
very, very, umm, liberal views, drifting away from tradition. These are 
things that bear much more merit, you know. Like homosexuality, you 
can touch on it, but so what? Who would care?  
 
Su echoes this popular and populist view: 
Well, yeah, premarital sex, thats rampant as well. You see the kids 
being dressed in as little as they can possibly get away with. So teenagers 
are not very well-behaved now. My point is there are more pressing 
issues to talk about. 
 
 
The (perceived) preponderance of social problems in Malay Muslim society is a well-
accepted and valid one. They are conscious of their inadequacies and have been 
constantly exhorted by their leaders and state figures to overcome these bumps. 
Premarital sex, teenage pregnancies and marriages and substance abuse are issues which 
have an emotional resonance. These problems can be easily and concretely located as 
stemming from structural and social inadequacies of Malay Muslim society in Singapore. 
These are problems where practical solutions can be found and are emotive issues, which 
can easily galvanise the society into action. Homosexuality is an issue which has no 
emotional resonance, because it is not its mea culpa. It is the fault of one person and the 
majority Malay Muslim public is clearly not eager to bear this cross. 
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5.2 When faith and sexuality collide 
The second is that Islam, as a key integer in the identity of a Malay Muslim, has 
undergone a review in content and tone. I have shown that oppositional (going by state-
defined boundaries) activism or action influenced by Islam is viewed very unfavourably 
by the state. In view of the heightened action on Islam and its representation here, there 
has been intensification in the promulgation of a right and progressive Islam, one that 
is compatible with a multi-cultural Singapore. The implication seems to be that the model 
of Islam in the past was an incompatible one. It would seem likely the perception arose 
because Islam had veered away from the realm of the personal and private to the public 
and the political (witness the tudung controversy). I am not implying that religion as an 
oppositional force has been totally emasculated and that Muslims and Islam here are 
incapable and unable to put forth views which are contrary to that of the state. While the 
reach of the state is extensive, it is not absolute and while the community is a picture of 
acquiescence, there is diversity within it. However, it is important to note that when 
difference is articulated and supported in the name of Islam in Singapore, it is almost 
always taken to be a potentially destabilising force. 
 
Religion, as conceptualised and realised by the state and subsequently internalised by the 
Malay Muslim public, is yoked to achieving progress. In the past, it was almost 
exclusively tied to achieving socio-economic progress. Of late, it has been expanded to 
include religious development as well. Thus, the emphasis now is on the imparting and 
inculcation of an expansive and an inclusive model of Islam which is reflective and 
supportive of the diversity present in Singapore. This necessarily calls for a more public 
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presentation of Islam. Its rough edges have to be smoothed and reshaped to fit this new 
mould. Against this backdrop, we are then able to appreciate why same-sex sexuality is 
almost always discussed in ethico-religious terms. However, oddly enough, there has 
been no public push towards reforming gay Muslims in Singapore. This stands in contrast 
to the more blistering and frank statements that have been launched by the anti-gay 
Christian camp in Singapore which I have outlined earlier in Chapter Two.  
  
5.3 Understanding gay spaces in Malay Muslim Society 
There are two reasons for the above. First gay Malay Muslims and its wider public here 
generally understand homosexuality to be almost exclusively a religious and personal 
matter. This is tied very much to how Islam is understood and practised here. A spirited 
and public discussion and condemnation of homosexuality would do precious little for 
both groups seeing as how the final arbitration lies not within the mortal realm. The 
uncompromisingly one dimensional picture of ethnicity and religion of Malay Muslims in 
the public sphere allows for very little incorporation of the multi-textured private (as 
homosexuality is synonymous with the chaotic subversion of natural order and religious 
propriety) into this public picture of genteel order.  This reveals much about the public 
positioning and regurgitation of Islam in Singapore where the contentious and 
controversial has been systematically weeded out of the public eye.  
 
This then segues into the second reason why there is a no rush to denounce 
homosexuality by Malay Muslims. With the announcement by the Prime Minister that it 
welcomes gays in the civil service and that the phenomenon is a natural one, Malay 
Muslims have found themselves at odds with the moral and official position of the state. 
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The state is an avowedly secular one and shies away theological considerations in its 
policy statements (although statements are still laden with moralistic overtones). The 
carefully calibrated response by MUIS highlights the discomfort. Having come under 
intense scrutiny by the community and the state over the tudung controversy and Jemaah-
Islamiah incidents, it is careful to not present itself as anything other than a moderate and 
rational minority. 
 
There is no doubting that the Malay Muslim public believes that homosexuality remains 
an aberration. There will not be a refashioning of perceptions, ala Al-Fatiha, towards 
same-sex sexuality here. An idea of an activist Islam is somewhat of an anathema for 
Muslims here because activist Islam could be regarded as dangerously political given 
the world climate at the moment. In view of this rather placid framework of non-action of 
Islam, the model of activism and change that Al-Fatiha is proposing would find little 
relevance and support from even the gay Muslims themselves. That the private is not 
political and will not be made public is the mantra of my respondents. It would seem an 
anomaly to be agitating for change and reform, in view of the space and anonymity 
presently enjoyed by my respondents. My respondents whose parents remain in the dark 
over their sexuality, naturally have a vested interest in preserving this silence. 
 
Its like, if people found out about this and it spreads outside, you know 
how malu (mortifyingly embarrassing) it is. So its like, [they said], you 
dont, whatever you do, bring shame to this family. [Aisyah] 
 
On a higher level, my respondents also believe that Malay Muslims are not prepared to 
discuss the issue openly and would rather it not be dredged up at all. My respondents 
 163 
believe homosexuality and Islam can never be talked about without malice or prejudice 
here.  
If, you know, I am sure that this issue would be dealt with, with an open 
mind, then, yes please, by all means, get it out in the open. But I think the 
community is not ready to be open-minded. If I am sure the issue would 
be treated fairly and openly, oh, no, but, the very nature of Islam is that 
its already wrong. So we cannot expect people to be open minded about 
it. You cant. How? You cant be open-minded when its stated clearly 
that its wrong? How else can you twist and turn it and try to come up 
with, and be accepting of it. So thats why, Malay and Islam, its 
intertwined. Malay and Islam are so intertwined so by that very nature, 
its quite hard for it to be an open discussion that would make both parties 
happy. So in that case, its better not to talk about it lah. [Hasyim] 
 
This explains the pointed and repeated remarks of some of my respondents that there are 
far more pressing issues in the community. Redirecting attention towards common social 
problems is an effective way to ensure that they fly low on the publicity radar. It is an 
arrangement desired by both parties. In view of the rather static conception of sin and 
sexuality and Islam in general, a fledgling group like As-Salam will, therefore, find it 
difficult to stimulate debate on the issue and simultaneously change the hearts and minds 
of the public and gay Malay Muslims. 
 
5.4 A retrospective look 
I have tried to piece together the attitudes of Malay Muslims towards same-sex sexuality 
and the analysis may be less than satisfying due to the lack of socio-historical data on 
Malay societys perceptions of and reaction to (alternative) sexuality. Thus, attitudes 
could have undergone a seismic shift (and indeed they have, going by the earlier 
observations of Jaspan and Raybeck in Chapter Two) but I was not able to plot more 
concretely these changes and locate more accurately what had contributed to these 
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shifting moral plates. Had that been done more completely, I would have been able to 
present more holistically the situation of the gay Malay Muslims here. Lack of 
endangerment to the anonymous spaces of the gay Malay Muslims could also have 
been replicated for other modes of alternative sexuality. This could have shown up 
more forcefully the attitudes that Malay Muslims have in publicly debating matters 
perceived to be too delicate for public consumption.  
 
Related to the above point of an unsatisfying historical sketch, I am aware of the limited 
sample size of my respondents. A pool of 14 respondents would hardly be sufficient to 
make any binding and long-standing extrapolations for all gay Malay Muslims here. 
However, they were well-suited to the aims of the study as they were sufficiently exposed 
to the workings and potential of gay civil activism to be able to respond and evaluate the 
impact it could have. The fact that all of them soundly rejected the Al-Fatiha model of 
action highlights the different values and action positions they occupy as Malay Muslims 
vis-à-vis as Singaporeans in larger secular society. It is this duality which I wished to 
highlight as it shows up the conundrum of being Malay and Muslim in Singapore. 
 
Another perceived deficiency would be the socio-economic characteristics of my 
respondents. They are tertiary educated, not deprived nor isolationist. They are 
effectively bilingual, plugged into what is happening in society and most importantly are 
comfortable with themselves and, to a limited degree, with heterosexual Singapore. Thus, 
they have very little reason to feel displaced or threatened and accordingly would feel 
little impetus to agitate for change. Thus, some may question the veracity of data and the 
extrapolations I have made over the representation of Islam and the role of the state.  In a 
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way, the very fact that they are satisfactorily settled would naturally mean they would 
soundly reject being any model of gay activism. And I have shown that their sense of 
calm and ease partly emanates from within their own familiar spaces of friends and 
families. Would the situation then be remarkably different for those who are estranged 
from themselves and society and economically less affluent? It could possibly be so. It 
would be worthwhile to study the other approximations of identity that a gay man or 
woman in Singapore may have, which could very well be different given his or her socio-
economic station. Similarly, for lower middle class gay Malay Muslims, who are 
economically and socially estranged, the very premise of collective action, which is an 
anathema to their more settled and affluent brethren could well be a godsend, seeing as to 
how it could open up opportunities and avenues for acceptance and change.  
 
Also, while I have argued that a co-relation exists between the macro-level moulding and 
reproduction of Islam by the state and the relative anonymity enjoyed by gay Malay 
Muslims, one must not negate the powerful influence that Islam wields on its believers. I 
have shown that attempts to dislodge Islam from its theological bedrock of being 
resolutely against homosexuality are unequivocally rejected and decried by my 
respondents. This has less to do with macro level state machinations or manipulations but 
instead represents a very fundamental aspect of Islam which has been so faithfully 
observed by my respondents. Due to the divinity of the word of God and its infallibility, 
there remains in Islam no necessity to alter the word which had been given. While 
homosexuality has been openly noted to be a natural state of being by the state, the 
harbinger of sin remains firmly etched in the minds of my respondents and Malay 
Muslims. The immutability of the Quran and the divine pronouncement is beyond 
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reproach.  Here, we have to understand Islam as being understood theologically and 
emotively appreciated by my respondents. This remains a fundamental tenet of Islam, 
over which the (secular) state wields little or has no influence.  
 
5.5 Future paths for exploration  
Future explorations into the theme of same-sex sexuality in Islam in Singapore could be 
explored in many ways. A deeper cultural treatise on how sexuality is understood and 
performed by Malay Muslims would shed much-needed light on the treatment of others 
who flagrantly flout such sexual and religious norms. Thus, a study into the lives of 
transgender Muslims in Singapore would reveal closer insights as to why, despite their 
very public existence, the publicity accorded to them in the community remains almost 
nil. This is quite unlike in Malaysia where the Pink Triangle has actively campaigned for 
the rights of the transgender sex workers whose lives have been immortalised in film 
made in 2000, Bukak Api. 89 Given that Islam actually allows for sex change operations 
if the individual concerned is a hermaphrodite, it would be worth exploring whether their 
interpretations and value positions towards Islam and those of the Malay Muslim public 
will be radically different, given this explicit policy of allowance. This is an area that is 
worth questioning and examining for it could show how differently Islam is 
experientially practiced if at all among another group of sexual alternates. 
 
As mentioned earlier in the introductory chapter, there is a clear lack of ethnographic 
material of alternative sexuality in the Southeast Asian region. While the historical lack 
                                                
89 The film was made with the support of the Malaysian AIDS Council to highlight and promote the 
message of AIDS awareness among the transgender sex workers. Bukak Api is an euphemism for having 
sex with a client. 
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may seem to be an almost foregone conclusion and little could be done to salvage the 
situation, the time is ripe for fresh exploration and documentation. Southeast Asia is host 
to the country with the most number of Muslims in the world. A composite sketch of how 
alternative sexualities are understood and reproduced across the vast and varied terrain of 
Southeast Asian Muslim societies would provide more pathways of possible exploration 
into the study. So, while gay Malay Muslim Singaporeans seem reluctant to rework and 
publicly agitate for legitimacy within Islam and within the community by remoulding 
Islam, such a situation may not hold true in other Muslim societies in this region. 
 
Dede Oetomo, an active and well-known gay activist in Indonesia, points to a rather 
different presence of homosexuality in Indonesia. In Indonesia, he says, there has been a 
long tradition of homosexuality which has been recognised, accepted and 
institutionalised (Oetomo 1996). The varied sexual terrain in Indonesia is so much more 
apparent with gay Indonesians occupying the same bandwidth of visibility and even 
grudging acceptance alongside the more established presence of transgendered males 
known as banci and waria. It is more than just a perfunctory nod to Indonesia 
housing the largest numbers of Muslims that Al-Fatiha has sought to hold its first ever 
conference in Southeast Asia there, but it is also a silent testament to the sexual diversity 
present within it. Indonesia plays host to Gay Nusantara, the largest gay and lesbian 
organisation in Southeast Asia which has established chapters in over 11 cities. (Oetomo 
in Offord & Cantrell 2001:242). However, it is not a civil activist group per se, agitating 
for rights or legitimacy within larger society. Its role is akin to Action for AIDS here and 
it is an active advocate for AIDS prevention and awareness. However, unlike AFA, 
which resolutely steers away from any gay-affirming strategies, Gay Nusantara seeks to 
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support and recognise traditional forms of homosexuality as well as to embrace the 
global gay culture (ibid:242). Thus, a further way ahead would be to examine the 
different manners and patterns of activism found in Muslim societies within the Southeast 
Asian region to see how varied reproductions of Islam and same-sex sexuality could be 
given these intersections between indigenous culture, state and society. 
 
Another possible field for exploration would be to examine if the current wave of 
progressive Islam, which has almost become a phrasal mainstay in contemporary 
discourse on Islam and Muslims in Singapore, could be mined and re-oriented to support 
a public and spirited re-examination of same-sex sexuality and Islam here. Hence, time-
honoured passages in the Quran and the Hadiths which deal with same-sex sexuality and 
its proscriptions for punishment should come under greater scrutiny and debate. Ismail, 
the founder of As-Salam, calls hadiths historical constructions and feels that more 
needs to be done to help unearth the socio-political contexts framing its utterances and 
subsequent codification. Kugle (2003:207) has argued for a thematic analysis on the 
Story of Lot because the Quran is not a chronological account of a distinct people or 
tribe[but] that central themes radiate out in patterns from a central point (ibid:207). 
Kugle highlights the disconnect which exists between a God whose basic message is that 
whoever does an atoms weight of good will see the results and whoever does an atoms 
weight of evil will see the results and the wretched exercise which saw the annihilation 
of women and children on account of anal intercourse (ibid:207). In a blistering 
commentary on the single-mindedness and individual proclivity that is almost always at 
the seat of numerous Hadith interpretations, Kugle seeks to emphasise that the Quran has 
always positively assessed diversity in creation and throughout societies and that Islam is 
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a religion which has been premised on tolerance and acceptance (ibid:195). Ever since 
the watershed 9/11 event in the United States, scores of Muslim leaders and Muslims the 
world over have reiterated that Islam is a religion which is humane, fair and just. The 
case for the legitimation of extremism in Islam could mirror the ongoing oppression of 
gay Muslims where simplistic scriptural readings have unfortunately being taken to be 
the definitive index of truth. Given that Singapore, more specifically MUIS, has taken the 
lead to share its model and inroads in the development of a progressive Muslim 
community with other overseas Muslim communities and countries, one could examine 
and discuss if the present time could indeed prove conducive for a local reworking in the 
conventional theory surrounding same-sex sexuality in Islam.90 It will therefore be a 
larger study on the totality of meaning and experience of progressive Islam in 
Singapore and the responsiveness and awareness that Malay Muslims in Singapore have 
towards this much vaunted progressive Islam. It will therefore reveal if this 
progressiveness, which has been lobbied with great zeal in Singapore, is little more than 
an extensive exercise in public relations or that it is truly indicative of a more engaging, 
inclusive and balanced look towards knowledge and truth in Islam. 
 
I have sought to faithfully reproduce the sites and strategies of gay Malay Muslims in 
Singapore. Their situation may seem like an anachronism to some more progressive 
gay activists who may decry their passive (non) action despite being denied the right to 
exist legitimately in any public realm. However, there is a distinct difference towards 
secular strategies for reclamation and resistance and one within a religious-laced 
                                                
90 See, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei aim to show religion's progressive side, Straits Times, 
10 December 2004 
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framework. The latter sees no room for human intervention and for moral/theological 
gerrymandering while the former has found (some) acceptance for its necessity and 
desirability amongst my respondents. In Singapore, where the normative boundaries of 
being Malay and Muslim have been shaped by the state, my respondents are spared the 
responsibility of being held publicly accountable for their choices. The Malay Muslim 
public understands this and by not probing and prodding gay Malay Muslims into coming 
forward, they have also preserved their own sensibilities from being assailed further. It is 
a symbiosis which, ironically enough, stems from very different spheres of existence but 
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The Lion In Winter  
After years of prosperity, Singapore's economic success formula is 
failingand citizens of the "nanny state" are being told it's time to 
leave the comfort zone  
BY SIMON ELEGANT SINGAPORE  
Posted June 30, 2003 
Simon Toh seems to have it all. Hes sitting at the dining table in a spacious two-
story house patiently helping his six-year-old, Samantha, with her spelling 
homework. His wife, Dilcy, whose barely swollen belly and slight glow are the 
only signs she is expecting their third child in a few months, sits watching a soap 
opera on a huge rear-projection TV. Their youngest, Stephanie, scampers around 
the living room while an Indonesian maid unobtrusively serves cold drinks and 
clears dishes. From the neat garden outsidea rarity in crowded Singapore
comes the soothing sound of a waterfall.  
But despite his prosperous and settled appearance, this 39-year-old management 
consultant is being buffeted by forces far beyond his control. Toh, whose last 
steady job was with one of the world's largest consulting firms, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, hasn't worked in nearly a year. Squeezed for cash, he 
was forced to sell his apartment and move his family in with his in-laws. He says 
he has sent out hundreds of résumés and had scores of job interviews, but even 
though he is ready to try anything, he is considered either too qualified or not 
qualified enough. Solid jobs with big-name firms such as 
PricewaterhouseCoopersor Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, another huge 
multinational Toh once worked forhave dwindled in Singapore, and Toh 
worries they are gone for good. "I'm not pessimistic, just realistic," he says. "We 
just might not have the resources, either personal or national, to go forward." 
 
To the casual visitor flying into Singapore, such gloom seems absurd. The 
wealthy city-state still thrums with technocratic efficiency. But beneath the gloss 
of its modern skyline, an unprecedented economic downturn has produced the 
worst identity crisis since the traumatic 1960s, when the island gained 
independence from Britain. The body blow the economy took from SARS
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong recently warned of a possible recession in 
2003has confirmed Singaporeans' worst fears about their future. Accustomed 
to defining themselves by their country's extraordinary commercial successes 
  
over the past four decades, they now confront the possibility that hard work and 
talent may not be enough, that history and geography can rob a nation of its 
wealth as fast as it was earned. "It sometimes seems as though Singapore's best 
days are over," one Singaporean accountant in his late 20s says. "Now we have to 
run as hard as we can just to stay in the same place."  
The country's famously farsighted but heavy-handed leadership is all too aware of 
the challenges the nation faces in struggling to invent a new economic formula. 
"If you can't evolve, big as you are or prosperous as you may be, you die like the 
dinosaurs," Prime Minister Goh tells TIME. "We have got to sound a warning, to 
get Singaporeans to be aware of what's going on around them, and then to change 
and adapt." Of course, other Asian economies face tough challenges, too. The war 
in Iraq and SARS have weakened key sectors, such as tourism and retail. And 
economies from Japan to Malaysia are under competitive pressure from China, 
the world's rising manufacturing superpower.  
But many Singaporeans believe their troubles go beyond transient business-cycle 
fluctuations and threaten the very foundation on which this "artificial nation," as 
one senior Singaporean politician puts it, was built. Once consistently among the 
world's fastest-growing economies, Singapore has stumbled in and out of 
recession since the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Despite having kept its 
financial house in orderfree of corruption and boasting huge trade surpluses, 
vast foreign-exchange reserves (some $80 billion at last count) and minimal 
public or private debtSingapore has been sideswiped by the economic 
transgressions of neighbors such as Indonesia, a major trading partner. Then, two 
years ago, just as the country finally appeared to be recovering, the technology 
bubble burst, causing a precipitous drop in the market for Singapore's main 
product, electronics. This catastrophe was swiftly followed by another: roiling 
uncertainty caused by the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.  
During Singapore's years as an Asian Tiger, its unemployment rate never much 
exceeded 2%meaning that essentially any able-bodied worker among the 
island's 4 million residents could find work. But joblessness hit a record 4.4% last 
year and is expected to rise furtherpossibly hitting 6% this yearas the 
multinationals that account for about three-quarters of the city's manufacturing 
output and 90% of manufactured exports look for cheaper sites, such as Malaysia 
and China, for their factories. Former Singapore stalwarts, including Compaq, 
Motorola and National Semiconductor, shuttered their plants in recent years, 
leaving the country's manufacturing sector with a net loss from 2001 to 2002 of 
some 12,000 jobs. Economists say this trend will accelerate. On June 19, U.S. 
electronics conglomerate Honeywell announced that it was shifting its Asian 
headquarters from Singapore to Shanghai, a move the usually cautious Straits 
Times characterized as a sign of things to come.  
Could the wealth accumulated in four decades of hard work and ruthlessly 
efficient planningthe city boasts an annual per-capita gross domestic product of 
$21,230, one of the world's highestdisappear at the same astonishing pace at 
  
which it was accumulated? Prime Minister Goh and other leaders are adamant 
that Singapore can avoid that fate. "We can't be hanging on to the manufacturing 
sector [if] the semiskilled jobs can be done better in China and elsewhere," Goh 
says. "So we have got to move up the value chain into higher-skilled jobs." Goh 
and his colleagues say the city-state can be remade from the top down by steering 
the economy away from its dependence on multinationals and into niche areas 
that the country is uniquely suited to exploit: financial services like banking and 
insurance, for example, or specialized and high-tech areas like medical care and 
biotechnology. The trick will be to foster creativity, entrepreneurship and the 
ability to take risks in a business culture long accustomed to following orders.  
In characteristic fashion, the Singapore government sought to tackle its problem 
by forming two high-level committees, one to look at the needed economic-
policy changes and the other to look at the thornier cultural changes. The cultural 
committee will publish its formal recommendations later this year, but its 
chairman has already indicated that bold initiatives aren't in the cards. The 
economic committee, headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong, reported its recommendations on Feb. 6. It eschewed sweeping 
changes, instead proposing tax restructuring, wage reform and external-trade 
expansion.  
The lack of major policy recommendations is indicative of what might be called 
the Singapore dilemma: the efficient central planning that made the island such a 
success has become a millstone. To skeptics, it just doesn't seem possible that a 
government that succeeded by dictating its citizens' every move, right down to 
whom they should marry and how many kids they should have, can now foster a 
freewheeling atmosphere. "There are many people like me in Singapore," says 
Toh, the unemployed management consultant. "We grew up in the era when the 
government guided us in everything, told us what kind of jobs to train for. The 
people of my generation were made to fit the industry the country needed, 
working for the big foreign corporations. Now, suddenly, we're all supposed to be 
entrepreneurs. How can we change our personalities overnight? If they drop us, 
we will fall." That sense of hopelessness has convinced thousands of 
Singaporeans, including many of the country's intellectual élite, to head for 
greener pastures. Emigration rates to favored destinationsAustralia, for 
exampledoubled in 2002, and a September 2002 survey by ACNielsen found 
that one-fifth of the country's population was seriously contemplating permanent 
departure. "At the end of the day," says Nicholas Woo, a lawyer now working as 
a partner in one of London's best-known firms, "Singapore is too small. I cannot 
think of a single country the same size with the same ambitions that has 
succeeded in achieving them." Woo, one of the many emigrants tagged "quitters" 
by Prime Minister Goh, has given up his Singaporean citizenship and now carries 
a British passport; he has married an Englishwoman and lives in a converted mill 
outside London with his two young children.  
Given the island's loss of high-paying jobs in recent years, it is easy to see why 
some of the country's best-educated citizens are bolting. One way to plug the 
  
growing job gap is to lessen dependence on multinationals and government-
controlled corporations by getting more Singaporeans to start their own 
businesses. But as even Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, 
acknowledges, the country's entrepreneurial record is dismal. The city has 
produced just one world-class entrepreneur: Sim Wong Hoo, founder of Creative 
Technology, the company that almost single-handedly invented the PC sound 
card. Singapore is home to other enterprising business ventures, of course, but 
most are small and contribute relatively little to the economy. In Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, in contrast, small and medium-sized enterprises generate three-
quarters or more of GDP. In Singapore, the figure is about one-fifth.  
"The government has created an environment for the individual to be in a comfort 
zone that doesn't give him the appetite to take risks of any sort," says Alvin Phua, 
chief executive of Byte Power, an Australian information-technology company 
that reported $16 million in profits last year. Phua's parents emigrated to Australia 
when he was 12 in part because they didn't want their three sons to suffer the 
stifling pressure Singapore's schools pile onto their students. Phua, now 30, 
believes his success as an entrepreneur would not have been possible had he 
stayed in Singapore. "The era we are moving into is extremely competitive in 
nature, and the government can be protective for only so long."  
Aware of the need for greater innovation, Singapore's leaders have made some 
gestures to encourage a can-do spirit. Government-backed loans have been made 
more available to start-ups, for example, and a Minister for Entrepreneurship has 
been named. But fundamental reformssuch as selling off parts of the 
government's stable of companies, which dominate every aspect of the private 
sector, from telecommunications to bankinghave been consigned to the back 
burner. Singapore's "nanny-state" technocrats recognize that imposing a Silicon 
Valley-like mind-set on the population through social engineering won't be easy. 
"We cannot create entrepreneurs," says Lee, Singapore's founding father. "We 
can only facilitate their emergence."  
But when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. For 
example, Lee himself has suggested stimulating Singaporeans to be more 
independent by having the government encourage "little Bohemias," 
neighborhoods where individuals with alternative views and lifestyles gather, 
cross-pollinate and eventually bring forth a brood of risk takers. The city already 
has one neighborhood with what passes for a raffish reputation: the former British 
army officers' living quarters at Portsdown Road, a favorite haunt of artists, 
musicians and other avant-garde types. It is a sprawling estate of vintage-1950s 
two-story walk-ups shaded by trees and set among grassy knolls. The area boasts 
one fashionably shabby meeting place, the ColBar (short for Colonial Bar), which 
serves English beer and warmed-over meat pies under a corrugated-iron roof and 
acts as an unofficial meeting vessel for the community. But the ColBar, along 
with a large chunk of Portsdown Road, is to be bulldozed in a few months to 
make way for a highway that is part of an ambitious government project tagged 
with the invented-in-a-cubicle moniker of Fusionopolis. There, according to a 
  
local news report, "arts, business and technology will hopefully become 
bedfellows, and researchers may be able to rub shoulders with moviemakers to 
create, say, better digital films or cybergames." If there are going to be little 
Bohemias, it seems they will be government built and supervised.  
It's not that the government is opposed to agents of organic change, as 
represented by the ColBar. In fact, authorities are trying to diversify the island's 
gene pool so that spontaneous change can occur. Once notoriously picky about 
whom it allowed into the country to live and work, Singapore has opened the 
floodgates in recent years through its "foreign-talent" program. Some 70,000 
foreign professionals now reside in the city-state, and foreign-born residents 
make up one-quarter to one-third of the population, a demographic unmatched 
anywhere except a few rich Gulf emirates.  
Singapore will do "whatever it takes" to attract talent, says Vivian Balakrishnan, 
the government official in charge of the Remaking Singapore Committee. As part 
of that effort, repressive government policies previously enforced in the name of 
social stability are being relaxed. The city now boasts seven saunas catering 
almost exclusively to gay clients, for example, something unthinkable even a few 
years ago. There are a sprinkling of gay bars, and many dance clubs set aside one 
night each week for gay customers. Prime Minister Goh says his government 
now allows gay employees into its ranks, even in sensitive positions. The 
change in policy, inspired at least in part by the desire not to exclude 
talented foreigners who are gay, is being implemented without fanfare, Goh 
says, to avoid raising the hackles of more-conservative Singaporeans. "So let 
it evolve, and in time the population will understand that some people are 
born that way," Goh says. "We are born this way and they are born that 
way, but they are like you and me."  
Foreigners, gay or straight, will be critical to carving out the niches in which the 
government hopes Singapore's new economy will thrive. In biotechnology, for 
example, the republic successfully lured Dr. Alan Colman, of Dolly-the-cloned-
sheep fame, with $30 million or so in funding for his stem-cell research into a 
cure for diabetes. And Professor Yoshiaki Ito, a world-renowned cancer specialist 
from Kyoto University, moved his entire team of 10 research scientists to 
Singapore. He says a maneuver on this scale could not have been accomplished 
anywhere else in the world. Ito observes that although there is no direct pressure 
on his team to focus on commercial results, the atmosphere in Singapore's 
scientific and research circles is the most business oriented he has ever seen. "'We 
don't want a Nobel Prize; we want money,'" he says a senior Singapore official 
told him. "That message controls the whole academic atmosphere here." For the 
moment, the tight commercial focus seems to be producing results: biotech and 
pharmaceutical products contributed some $5.8 billion to the country's GDP last 
year, a 48% gain over 2001, and the government predicts the figure will surpass 
$8.6 billion by 2005.  
But even Singapore's deep-pocketed government can't afford to forever throw 
  
money at sectors it deems crucial. Nor can it afford a large population of the 
permanently unemployed. Economists point out that neither biotechwhich 
employs about 7,000 scientistsor other niche fields can come close to providing 
jobs for the tens of thousands of factory workers whose positions will probably 
disappear in coming years. Ultimately, the solution to Singapore's woes lies with 
individuals being willing to move out of their comfort zones and start taking 
risks, says Sudhanshu Sarronwala, chief executive of Internet-based music site 
Soundbuzz. "It doesn't really matter what the government does or doesn't do," 
says Sarronwala, who was born in India but runs Soundbuzz in Singapore. "The 
change has already begun, and it's going to happen a lot faster than anyone thinks. 
That's because you aren't talking about changing the mind-set of an existing 
population. You're talking about the influence of a flood of new people, with their 
talents and viewpoints making a completely new mixture." A former chief 
executive of MTV Asia, Sarronwala says his own company is a good example of 
what is coming: staffed by a mixture of native Singaporeans and immigrants from 
a dozen other countries, it has survived the Internet debacle and is now expanding 
throughout the region.  
It will be years before efforts such as the foreign-talent program can be deemed 
successes or failures. But there are early signs that sheer necessity is forcing 
change. Even Toh, a cautious company man, has taken a stab at entrepreneurship. 
He and two friends (one Singaporean and the other Australian) formed a 
consulting firm last year to teach the latest inventory-control techniques. After 
months of failing to find work in Singapore, their company finally landed a job
in Inner Mongolia. The project, which involved advising executives at a milk 
factory about how to streamline operations, collapsed after a few months, taking 
the budding consultancy with it. "It was hard," Toh says, "we lost almost all of 
what we had put into the company."  
But Toh says he would be willing to try again, probably with the help of more 
foreign talent. "You have to be flexible," he says. "We Singaporeans were always 
told we had to be perfect. Now sometimes we're learning it's okay to make 
mistakes, too, if you learn from them." Words to live by, if Toh and his 
hometown are to pull through their mid-life slumps.  
With reporting by Genevieve Wilkinson and Douglas Wong/Singapore  
 
 
 
